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SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 8, 1982

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CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing day:	
March 8, 1982	1
Statement of—	
Gouttierre, Thomas E., dean of the Center for Afghan Studies at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, Nebr	50
Khalilzad, Zalmay, Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, New York, N.Y	79
Klass, Rosanne, director of Freedom House's Afghan Information Center, New York, N.Y	71
Stoessel, Hon. Walter J., Deputy Secretary, accompanied by Ambassador Gerald B. Helman, Special Assistant, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs and Philip H. Stoddard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Current Analysis, Intelligence and Research Bureau, Department of State	2
Insertions for the record:	
ICRC interest in CW use in Afghanistan—submitted by the Department of State	13
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons—reprinted from the U.N. General Assembly, Nov. 20, 1981	14
Red army tales: Cold, lonely life in Afghanistan—reprinted from the Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1982	46
International support for Afghan refugee relief—submitted by the Department of State	47
UNHCR documentation of refugees in India—submitted by the Department of State	49
Prepared statement of Thomas E. Gouttierre	53
Prepared statement of Rosanne Klass	73
Prepared statement of Prof. Zalmay Khalilzad	82
Appendix:	
Amnesty International Report, 1981	133

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

MONDAY, MARCH 8, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Boschwitz, and Pell.

Senator BOSCHWITZ [presiding]. It has been a little more than 2 years since the Soviet Union airlifted thousands of troops into Afghanistan to launch what has become an increasingly brutal presence.

The Soviets have used helicopter gunships, tanks and, according to increasingly strong evidence, chemical warfare against villagers who only wanted to be left alone. There have been recent reports of heavy shelling and destruction of urban areas, such as Kandahar, the second largest city.

Dominance over Afghanistan may be an ancient Russian imperial dream, but for the Afghan people it has been a nightmare.

Today's hearings will provide a timely opportunity to obtain an up-to-date assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. The hearing is timely because on Wednesday, President Reagan is scheduled to hold a White House ceremony to sign into law Senate Joint Resolution 142, which declared March 21, the Afghan New Year, Afghanistan Day. The resolution passed the Senate on Wednesday by a vote of 96 to 0. The House also passed the measure and the European Parliament, where the idea originated, passed a similar resolution last December.

Thus, I hope the hearing will provide some additional information and insights into the situation and the plight of the Afghan people. It is important that they and the Russians be aware that the invasion has not been forgotten or forgiven.

Our first witness is Walter Stoessel, the Deputy Secretary of State, who will provide us with the administration's current assessment of the situation. I believe this is the first time you have been on the Hill since you have been appointed Deputy Secretary. Mr. Secretary, we congratuate you for that.

We will then hear from three outside witnesses, also students of the Afghan situation. They are Prof. Zalmay Khalilzad, Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University, Dr. Thomas Gouttierre, director of international studies and programs and director of the Center for Afghan Studies, University of Nebraska, and Rosanne Klass of Freedom House.

Mr. Gouttierre will present an overview of the situation. Professor Khalilzad, an American citizen born in Afghanistan, recently visited India and Pakistan, to look more closely at the situation on the scene. Mrs. Klass is director of Freedom House's Afghanistan Information Center and has been closely following human rights and other developments in that country.

After they present their testimony, I would like them to sit as a panel so that we can ask them questions at the same time.

I ask unanimous consent that a statement by Amnesty International be included in this record after the testimony of the witnesses.

Mr. Secretary, would you please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., DEPUTY SECRETARY, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR GERALD B. HELMAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, BUREAU OF NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS AND PHILIP H. STODDARD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CURRENT ANALYSIS, INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador STOESSEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is a great pleasure for me to appear before your committee today on the joint congressional resolution adopted unanimously by the Senate and by the House of Representatives designating March 21 as Afghanistan Day. I wish to congratulate you for the action you have taken to pay tribute to a valiant people struggling for their freedom against foreign aggressors. Our European allies who conceived of this initiative and other countries around the world will also be observing Afghanistan Day.

The President will sign the proclamation of Afghanistan Day this Wednesday at a White House ceremony. The same day the State Department will brief and host a reception for representatives of ethnic groups in the United States from Eastern Europe, South and Southeast Asia and the Caribbean on the commemoration. The President fully supports and endorses the purpose of Afghanistan Day, as do former Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon and former Secretaries of State Muskie, Vance, Kissinger, and Rusk.

The President has requested former Secretary of State William Rogers to coordinate private American observance of this date. Over the next several days Secretary Rogers will be outlining various nongovernmental activities which will be undertaken in our observances here. We hope that these activities by concerned private groups will help focus American public attention on what is happening in Afghanistan today.

The vernal equinox, March 21, has traditionally been celebrated as the beginning of the Afghan New Year. The worldwide observance of Afghanistan Day will signal to the Afghan people that they enjoy the solidarity of the free world. We believe that it is of the utmost importance that the international community also signal to the Soviet Union that the passage of time has not dimmed the concern of free men everywhere over Soviet aggression, nor diminished demands that the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from that country.

We must not forget the Afghan people's struggle. We must not allow the Soviets to believe that their aggression is accepted as a fait accompli.

December 27, 1979, was a watershed in post-World War II history. On that date, for the first time Soviet forces invaded an independent country which was not a member of the Warsaw Pact. This act was one of outright aggression, even more pronounced than recent Soviet actions in Poland. Today we estimate that as a result of Moscow's augmentation of its forces in Afghanistan since November, the Soviets may have as many as 100,000 troops in Afghanistan.

The saga of Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation is one of personal courage and heroism against great odds. The hardships and losses which the Afghan people have suffered in this unequal battle have been high. Thousands of innocent civilians have been killed or maimed as the Soviets and the puppet Afghan army have destroyed villages and crops, strewn antipersonnel mines over trails and inhabited areas, employed lethal chemical weapons and forcibly impressed young Afghans in the armed forces.

Just recently Soviet troops surrounded Afghanistan's second largest city, Kandahar, and subjected it to a savage artillery and air bombardment in which hundreds of innocent civilians lost their lives. After the bombardment, Soviet forces entered the city and engaged in wanton looting and killing among the civilian population.

Many of the city's buildings were seriously damaged. Two-thirds of its population fled. Soviet forces also moved against Afghanistan's fourth largest city, Herat, with similar ruthlessness, causing great suffering among its population.

I would like to refer to a particularly heinous aspect of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan. The use of chemical weapons in war is a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to which the U.S.S.R. is a party and the rules of customary law which apply to all nations. Analysis of all the information available leads us to conclude that attacks have been conducted with irritants, incapacitants, nerve agents, phosgene oxime, and perhaps micotoxins, mustard, lewisite, and toxic smoke.

Afghan military defectors have provided information on chemical weapons containing lethal nerve agents, where they were stockpiled, and where and when they have been used. This information generally corresponds with refugee reports and recorded military operations. As a result of chemical attacks, over 3,000 deaths attributed to 47 separate incidents between the summer of 1979 and the summer of 1981 have been reported.

Today, the Soviet Union maintains the fiction that the regime of Babrak Karmal is a legitimate government. However, it is the Soviets who not only make policy in Kabul, but who also make the day-to-day political, administrative, and military decisions of government. Moreover, it is commonly accepted that the Karmal regime would not last until nightfall without the presence of Soviet troops.

The Soviet suppression of Afghan political freedom is paralleled in all other aspects of life. For example, the Soviets are currently imposing their brand of judicial system and the Soviet model of education in Afghanistan. At Kabul University, medical school de-

grees are no longer granted and medical students are required to obtain their degrees in the Soviet Union.

Despite regime efforts to cloak itself in religious piety, concern for the preservation of Islamic values remains at the heart of the anti-Communist resistance.

The most basic human rights, to life itself, is being violated daily by the Soviets and their puppets in Afghanistan. There are thousands of political prisoners. We have frequent reports of torture, of summary executions, and a long list of other violations which testify to the brutality of the Afghan regime and its Soviet masters.

About 3 million Afghan refugees have fled their homeland seeking freedom, principally in neighboring Pakistan. Almost one-fifth of the preinvasion population of Afghanistan, the largest group of refugees in the world, has so voted with its feet.

Although conditions in refugee camps are hard, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, aided by resources from many countries, including our own, has done a commendable job of assisting these innocent victims of Soviet aggression. The Government and people of Pakistan have also displayed a generosity and hospitality of the highest order in welcoming these refugees to their country.

The plight of the Afghan refugees is one which deserves our help. We will continue to support the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees with funds and with food assistance.

Mr. Chairman, it is the very concept of freedom which is on the line today in Afghanistan—the freedom of a people to determine its own destiny, to form a government of its own choosing, to practice freely its religion and to enjoy full sovereignty and independence. Historically, Afghanistan existed, sometimes uneasily, between the expanding Czarist Empire and British India. On three occasions when external powers sought to expand their influence in Kabul through military action, they were rebuffed as Afghans united to repel the foreign invader.

I recall this history to highlight a major characteristic of the Afghan people—their fierce determination to retain their freedom despite the misfortune of a geography which places them on the border of a powerful, expansive neighbor. To achieve this, various Afghan Governments adopted a policy of nonalinement. We accepted this policy, which also seemed to serve the interests of the Soviet Union, until it was destroyed overnight by a decision made in Moscow.

Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has been viewed with particular concern by other nonalined nations, who rightly see it as an example of superpower imperialism. This has been reflected in overwhelming votes in the U.N. General Assembly and other U.N. bodies and a wide variety of international organizations.

The Islamic countries have felt a special empathy for the fate of their Muslim brothers. On four separate occasions, the 43-member Islamic Conference has passed resolutions calling on the Soviets to withdraw their forces, for restoration of Afghanistan's neutrality and nonalinement, for the right of the Afghan people to form a government of their own choosing, and for condition which will permit the Afghan refugees to return to their homes.

In South Asia, the Government of India and other regional states have called on Moscow to withdraw its forces, whose presence in Afghanistan has changed the regional strategic equation.

The 99 members of the nonalined movement, meeting in plenary session in New Delhi 1 year ago, made a similar plea. Last fall, 116 countries, 54 more than the previous year, endorsed a U.N. General Assembly resolution along similar lines. This was the third such resolution overwhelmingly adopted by the U.N. General Assembly since the invasion.

Mr. Chairman, our Government earnestly wants to see a political solution to the Afghanistan conflict which brings the violations of human rights and the sufferings of the Afghan people to an end. We have consistently made it clear to the Soviets that we are ready for serious discussion on Afghanistan which might promote a Soviet withdrawal and a political settlement on terms acceptable to the Afghan people.

Let me outline some of the actions which we and others have taken in a search for a political solution. Secretary Haig made clear to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during their recent meeting in Geneva that the Soviet occupation remains a major impediment to prospects for improvement of United States-Soviet relations. Unfortunately, the Soviet side has not demonstrated a willingness to seriously discuss a peaceful settlement of the Afghan conflict.

We will continue to raise this matter in our high-level contacts and in our normal diplomatic dialog with Moscow. Our hope is that eventually the Soviet Union will remove its forces from Afghanistan, thereby reducing a major barrier to better East-West relations.

International efforts to achieve a Soviet withdrawal are also in progress. The U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has appointed a personal representative to continue discussions with the concerned regional nations about a political solution. We support this effort by the Secretary General, though we must point out that the source of the problem is not in Islamabad, Tehran, or Kabul, but in Moscow. It is there that a solution ultimately must be sought.

The European community last June proposed a two-stage international conference on the Afghan conflict. Regrettably, the Soviet union has chosen to reject this important initiative. We note that it remains on the table, a serious proposal which we will continue to urge the Soviets to pick up.

Mr. Chairman, in closing let me praise the courage and heroism of those Afghan freedom fighters who refuse to accept foreign domination of their homeland. Their courage, steadfastness of purpose and determination have earned the admiration of all who cherish freedom. Let us also remember the Afghan refugees in Pakistan who have been forced to flee Soviet oppression.

The joint resolution is a fitting tribute to these Afghan patriots from a people who also guard their freedom zealously. It forcefully reminds the Soviet Union that the Afghan conflict is at the very heart of the increase of international tension and that a negotiated settlement will serve the genuine security interests of all parties, including the Soviet Union.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my remarks. I will be very pleased to answer any questions that you may have.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you Mr. Secretary.

I wonder if we could proceed with the other witnesses. The chairman of the committee is supposed to be here in 10 or 15 minutes. Unless you have other pressing business, perhaps you could wait until the chairman comes. At that point—at the conclusion of the witness who is testifying at the moment the chairman arrives—we will direct some questions to you, so that we will not hold you up during the course of the entire morning. Will that be satisfactory?

Ambassador STOESSEL. That is acceptable to me, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you very much. We will ask our other three witnesses to come to the witness table. They are Ms. Rosanne Klass, Dr. Thomas Gouttierre, and Professor Khalilzad. [Pause.]

Dr. Gouttierre, we will begin our testimony with you. As you just heard me say, we are awaiting the arrival of Senator Percy. When he gets here we will ask you to give up the witness table to Secretary Stoessel and then we will ask questions of the Secretary, and then will return to this panel.

Dr. Gouttierre, would you please begin with your testimony.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor for me to be here, and particularly to address, when they arrive, individuals on this committee with whom I have worked in the past with regards to Afghanistan. I would like to single out Senators Percy, Pell, and Zorinsky in particular for their interest in the past concerning Afghanistan.

Events this week provide encouragement to those of us who have been actively concerned over the past several years about the situation in Afghanistan regarding the level of publicity we have long sought. This hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee combined with President Reagan's signing the authorization this Wednesday for the observance of Afghanistan Day on March 21 again brings an appropriate measure of attention to the tragic conditions of Afghanistan.

I have included a recent political cartoon in the text of these remarks because I feel it so effectively dramatizes the public relations problem suffered by the war resistance in Afghanistan. For those in the room who do not have the text of my remarks, this cartoon has two individuals. It is by Ben Wicks. One individual says to the other: "Poland this, Poland that. Whatever happened to Afghanistan?" The reference of Poland could be changed, of course, to El Salvador or other countries as issues evolve.

I see that the chairman has arrived, Senator. Would you like me to yield? [Pause.]

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Professor Gouttierre, since you have just begun your testimony, we will give you another chance to begin it again. If we could get back to Secretary Stoessel, we would appreciate it.

Mr. Secretary, if you and your assistants will come forward once again, we will proceed in normal order. [Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I want to express appreciation to Senator Boschwitz for beginning this hearing while my plane arrived.

I want to just take a minute, Secretary Stoessel, to welcome you today. I would indicate at the beginning that we very much appre-

ciate your appearanace here. As you know, I have felt very deeply about Afghanistan. My entire family has spent holidays there. Also, my brother-in-law was the Country Director for the Peace Corps and lived there for 3 years with his family. My daughter Gail lived and worked there for a year.

We have numbered among our friends in Washington Ambassador Malikyar and his entire family. We know the tragedy that one family can go through, the loss of life, injury, the feeling that you are now without a country. All of us in the United States have tried to make him feel that he does have a home, that he and his family are always welcome here.

We have paid great tribute to the Pakistanis and others and to the many Americans who have contributed so magnificently to the conditions of the Afghans in the camps in Pakistan. And we have had testimony from the State Department Director of Refugee Affairs and have talked with the U.N. Director of Refugees. All agreed that these are among the noblest and finest refugees. They are well disciplined. There is an esprit de corps and a sense of purpose.

I had conversations in the Kremlin with the heads of the Soviet Government and told them that in my judgment they did not know what they were getting into when they entered Afghanistan and brutalized the people in an attempt to suppress them. For centuries people have tried to oppress the Afghans and they have not been successful. The Soviets will not be successful either.

Again, Senator Boschwitz, I deeply appreciate your beginning this hearing. And Senator Pell, we are happy to have your presence here today.

Is there anything further, Mr. Secretary, that you wish to state at this time? I understand that you have given us your testimony.

Ambassador STOESSEL. No, Mr. Chairman. We await your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I would very much appreciate your updating us as to the U.S. role in reaction to the Afghan invasion. We certainly are well familiar with the fact that we boycotted the Olympics. The free world was united in this regard.

What other steps can the United States take? What steps are we contemplating taking? How successful do you think the steps have been so far in marshaling world opinion against this action by the Soviet Union?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the Olympic boycott. We can also recall several measures taken in the economic field vis-a-vis the Soviet Union to express displeasure. A number of the steps which we took at the time and which other governments in the free world also took are still in place. I think they have had some effect. They certainly underline the seriousness with which we regarded the Soviet action.

We have also continually been active in terms of stimulating public opinion through many speeches and resolutions in the Congress and statements by high officials, including the President, to continue to draw attention to the fact of Soviet aggression and the occupation of this country by Soviet troops, in an effort to make sure that this particular problem, which constitutes such a blatant

violation of the rules of international procedure, is not forgotten in the rush of all the other crises which we have in the world.

We have been active in working with others to promote a political solution of the problem, supporting the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations through his special representative. We also have supported the initiative of the European Community for a two-stage conference looking to a solution of the Afghan problem.

We have worked closely with and supported the nations of the Islamic Conference in their opposition to the occupation of Afghanistan. We have also cooperated with them in the United Nations, where the votes have consistently been overwhelming against Soviet occupation. Those votes have become increasingly larger as the time has gone by.

Also, in the refugee field we have cooperated very closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Since 1980 we have provided over $200 million in support of the refugee population in Pakistan. We have also moved to strengthen our relationship with Pakistan, particularly in view of the fact that Pakistan is now a frontline state facing Soviet troops right across the border.

The CHAIRMAN. In the travels that I did in Afghanistan when I was producing a sound-color movie there—by the way I offered to show that movie in the Kremlin when I discovered that none of the leaders had ever been in Afghanistan and were not really familiar with their neighbors—I developed a feeling for the characteristics of the people, the strength of their character, and the fierceness of their resolve.

Why, young boys only 9 or 8 years old could handle a sword very well. The art of self-defense is well developed there.

Are you surprised that the Afghans have stood up against their mighty neighbor, have refused to give in to the force of more than 85,000 highly trained and heavily equipped troops, and have been able to maintain a standoff? In fact, security on the roads today even after dark is not good. The Soviets do not venture forth on the roads at that time and limit their activities to the major towns. The countryside essentially is in the hands of the Afghans.

Are you surprised at all by this? To what do you attribute this remarkable show of strength by these determined people?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Mr. Chairman, no, I am not surprised by that, given the traditions of the Afghan people. Their tradition has been a very long one of resistance against foreign aggression and foreign domination. As you have pointed out, they are very good fighters. This is something they have lived with. That tradition goes back for many, many generations.

The Afghan people are tough. They are experienced. The terrain of Afghanistan is a very difficult one. It lends itself to the type of activity which we have seen the freedom fighters conducting. So I am not surprised that the Soviets have encountered really tremendous difficulties in trying to dominate and to occupy that whole country.

As you correctly point out, they can control, with some difficulty, the main cities and the roads in daylight. But the rest of the country is in the hands of the guerrillas. I believe that the Soviets

themselves were surprised by the extent of the resistance and the tenacity of the freedom fighters.

The CHAIRMAN. I would be happy to yield the balance of my time to Senator Boschwitz, who has another hearing that he must go to.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, the chairman has just referred to 85,000 troops being in Afghanistan, and that was the previously accepted number. I notice in your testimony you talk about 100,000 troops now being in Afghanistan. Is that an indication that the Russians are encountering more difficulties, that the Russians are expanding their troop concentrations there?

This is a new figure, Mr. Secretary. Would you comment on it?

Ambassador STOESSEL. This reflects recent information which we have received that there has been an augmentation of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. We feel, based on this information, that the full strength of Soviet forces in Afghanistan approximates 100,000 at this time. Now, there can be variations, of course, from time to time as they move units in and out. There could be a variation, say, of 10 percent. But the top figure for full strength would be 100,000.

I think it does reflect increasing difficulties which the Soviets have been having. We are aware that they have had a high level military delegation in Afghanistan in past months, led by the Deputy Defense Minister Sokolov, and it would appear that this augmentation is a result of the conclusions of that delegation.

We also see continuing evidence that the Soviets are digging in for the long haul. It is clear that this is not a temporary occupation. They are building their barracks, their infrastructure, in such a way as to indicate that they plan to stay there for quite a while.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I also have read about some evidence that the Afghan Army is in a rather poor state. I wonder if you would comment on that. Also, what about the morale of the Russians who are in Afghanistan?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Regarding the Afghan armed forces, it is quite true that they are in a bad state. We estimate that there were approximately 80,000 in the Afghan Army at the time of the Soviet invasion. This figure now has been reduced to about 30,000, and this is despite intensive efforts of the regime to encourage recruitment through higher pay and through lowering the recruitment age.

They still are unable to obtain sufficient manpower, and those they do obtain frequently defect as soon as they are able to do so. So that is very much of a problem area for the Soviet Union.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Then it is quite correct to say that the only authority that exists in Afghanistan is the authority of the Soviet troops?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Certainly that is true, that is the main element.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Have some of these Afghan Army defectors taken equipment with them?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Yes, sir, they have. Most of the equipment, according to the freedom fighters, which they use comes from defecting Afghan soldiers or is equipment obtained in ambush of Soviet forces.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. In your statement you expanded quite a bit on the knowledge that had been made public of the use of chemical weapons against the Afghanis.

You listed various types of irritants, incapacitants, nerve gases, phosgenes, mycotoxins, mustard, lewisite, and toxic smoke. I have not seen all of those listed before.

You also said that as a result of chemical attacks there were over 3,000 deaths attributed to 47 separate incidents between the summer of 1979 and the summer of 1981.

Perhaps this is the most heinous aspect of warfare, where innocent people and others are attacked in a manner in which they have no capacity to defend themselves. I wonder if you would expand on the essence of your testimony, which is already an expansion of our knowledge in this area.

Ambassador STOESSEL. This represents information which has been collected in recent months primarily from Afghan sources themselves. We have found that a number of Afghan officers who were trained in the Soviet Union in the use of chemical agents have defected and they have been able to provide us with very precise information about the types of agents employed, where they were employed, where they are stored, the methods used and so on.

We also are continuing to collect information from refugees in Pakistan who experienced chemical attacks. So we feel this is very reliable information about a very serious situation.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. There were 47 attacks, over 3,000 deaths. Those are very sizable attacks, Mr. Secretary. Each attack resulted in an average of 65 deaths. That means some of those attacks must have been very large attacks.

Do you have any more specific information with respect to any of them? That is the first part of my question.

Second, what are we doing to bring this specific information to the world's attention, perhaps through the United Nations or other places?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Senator, I do not at this time have any more specific information on those attacks. Perhaps Mr. Stoddard could add to that.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Would you please introduce your colleagues, Mr. Secretary.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Yes. Mr. Stoddard is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Current Analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department. On my right is Ambassador Gerald Helman, who is the coordinator for Afghanistan Day activities in the State Department.

Mr. STODDARD. On the figure of over 3,000 who were killed in the 47 attacks, we have not been that specific before, as you point out, Mr. Chairman. What we are saying, Mr. Chairman, is that we have looked at all of the evidence that has come in from eyewitnesses and Afghan defectors, all of the people whom Ambassador Stoessel mentioned, and we have looked at all of this material very carefully over an extended period.

We have used various accounts of the same attack from different sources to corroborate details. On the basis of that intensive investigation we came up with this figure. We think that the actual

total of persons killed by chemical warfare of one sort or another in Afghanistan is considerably higher than 3,000.

Now, the detailed analysis on which that figure is based in due course will be made available in great detail on an unclassified basis, so that everybody could see it.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So what you are also saying, then, is this: If you can bring the number down to 47 separate incidents and over 3,000 deaths, you are saying that you have a great deal of specific information.

Mr. STODDARD. That is correct.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. From a large number of sources.

Mr. STODDARD. Yes, sir.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So is it fair to say that you have been conservative in these estimates and in these numbers, and that indeed the truth may be that the numbers, as you indicated, may be far larger.

Mr. STODDARD. That is right, Senator.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That you simply have not been able to corroborate the larger statistics from many angles and many sources.

Mr. STODDARD. We have not been able to give that data the same kind of verification that we have the data that underlies the over 3,000 figure.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. If you were to include evidence that may not be quite as hard, how many deaths would you estimate have been caused by chemical warfare in Afghanistan?

Mr. STODDARD. I could not come up with a precise figure on that beyond the statement I made that it is quite a bit higher than that. Of course, we are continuing to work on the problem. It is a major effort.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. As the Secretary said, of the various acts of warfare there are few that are more heinous, few that are more cruel, few that would indicate a greater meanness on the part of the Soviets, a greater abject disregard for any of the most basic human rights that we have developed over the history of mankind.

Mr. STODDARD. Absolutely.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Have there been other than this instance and that which apparently occurred in Laos and Northern Vietnam, other incidents of the use of poisonous gases and chemicals since the 1925 agreement signed in Geneva?

Mr. STODDARD. Well, there were a number of allegations concerning the use of chemical agents in the Yemens, if you will remember, many years ago during the civil war.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Yes. But during the last 55 years these have been the first documented violations of the ban on chemical warfare that we are aware of.

Mr. STODDARD. Well, there are also violations of the Treaty on Bacteriological Weapons and Toxins of 1972, as well.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Senator, with regard to your question about what are we doing about this, of course we have been in touch with the United Nations and the committee investigating these charges on a continuing basis. We have not yet presented the United Nations with these detailed figures and we will be doing so in the very near future, as we do intend to follow this up.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Have we approached the Russians at all, Mr. Secretary, with the evidence that we have developed?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Yes; this has been raised at a number of levels with them.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. What has been their response?

Ambassador STOESSEL. They deny that they are engaged in this type of activity.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, my time is up. I regret that I have to go to another hearing. I will read the testimony of the other witnesses and will perhaps correspond with them about the whole Afghan situation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The hearing today provide an opportunity to focus public attention on the ongoing tragedy in Afghanistan. Deputy Secretary Stoessel and our distinguished panel of public witnesses will provide the committee with an update on events inside Afghanistan and on the efforts at the United Nations and elsewhere to bring about a Soviet withdrawal.

Public exposure can be a powerful weapon against the Soviet occupation. Every day in Afghanistan Soviet aircraft bring death and destruction to countless Afghani men, women, and children. Soviet search and destroy missions have burned crops, torched villages, massacred villagers in the so far unsuccessful effort to break the will of the Afghan people. We must do what we can to keep the news of Soviet brutality, as well as that of the heroic struggle of the Afghan people, before the public.

As cochairman of the Afghanistan Relief Committee I am particularly concerned about the plight of the 2.5 million Afghans who have been forced to seek refuge in Pakistan. Alleviating the suffering of these people—who constitute some 15 percent of the population of Afghanistan—must be a matter of the highest priority. Even more important, we must work to create the conditions of peace and freedom in Afghanistan so that they can return home.

I am delighted that these hearings are taking place, because they really focus attention on this problem. In this regard, would I not be correct in saying that it is the first use of Soviet troops outside their unhappy empire since World War II?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Yes; that is true, the first use outside of the Warsaw Pact.

Senator PELL. I do not think that the world is sufficiently aware of what a dreadful precedent this could set. That is why I think this hearing today is so useful.

I would like to direct a question if I could at Secretary Stoessel. Why, in your view, do the Soviets engage in such a foolish occupation? They had only to look at Vietnam to see what happens when the populace is against you. They already had a Communist prime minister. No other nation was threatening them there. What was their reason for doing this, in your view as an old Eastern European hand?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Senator, I think they were not happy with the incumbent Communist regime. They felt that in the country

itself there was an independent movement strongly supported by religious factors, which risked getting out of hand. And they finally decided that they should take military action, I believe, feeling that this could be done in relatively short order, that they could move in and probably clean it up in about 2 or 3 months.

And of course, that has proven to be quite erroneous. They are still there and are encountering increasing difficulties. I think it was probably a miscalculation on their part.

Senator PELL. Do you see them ever committing enough troops to achieve a true military solution? That would involve, I would think, on the 10 to 1 ratio we always say—only usually, the guerrillas are Communists and in this case the anti-Communists are the guerrillas—it would take practically all their armed forces in that part of the world.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Well, I think that is true, and I think that it has been demonstrated that what they have now, even with the small augmentation which I mentioned, that they are not able to dominate the situation in a military sense. They do seem to be planning for the long haul and hoping to, through time, wear down the resistance and achieve a degree of popular support for the government which they are propping up.

I think it is very dubious that this will be achieved. Of course, there is also the factor which we should not neglect that by moving troops into Afghanistan, thereby getting the direct use of airfields there, they are that much closer to the lines of communication for oil shipments in the Persian Gulf. They are in a better position to threaten neighboring countries.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I guess my next question would more be intended for Ambassador Gerry Helman, who has done such a wonderful job for the United States at Geneva in the United Nations. What other countries support our views with regard to the Soviet use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan? Is the ICRC there? Have we taken this up at all with the ICRC and asked for their inspectors?

What support is there outside the United States for our view that they are using chemical warfare?

Ambassador HELMAN. Senator, I think most countries are looking to the United Nations group that is investigating these allegations of the use of chemical warfare and are awaiting the reports of that group and look to that group for its evaluations.

As far as the ICRC is concerned, it does have an important role. I do not know, at least at this point, the extent to which the ICRC has in fact involved itself in the allegations of the use of chemical agents.

Senator PELL. Would you submit for the record a statement as to what they are doing, if the ICRC is involved?

Ambassador HELMAN. Certainly.

[The material referred to follows:]

ICRC INTEREST IN CW USE IN AFGHANISTAN

[SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE]

The ICRC sees its function as entirely humanitarian, in particular to provision of medical relief to victims of armed conflict. In the past, when ICRC delegates have

directly witnessed CW use or have had access to victims shortly after CW attacks, it has taken vigorous action.

The organization does not, however, view itself as "an investigative" body, believing that such functions are better carried out by other organizations, including the U.N. It has indicated its willingness to cooperate with such bodies in the event that its representatives have direct access to CW attacks or to the victims of such attacks.

The ICRC has of course been consistently refused by the Babrak regime the right to maintain a presence in Afghanistan. It therefore has no first-hand knowledge of conditions inside that country.

Senator PELL. Also, the United Nations body that is investigating this matter right now, how is it set up, under a General Assembly resolution or a Security Council resolution?

Ambassador HELMAN. I believe it is established under a General Assembly resolution. That was established I believe in 1980, I believe about a year and a half ago.

Senator PELL. Well, that is even slower than normal for the United Nations to take a year and a half to ascertain if there is any truth in this.

Ambassador HELMAN. I believe it has conducted some investigations and discussion, and has come out with at least one preliminary report. Perhaps that should be made a matter of record, since I do not have all of the facts at my fingertips.

Senator PELL. The committee would be very interested if you could submit that preliminary report. It should not be only the United States who alleges that the Soviets are engaged in this activity, but we should have the confirmation and approbation of other nations as we level these charges.

[The material referred to follows:]

[United Nations General Assembly, November 20, 1981, Thirty-sixth Session, Agenda Item 42]

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. In its resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980, the Genral Assembly decided to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain facts pertaining to reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by the use of such weapons. It requested the Secretary-General to carry out such investigation with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts.

2. In pursuance or resolution 35/144 C, the Secretary-General appointed the members of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.[1] By a letter dated 19 November 1981 the Chairman of the Group of Experts transmitted to the Secretary-General the report which is hereby submitted to the General Assembly.

FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. By its resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980, the General Assembly decided to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to the reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by the use of such weapons. The Assembly, further, requested the Secretary-General to carry out such investigation, with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts in order to: (a) seek relevant information from all concerned Governments, international organizations and other sources necessary; (b) collect and examine evidence, including on-site with the consent of the countries concerned, to the extent relevant to the purposes of the investigation.

[1] For the names of the experts, see the letter of transmittal on page 15.

2. In pursuance to the resolution, a group of qualified experts was appointed after consultations with Member States. The Group held three sessions between April and November 1981.

3. The experts, in their personal capacities, have submitted to the Secretary-General a report containing their considered views on the subject-matter and conclusions on their findings with regard to reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons as stipulated by the General Assembly in resolution 35/144 C.

4. The Secretary-General wishes to thank the experts for their report which, in pursuance of paragraph 5 of resolution 35/144 C, he hereby submits to the General Assembly for its consideration. It should be noted that the observations and conclusions contained in the report are those of the experts. In this connexion, the Secretary-General would like to point out that in the complex field of disarmament matters, in many instances he is not in a position to pass judgment on all aspects of the work accomplished by experts.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

NOVEMBER 19, 1981.

Mr. KURT WALDHEIM,
Secretary-General of the United Nations,
New York.

SIR: I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons which was appointed by you in pursuance of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980.

The experts appointed by you were the following:

Major General Dr. Esmat A. Ezz, M.B., B.Ch., D.M., Ph.D.,
Head of Scientific Research Branch,
Egyptian Armed Forces,
Cairo, Egypt.
Dr. Edward E. Ambeva, M.D., F.R.C.S.,
Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon,
Coast Province General Hospital,
Mombasa, Kenya.
Lt. Col. Nestor C. Castillo, B.S., CH.E., M.B.A.,
Deputy Chief and Executive Officer,
Ordnance and Chemical Service,
Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Quezon City, Philippines.
Dr. Humberto Guerra, M.D., Ph.D., Dr. Med.,
Professor,
Instituto De Medicina Tropical Alexander von Humboldt,
Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia,
Lima, Perú.

The report was prepared between April and November 1981, during which period the Group held three sessions: from 20 to 24 April, from 13 to 28 July and from 20 October to 19 November 1981 in New York. During the latter period between 31 October and 10 November, the Group also undertook a visit to Thailand for the purpose of on-site collection and examination of evidence.

The members of the Group of Experts wish to express their appreciation for the assistance which they received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations. They wish, in particular, to convey their thanks to Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Centre for Disarmament, who served as Secretary of the Group, to Mr. Wlodzimierz Wieczorek, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Centre for Disarmament, and to Professor Herbert Marcovich of the Pasteur Institute, Paris, who served as consultant to the Secretariat.

I have been requested by the Group of Experts, as its Chairman, to submit to you on its behalf, its report which was unanimously approved.

(Signed) ESMAT A. EZZ,
Chairman of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980, the General Assembly called upon all States parties to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of War-

fare,[1] to reaffirm their determination strictly to observe all their obligations under the Protocol, and upon those States which had not yet done so to accede to the Protocol, and appealed to all States to comply with the principles and objectives of the Protocol. Further, the Assembly decided to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by the use of chemical weapons and requested the Secretary-General to carry out such investigation, *inter alia*, taking into account proposals advanced by the States on whose territories the use of chemical weapons had been reported, with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts who shall: (a) seek relevant information from all concerned Governments, international organizations and other sources necessary; (b) collect and examine evidence, including on-site with the consent of the countries concerned, to the extent relevant to the purposes of the investigation. Finally, the Assembly invited the Governments of States where chemical weapons were used to provide the Secretary-General with all relevant information they might have in their possession, called upon all States to co-operate in this investigation and to provide any relevant information they might have in their possession regarding such reports, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the matter to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

2. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General sent to all the Member States a note verbale dated 26 January 1981 requesting any information that the respective Governments might deem appropriate to provide in that connexion, to which communications were received from 24 Governments. Further communications were received from the Government of the United States of America on 14 September and 12 November 1981.

3. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organization (WHO) sent their comments in accordance with operative paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 35/144 C.

4. The Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, nominated by the Secretary-General, conducted its investigation during three sessions held between April and November 1981. The organization of work and the proceedings of the Group are summarized in section II of this report.

5. Section III describes briefly the background to the problem and the sources of information upon which the investigation was based.

6. Section IV contains general observations on the use of chemical weapons, and the question of definition and parameters of the investigation.

7. Section V sets forth an evaluation of written submissions.

8. Section VI deals with the question of mycotoxins which the Group examined, in some detail, in the course of its investigation, in connexion with the United States reports on the alleged use of such toxins as a chemical warfare agent.

9. Section VII contains information concerning the Group's visit to Thailand, which was undertaken with a view to collecting and examining evidence from victims and/or eye-witnesses of the alleged use of chemical weapons.

10. The conclusions arrived at by the Group appear in section VIII of the report.

11. The report also contains a number of annexes which are as follows: I. Questionnaire sent by the Group of Experts to the Governments of Canada and the United States of America; II. Substantive parts of the communications by the international organizations; III. Trichothecenes; IV. Questionnaire sent by the Group of Experts to the Government of the United States in connexion with its submission dated 14 September 1981; and V. Summary of the interviews conducted by the Group of Experts during its visit to Thailand.

II. Organization of Work and Records of Proceedings

12. The Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, established by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/144 C, held its first session from 20 to 24 April 1981 at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

13. The session was attended by Major General Dr. Esmat A. Ezz of Egypt and Dr. Edward E. Ambeva of Kenya as well as by the Consultant to the Group, Dr. Herbert Marcovich of the Pasteur Institute, Paris, France. The Group decided to defer the question of election of a Chairman until the second session, pending the completion of the Group.

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[1] League of Nations, "Treaty Series," vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65.

14. The Group considered its mandate as contained in operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution according to which the Secretary-General was requested to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain facts pertaining to the reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by the use of chemical weapons, and to carry out such investigation.

15. At its first session, the Group carried out a preliminary examination of the following material:[2]

(a) Replies received from Governments to the note verbale from the Secretary-General, dated 26 January 1981, pursuant to resolution 35/144 C.[3]

(b) Relevant documents of the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly.

16. The Group also took note of the existence of other General Assembly documents from previous years which might be of relevance to its work.

17. After the preliminary examination of the material, the Group felt that in order to ascertain the facts and with a view to reaching scientific conclusions, it was important that a questionnaire, as formulated by the experts, should be addressed to the Governments which had submitted substantive information in response to the note verbale of the Secretary-General, requesting them to furnish further details which might clarify areas of uncertainty concerning the reports where alleged use of chemical agents were mentioned.[4] Accordingly, at the request of the Group, the questionnaire was transmitted to Canada and the United States of America and the replies[5] received were available to the group at its second session.

18. Upon the completion of nominations by the Secretary-General, the Group of Experts held its second session from 13 to 28 July 1981. The Group elected Major General Dr. Esmat A. Ezz as its Chairman.

19. During its second session, the Group, after having once again taken note of its mandate as contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 35/144 C, undertook an examination of the new material on the alleged instances of the use of chemical weapons.[6]

20. Further, the Group noted that in pursuance of paragraph 5(a) of resolution 35/144 C, the Secretariat, in a communication dated 1 May 1981, had requested the following organizations to provide any information that they might deem appropriate; the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Health Organization. The Group studied the replies received from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Health Organization.[7]

21. In the course of its second session, the Group also considered questions related to the background to the problem of the alleged use of chemical weapons and took a decision on the parameters of its investigation in terms of the documentation on the basis of which the investigation should proceed.[8]

22. In addition, the Group of Experts discussed various issues related to the technical and medical aspects concerning the methods of its investigation, including the question of definitions and parameters of its investigation.

23. The third session of the Group was held from 20 October to 19 November 1981 in New York, with a concurrent visit to Thailand from 31 October to 10 November 1981. During this period the Group examined new submissions referred to in paragraphs 62, 63 and 73 below and adopted its report to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. The visit to Thailand was made by the Group pursuant to the acceptance from the Government of Thailand to visit the holding centres for refugees from Indochina in pursuance of paragraph 5(b) of Assembly resolution 35/144 C.

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[2] Regarding a detailed discussion of sources of information, see sect. III.

[3] Conference Room Papers No. 1 and 2 containing, *inter alia*, a compendium entitled "Reports of the Use of Chemical Weapons in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea", and its up-date enclosed with the communication of the United Stated Government, dated 27 March 1981, in reply to the note verbale of the Secretary-General dated 26 January 1981.

[4] For the contents of the questionnaire, see annex I.

[5] Conference Room Papers Nos. 2 and Add.1.

[6] Conference Room Paper No. 1., Adds, 3 and 4; Conference Room Paper No. 2 and Add. 1; and documents A/36/81, 104, 121, 157, 173, 207, 229, 232-S/14473, 254 and 312.

[7] Conference Room Paper No. 3. For the reply from UNHCR, see para. 50.

[8] See section III.

III. Background to the Problem of the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons and Sources of Information on the Subject

24. In the context of the United Nations, allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons have been made in the past from time to time, as reflected in the relevant documents of the General Assembly over the years. General Assembly resolution 35/144 C was, however, the first instance in which the Assembly decided to request the Secretary-General to carry out an investigation of reports concerning the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by the use of these weapons.

25. In the course of discussing its mandate, the Group considered the parameters of its investigation in terms of the documentation on the basis of which it would conduct its investigation.

26. The Group of Experts was cognizant of the relevant discussion during the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly concerning questions relating to a possible time frame within which reports of alleged use of chemical weapons would have to be investigated.

27. After an intensive exchange of views and elaborate consideration of the question of documentation to be addressed, the Group decided that, for practical reasons, it would be necessary to concentrate, in the first place, on the communications received from Governments by the Secretary-General, in pursuance of paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 35/144 C, in which the General Assembly invited the Governments of States where chemical weapons were used to provide the Secretary-General with all relevant information they might have in their possession, and called upon all States to co-operate in this investigation and to provide any relevant information they might have in their possession regarding such reports.

28. Communications were received from the following Member States: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Viet Nam.

29. Furthermore, the Group deemed it necessary to take account of the relevant documentation and official records of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly on the subject, as well as of the relevant documentation on this matter submitted in connection with the thirty-sixth session of the Assembly. The following documents were considered by the Group:

I. Complaints regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons submitted at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

(a) Letter dated 22 January 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/71);

(b) Letter dated 11 February 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/96-S/13790);

(c) Letter dated 11 April 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/173-S/13891);

(d) Letter dated 24 April 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/185-S/13906);

(e) Letter dated 12 May 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/226);

(f) Letter dated 10 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/288-S/13992);

(g) Note verbale dated 4 September 1980 from the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/430);

(h) Letter dated 17 September 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/462-S/14178).

II. Official records of discussion at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly on the subject under agenda item 34.

III. Complaints regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons submitted at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

(a) Letter dated 26 January 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/81);

(b) Letter dated 17 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/104);

(c) Letter dated 9 March 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/121);

(d) Letter dated 27 March 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/157);

(e) Letter dated 6 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/173);

(f) Letter dated 14 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/207);

(g) Letter dated 27 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/229);

(h) Letter dated 5 May 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/232-S/14473);

(i) Letter dated 14 May 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/254);

(j) Letter dated 8 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/312);

(k) Note verbale dated 14 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/509);

(l) Letter dated 22 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/549);

(m) Letter dated 30 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/566-S/14713);

(n) Letter dated 5 October 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting Inter-Parliamentary Conference resolutions (A/36/584);

(o) Letter dated 9 November 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/664);

(p) Letter dated 13 November 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/687);

(q) Letter dated 9 October 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/C.1/36/5);

(r) Letter dated 12 November 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/C.1/36/10);

30. In addition, the Group noted that in the preambular paragraphs of resolution 35/144 C the General Assembly had taken note of the statements of various international organizations concerning certain reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons. Also, in paragraph 5 of that resolution, the Assembly requested that relevant information on the subject be sought, *inter alia*, from international organizations. Accordingly, as noted in paragraph 20 above, the Secretariat, in communications dated 1 May 1981, requested the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Health Organization to provide any information that they might deem appropriate. Replies were received from the ICRC, UNHCR and WHO and were examined by the Group.[9]

31. The Group recognized that in carrying out its task it could explore other necessary sources of information as stipulated in paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 35/144 C.

32. After a thorough examination of the relevant documentation, the Group found that various statements containing allegations of the use of chemical weapons in recent wars and in military operations were related to a number of areas of the world, but that in a majority of instances the claims were not pursued in the communications submitted in reply to the note verbale of the Secretary-General.

33. With regard to complaints by Viet Nam, the Group took note of the letter dated 22 January 1980 from the Chargé d'Affairs a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/35/71), the

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[9] For the text of the substantive parts of the replies, see annex II.

annex to which contained a "Memorandum of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the U.S. criminal use of toxic chemicals in Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea". This stated, *inter alia:*

"In its war of aggression against the peoples of Viet Nam, Loas and Kampuchea, besides bombs and shells and war means of various kinds, the United States used systemically and on a large-scale toxic chemicals and gases to kill civilians and destroy the environment in the three Indochinese countries.

"The United States sprayed more than 100,000 tons of toxic chemicals on almost all provinces of South Viet Nam, where 13,000 km2 (43 percent) of land areas and 25,000 km2 (44 percent) of forests were targets for one to several sprayings.

"70 percent of coconut orchards, 60 percent of rubber plantations, 110,000 hectares of pine-woods along the coast and 150,000 hectares of mangrove forests were sprayed for defoliation, and amount of food enough to feed millions of people was destroyed as a result of this chemical warfare.

"There were 2,000,000 victims of toxic chemicals among whom 3,500 were dead.

". . .

"Of late, in close collaboration with China and its henchmen, the United States has circulated fabrications and slanderous allegations about what is called 'Viet Nam's use of toxic chemicals in Laos and Kampuchea'.

"In so doing, the United States, obviously, tries to mislead public opinion, cover up and blot out its genocidal crimes in the Indochinese peninsula and shirk its responsibility for the crimes it committed against the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, and its responsibility towards victims of chemical warfare who were U.S. servicemen and soldiers of U.S. allies engaged in the war of aggression against Viet Nam.

"While striving to stage this scene of 'Viet Nam's use of toxic chemicals', the United States deliberately conceals the war crimes against the Vietnamese people in February 1979 by Chinese troops including the use of toxic gas in some populated areas and the poisoning of drinking water sources in the areas they set foot in."

34. (a) Furthermore, the Group studied the reply of the Government of Viet Nam, dated 18 April 1981, to the note verbale by the Secretary-General dated 26 January 1981 the relevant part of which referred to the subject examined by the Group and stated the following:

"Of late, the United States has, in coordination with the Chinese ruling circles, slanderously charged Viet Nam of resorting to the so-called 'use of chemical weapons' in order to cover up the criminal U.S. chemical war waged against the Vietnamese people and the crime of genocide perpetrated by the Chinese ruling circles against the Kampuchean people through the hands of their henchmen, the Pol Pot clique of bourreaus.

"At the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, together with many other delegations, rejected this vicious political design and voted against resolution 35/144 C.

"The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, in co-operation with other countries, is making great efforts to correctly assess and gradually overcome the consequences of the use of U.S. chemical weapons caused to the people and the environment of Viet Nam. However the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam will not engage in any activities in the framework of the ill-intentioned resolution 35/144 C.

(b) The Group of Experts also took note of the reply by the Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic dated 31 August 1981 to the note verbale of the Secretary-General dated 26 January 1981 in pursuance of resolution 35/144 C, the relevant part of which stated *inter alia:*

"During the debate in the First Committee on questions of arms limitation and disarmament at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the delegation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic vigorously refuted and condemned the totally unfounded allegations brought against its country by the delegation of the United States on the subject of chemical weapons.

While continuing its efforts, together with all countries which value peace and security, towards the conclusion of an international treaty on the banning of chemical weapons, the Lao People's Democratic Republic reaffirms its unmoving opposition to resolution 35/144 C and categorically rejects the so-called 'Group of Experts' envisaged in that resolution."

(c) Under the circumstances, the Group felt unable to undertake any investigation of the allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons on the territory of Viet Nam and Laos.

IV. General Observations on Chemical Weapons and Parameters of the Investigation

35. In its endeavours to examine impartially the reported allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons, the Group of Experts had to compare the material submitted for its consideration with the accessible body of available up-to-date information on such chemical weapons. Presented below is the background information on this subject as discussed by the Group during its proceedings.

A. EXISTING PROHIBITIONS ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

36. From a military point of view, chemical warfare is highly effective, but it has been considered an uncivilized and immoral form of warfare, especially since its use in World War I. Attempts to outlaw chemical warfare were made in the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and at the Hague International Peace Conference of 1899, which condemned the use of asphyxiating gases. When casualties of gas attacks returned home after the First World War, their physical condition raised great concern and caused horror towards the use of chemical warfare agents. The Versailles Peace Treaty contained a section which outlawed the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids. As a result of various efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross and under the pressure of general public opinion, the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare [10] was concluded in 1925. This Protocol is considered by many governments as prohibiting the first use of chemical weapons, since a number of signatories of the Protocol reserved the right to retaliate in kind. Other States consider that only States parties to the Protocol are entitled to benefit from its restrictions. The Protocol does not prohibit the production of chemical weapons, nor does it include verification provisions.

B. COMBAT CHARACTERISTICS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

37. Chemical weapons possess the following combat characteristics:

(a) Large area coverage;

(b) Penetration into shelters, bunkers, buildings, personnel carriers, tanks, interior of aircraft and ships;

(c) Covertness;

(d) Ability to pollute water and food supplies;

(e) Ability to continue to produce their effect for some time after their use, depending on the nature of the agent used;

(f) Wide range of optional effects extending from rates and degrees of incapacitation of various kinds to lethality, the onset of which may occur after varying periods following exposure;

(g) Ability not to destroy territory, buildings or equipments and to be utilized for neutralizing areas whose resources are to be kept completely intact for use after occupation;

(h) Ability to render areas temporarily impassable or untenable;

(i) Ability to render material and equipment temporarily unusable;

(j) Ability to produce panic and horror among troops, especially if they are not well trained, or equipped with protective means;

(k) Troops are forced to put on protective masks and clothes, which greatly reduce their combat effectiveness.

C. METHODS OF DISSEMINATION

38. Chemical agents are usually stored in liquid, powder or gaseous form. The agents can be loaded into most of the tactical and strategic munitions and delivery systems. Chemical munitions include artillery shells, mortar bombs, mines, aerial bombs, grenades, rockets and cannisters for aerial spraying. Some aerial bombs or missile warheads are filled with bomblets or submunitions which are scattered across the target area, exploding in mid-fall or by delayed action once they reach the ground. Chemical agents can be disseminated by aerial spraying, creating chemical clouds whose life span would depend on the particle size of the aerosol produced and also on the speed of the wind and other weather conditions. Chemical ammunitions pose great risks in storage, transport and handling; in addition some of these ammunitions may leak when old. These considerations have led to the introduction of binary munitions, which contain two separate compartments, each

[10] League of Nations, "Treaty Series," vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65.

containing an agent which by itself is practically non-toxic. After a projectile has been fired the two substances mix and thus generate the toxic agent while in flight. Such chemical ammunition is safer to handle and can be stored indefinitely.

D. ROUTES OF ENTRY

39. Chemical warfare agents gain access to the living organism through breathing and feeding or through the skin and/or mucous membranes. Plants can be toxic after absorbing herbicides or defoliants through their leaves or roots. Humans and animals can be injured or killed when they breathe the air, eat food or drink water which has been contaminated with a chemical warfare agent. Disease or death may also occur if such agents enter the body via cuts, wounds or the bare skin. Incapacitating or harassing agents are prone to produce their effect by entering the eyes and/or the respiratory tract.

E. EFFECTS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MEDICAL SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS

40. The following generally recognized effects of the commonly known chemical warfare agents on the major organs and systems of the body were taken into account by the Group in its investigation, drawing on the publicly accessible sources of professional literature, notably: the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use," [11] the WHO Report on Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, [12] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and others, such as military manuals and military journals.

1. Effects on the eyes

41. Practically all chemical warfare agents affect the eyes to some extent, dependent on the nature of the agent and its concentration.

(a) Vesicants (mustard, nitrogen mustard and lewisite), if brought into contact with the eyes, cause great damage. The symptoms begin with redness and oedema of conjunctiva, a severely painful gritty sensation, swollen eyelids and blepharospasm, and increase to include photophobia, excessive lacrimation and ulceration of the cornea. In severe cases the pupil may be slightly constricted but light reflex is still present. The effects of lewisite occur immediately after exposure, while those of mustard are delayed for several hours and may not reach their peak except after 2 to 3 days after initial contact.

(b) Nerve agents in vapor or liquid form cause constriction of the pupil (pin-point) which is nonreactive. They cause redness of the conjunctiva, pain behind the eye and dimness of vision.

(c) Phosgene may produce some lacrimation, but the respiratory symptoms overshadow this effect.

(d) Sternutators irritate the eyes and cause lacrimation but they are mainly recognized by the concomitant sneezing and coughing.

(e) Lacrimators cause irritation of the eyes, pain, redness, photophobia, pelepharospasm and profuse lacrimation.

(f) Cyanogen chloride vapor causes irritation of the eyes and lacrimation.

2. Effects on the nose and throat

Such effects include the following:

(a) Sternutators cause violent sneezing, pain, a feeling of fullness of the nose and rhinorrhea.

(b) Vesicants cause local irritation and severe pain, followed by swelling, discharge and local ulceration. These symptoms are more severe when lewisite is involved; the effects of the use of this agent occur immediately after exposure.

(c) Nerve agents produce no local action on the nose and throat but as a part of their general action they produce watery discharge, excessive salivation and a feeling of tightness in the throat.

(d) Lacrimators cause local irritation lasting during the period of exposure only.

(e) Cyanogen chloride vapor, if inhaled, cause nasal irritation and rhinorrhea.

(f) Diphenylcyanorsine (DC) may produce bleeding through the nose and mouth.

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[11] United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

[12] "Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Report of a WHO Group of Consultants" (World Health Organization, Geneva, 1970).

3. Effects on the respiratory system

(a) Lacrimators, if inhaled in high concentration, produce local irritation and tightness of the chest.

(b) Sternutators, if inhaled, cause local irritation and pain, and besides sneezing, cause violent coughing.

(c) Inhalation, of cyanogen chloride causes irritation of the respiratory system, coughing, choking and tightness of the chest.

(d) Inhalation of hydrocyanic acid causes deepening of the respiration at first, followed by dyspnea, gasping and cessation of respiration.

(e) Inhalation of phosgene causes tightness of the chest, excessive coughing, choking, increasing dyspnea, frothy sputum and cyanosis and finally lung oedema.

(f) Visicants, inhalation of mustard and nitrogen mustard cause a slowly developing irritation, tightness of the chest, cough and hoarseness of the voice and dyspnea. When lewisite is used the symptoms develop and progress very rapidly.

(g) Nerve agents, if inhaled, do not produce local action, but they are rapidly absorbed. As a part of their general effects they produce bronchorrhea bronchospasm, cough and dyspnea. Secretions may become so excessive that the casualty may be drawn in his own secretions. At lethal levels, respiratory failure due to paralysis of the respiratory muscles may occur.

4. Effects on the gastrointestinal tract

Such effects include the following:

(a) Sternutators may produce excessive salivation.

(b) Cyanogen chloride may produce nausea.

(c) Phosgene may cause nausea, but this is usually overshadowed by the respiratory effects.

(d) Vesicants, if ingested, cause severe vomiting and diarrhea.

(e) Nerve agents affect the gastrointestinal tract through their general effects. They cause excessive salivation, abdominal cramps, heartburn, eructation diarrhea, tenesmus and involuntary defecation.

5. Effects on the cardiovascular system

Such effects include the following:

(a) Phosgene has effects on the cardiovascular system that are secondary to those it exerts on the respiratory system and to the development of lung oedema.

(b) Vesicants may induce shock, owing to loss of body fluids through the damaged skin. As vesicants cause depression of the bone marrow after systemic absorption they cause anaemia and haemorrhages.

(c) Nerve agents may cause pallor and elevation of the blood pressure. Later, shock may occur with the development of respiratory failure.

6. Effects on the urinary system

Nerve agents may cause increased frequency of micturition and in severe cases involuntary micturition may occur.

7. Effects on the skin

Such effects include the following:

(a) Lacrimators and sternutator may produce mild stinging in the skin of the face. When the skin is not healthy, dermatitis may occur. Blisters do not arise.

(b) When phosgene produces respiratory embarrassment, it causes cyanosis of the skin.

(c) Hydrocyanic acid makes the skin more pink than normal, because of the inability of the tissues to remove oxygen from the blood. However, the skin becomes cyanotic when respiration stops.

(d) Vesicants cause redness, burning, blisters and, later, necrosis at the sites exposed. Mustard and nitrogen mustard produce delayed and less pronounced discomforts, while arsenical vesicants such as Lewisite and phosgene oxime produce immediate pain and irritation.

(e) Nerve agents, although readily absorbed through the skin, do not have irritant local effect. As a part of the general effects of a nerve agent, increased sweating and muscular twitches may occur at the site of absorption. When the case progresses, profuse perspiration and extensive muscle tightening may be noted.

8. Effects on the skeletal muscles

Of all the chemical warfare agents only the nerve agents affect the skeletal muscles. Muscle twitches may occur at the sites of skin absorption. Besides easy fatigability and progressive general weakness, systemic nerve agent poisoning causes muscle cramps and twitches. Generalized convulsions occur before death.

9. Effects on the central nervous system

Such effects include the following:

(a) Exposure to lacrimators may be followed by a headache.

(b) Sternutators may cause headaches and slight mental depression.

(c) Phosgene may cause malaise, headache and depression in severe cases.

(d) Vesicants can produce mental depression after severe exposure.

(e) Depending on the dose absorbed, nerve agents may have effects on the central nervous system. These start with giddiness, headache, drowsiness, insomnia, incoherence and a loss of memory. Severe effects include confusion, slurring of speech, ataxia, generalized muscular weakness including respiratory muscles, coma, loss of reflexes, convulsions and death.

F. QUESTION OF DEFINITION AND PARAMETERS OF THE INVESTIGATION

42. The group addressed itself to the question of definition of chemical weapons so as to be able to evaluate the allegations presented. In the course of its deliberations it, *inter alia,* considered the definitions of chemical weapons contained in the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and biological weapons in the World Health Organization report on health aspects of chemical and biological weapons, as well as discussions held in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament on a ban on chemical weapons.

43. In the report of the Secretary-General[13] chemical agents of warfare were defined as "chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on men, animals and plants" (para. 17). This report considers toxins as chemical warfare agents because although they are produced by living organisms, they themselves do not multiply.

44. Similarly, the World Health Organization Report entitled "Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons" contains a similar approach to the definition of chemical warfare agents. Besides the definition, it addresses certain criteria regarding the categories of chemical warfare agents. It provides the following:

(a) Chemical agents of warfare include all substances having harmful toxic effects on men, animals or plants;

(b) A lethal agent is one intended to cause death when man is exposed to concentrations well within the capability of delivery for military purposes;

(c) An incapacitating agent is one intended to cause temporary disease or to induce temporary mental or physical disability, the duration of which greatly exceeds the period of exposure;

(d) A harassing agent (or short-term incapacitant) is one capable of causing a rapid disablement that lasts for little longer than the period of exposure. Furthermore, the report proceeds to point out that no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between lethal and incapacitating agents used in chemical warfare, because incapacitating agents can be lethal or permanently disabling under certain circumstances (e.g., in the presence of malnutrition or pre-existing diseases, in infants or the aged, or when there is exposure to unusually high doses, as in enclosed spaces or in close proximity to functioning chemical weapons). For similar reasons, no sharp demarcation line can be drawn between harassing agents and other anti-personnel chemical agents. Furthermore, harassing agents may be used in war in conjunction with high-explosive, fragmentation or other weapons to increase the lethal effectiveness of the latter, as distinct from their employment in riot control in order to reduce injuries and to save lives.

45. The definitions proposed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the Committee in Disarmament included different points of view dealing with evaluation of toxicity, single and dual purpose agents precursors, binary weapons and other areas that the group felt have no direct bearing on the current investigation. Besides, no consensus has emerged as yet on any one single definition.

46. In view of the above considerations, the group, in defining the parameters of its investigation, took into account, *inter alia,* the following:

Delivery systems

(a) The chemical weapon system includes a delivery system for chemical warfare agents;

(b) Any delivery system can be used for this purpose;

(c) The design of delivery system of chemical weapons can also be specific. Thus, for example, the thickness of the wall of the chemical projectile is usually less than that of a highly explosive projectile. On the other hand, a standard highly explosive projectile can also be filled with chemical agents. In any case, perhaps the only way

[13] See footnote 11.

to determine whether a projectile used in warfare is a chemical weapon or not is by having access to such projectile or its remnants and to conduct a technical examination and, if necessary, even laboratory tests for chemical agents or degradation products that might be present;

(d) Perhaps, the binary chemical ammunition would be the only type which could be exclusively used for chemical warfare. The presence of remnants of such ammunitions would probably yield conclusive evidence of a chemical attack;

(e) Aerial spraying can only be used in the case of chemical and biological warfare and hence incidents where such a method is being used can be taken as evidence of such types of warfare. The only way to differentiate between such types of warfare, besides studying the effects and their onset, would be laboratory analysis. It is known that whereas in the case of chemical attack the effects produced occur either immediately or shortly thereafter, in the case of biological warfare, a much longer period of incubation is involved.

Chemical agents

47. The group decided to take into account the chemical agents which were considered in the reports of the Secretary-General and WHO and decided that the agents to be considered were the groups and types of chemical agents which are commonly known to include lethal agents, incapacitants, and harassing agents. Toxins were also considered, in this context because they are poisonous chemicals regardless of methods of production, be they biological or synthetic: it is known that some toxins which are normally produced by micro-organisms can be synthesized without the benefit of any living organism.[14]

V. Evaluation of Written Submissions

A. METHODS

48. To investigate an allegation of chemical attack, the ideal approach for experts would be to conduct an on-site examination of the alleged attack as soon as possible. This would enable a thorough and technical examination of the site, particularly of any remnants of alleged chemical ammunitions. This would also allow the collection of samples of contaminated soil, vegetations, water and objects for laboratory analysis for any chemical agent or its degradation products. Being on the site immediately after the alleged attack would permit examination of the alleged casualties while there are still some fresh signs and symptoms produced by the chemical agent. It would also afford the opportunity to question the medical staff who attended such casualties and examine the medical records and laboratory investigations which were conducted and the type of treatment which was given. Such on-site investigation would enable post-mortems to be carried out and the possible collection of samples for further investigation. Furthermore, being on the site shortly after an alleged chemical attack would make it possible to question eye-witnesses while facts are still fresh in their minds. All these procedures would help in deciding, with a good degree of certainty, whether a chemical warfare agent was used or not and, perhaps, even the nature of the alleged agent involved.

49. The actual situation with which the group was confronted was, however, a different one. The allegations submitted referred only to incidents which were said to have occurred some time ago. However, despite the constraints involved as a result of having to base itself initially only on documentary material and the general constraints involved in an *ad hoc* exercise of this type, the group worked out certain modalities for a careful investigation of the allegations presented. After a preliminary examination of the material, the group decided that the first step should be to transmit a questionnaire, which the group prepared, to those States which has submitted substantive information in reply to the note verbale of the Secretary-General, namely Canada and the United States. The purpose of the said questionnaire was to seek further clarification and amplification of some of the data presented. The replies received underlined the fact that the previous submissions had included as much detail as possible and the United States specifically urged the Group of Experts to visit refugee camps as well as the areas of reported attacks in order to obtain testimony and evidence first hand from the relevant sources.

50. After studying the communications received from ICRC, UNHCR and WHO, the group decided that further approaches should be made to ICRC and UNHCR with a view to eliciting additional information and co-operation, as relevant. After

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[14] For further elaboration regarding the chemical agents under consideration, see section VI and annex III.

considering the replies from these organizations, the Group felt that further co-operation from them would be appreciated.

51. In view of the above, the following method of study was employed:

(a) The first step was to evaluate the degree of reliability of the source and the credibility of the information. In this respect, it was decided to give greater attention to information provided by eye-witnesses of the alleged attack or by the victim of such an attack. Greater attention was also given to information gathered by technical people, such as medical and military personnel.

(b) The second step in examining the allegations of chemical attacks was to evaluate the information with respect to alleged methods of attack in terms of the generally accepted tactics and practices of chemical warfare. In this connexion, the Group agreed to devote special attention to attacks which were found to be allegedly conducted in conformity with such tactics and practices.

(c) The third step in the evaluation of the allegations was to study the signs and symptoms reported to have been experienced by casualties, following exposure to the alleged chemical attacks, and to try in each case to find out if such signs and symptoms could be produced by any particular known chemical agent. In this evaluation, the group agreed to use as a reference the generally accepted signs and symptoms produced by various individual chemical warfare agents on different organs in the body as described in paragraph 41 above.

52. Various environmental and individual factors which could modify the clinical picture were taken into consideration, for example, weather conditions, temperature, humidity and also the general health of the victim, as well as his or her age and sex.

B. GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

1. The reliability of information

53. After reviewing the material before it, the Group addressed itself to the reliability of the information. The Group did not find any reason to doubt the integrity of those who reported on the chemical attacks. On the other hand, it could not overlook the fact that it was difficult to determine the objectivity of alleged victims or witnesses.

2. Technical aspects

54. In reviewing the reports, certain allegations of the use of chemical weapons could not be accepted outrightly, e.g., the supposed dissemination of chemical agents by aircraft flying at an altitude of 7,000 feet, since at that altitude such agents would be dispersed by the wind and diluted to such an extent that no effective concentration could reach a target. Similarly, such aerial spraying could not possibly affect—as it was alleged to have done—water supplies to produce toxicity and death, produce holes in the leaves of the trees or destroy soft tissues down to the bone. There was also repeated mention of the colours of the chemical agents used. Most chemical warfare agents are colourless, however, and, although different colours may be added to some of the harassing agents, it was the judgement of the Group that it was difficult to consider colour as a factor in identifying the nature of chemical agents. Some mention of grenades or remnants of chemical ammunition was reported, but no elaboration was provided of such samples which could have contributed to the identification of the alleged chemical attack.

3. Medical aspects

55. The Group found it difficult, in most cases, to pinpoint any chemical agent as being the probable cause of alleged signs and symptons mentioned, the reason being that in most of the cases in question the signs and symptoms described could not possibly have been produced by a single chemical agent, even after the individual variations in responses to a chemcial insult and the modifying effects of the constitution or general health and the degree of tolerance of each individual involved have been taken into consideration.

56. This evaluation is based on an assessment of the medical aspects of each case as reported. The clinical accuracy depends very much on the way the information was collected. In some instances this collection was done by a medically trained person, and the reliability is therefore greater. However, since the data were obtained by people with limited knowledge of chemical agents used in warfare, many signs and symptoms could have been ignored or described incompletely and subjectively, especially since the alleged victims might have biased their reports.

57. A simplified description of symptoms attributable to chemcial warfare agents has been established to systematize the reported symptomatology. Death and nonspecific symptoms such as dizziness, headache or unconsciousness could not be sys-

tematized. In view of the imprecision of many reports, no conclusion could be reached from them.

58. The specific identification of the chemical agents, because of vagueness of the whole symptomatology and also because of the lack of full medical assessment and investigations as well as any chemical analysis, is impossible. The only conclusion which could be drawn would be to ascribe a given symptomatology to a type of agent.

59. Diphenylcyanoarsine (DC) was used as a harrassing agent against the Chinese during the Chinese-Japanese war of 1934-1945. Some seriously affected persons bled through their noses and mouth and died from asphyxiation. This might explain some of the symptomatology in some of the cases described in the United States submission with similar signs and symptoms.

60. The following is a classification of the cases, in terms of the possible agents which could allegedly have produced the signs and symptoms as presented in the Canadian and United States submissions. The cases have been considered one by one but are grouped according to their common symptomatology for this summary.

A. No correlation with chemcial agents (no symptoms given, imprecise reports, serious inconsistencies) [15]

Afghanistan (United States submission):
Cases [15] 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 9b, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32.
Afghanistan (United States update):
Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28B, 31, 32, 33.
Laos (United States submission):
Cases 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27B, 30, 34, 35, 36B, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68B, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114.
Laos (United States update):
Cases 1, 3, 4, 5, 6.
Laos (Canadian submission):
Cases 4, 5, 6, 7.
Kampuchea (United States submission):
Many of the reported cases lack any reference to symptoms. The following is the list of symptoms which are most often referred together in the submission. This list does not fit any known chemical warfare agent: dizziness, weakness, headache, dyspnea, suffocation, nausea and vomiting, a sometimes bloody diarrhea and/or skin lesions described as "burns."
Submissions by Democratic Kampuchea:
The submissions by Democratic Kampuchea contained allegations of use of chemical warfare agents which are claimed to have caused casualties, but no significant clinical data were provided which could have helped in reaching adequate assessment of the situation.

B. Harassing agents

(1) Possibly adamsite, characterized by upper respiratory tract irritation, nausea and vomiting, eye irritation and in some cases death.
Afghanistan (United States submission):
Cases 2, 8, 20, 23.
Afghanistan (United States update):
Cases 11B, 29.
Laos (United States submission):
Cases 9, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 24, 31, 37, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 61, 76, 79, 81, 83, 87.
Laos (United States update):
Cases 2, 7, 9B, 9C.
Laos (Canadian submission):
Cases 1, 2, 3, 9, 10.
(2) Possibly tear gas, characterized by eye irritation, coughing, upper respiratory tract irritation, rhinorrhoea (runny nose).
Afghanistan (United States submission):

[15] The numbers correspond to those appearing in the submissions of the United States and Canada.

Cases 3, 14, 17.
Afghanistan (United States update):
Cases 7A, 11, 12, 28A, 29A, 30.
Laos (United States submission):
Cases 2, 5, 7, 23, 27, 28, 32, 35, 36A, 37B, 53, 56, 57A, 57B, 62, 64, 69, 77, 78, 82, 90, 91.
Laos (United States update):
Cases 8, 9A.
Laos (Canadian submission):
Case 8.

C. Blistering agents

Not specifically identified.
Afghanistan (United States update):
Cases 7B, 8B, 9B.
D. Nerve Gas
Not specifically identified.
Laos (United States submission):
Cases 6, 100, 103.

61. It was the feeling of the Group that the above classification of the cases, in terms of the alleged signs and symptoms suggestive of the most probable chemical agent which could have produced a particular clinical picture, in no way establishes that the Group was in a position to suggest that such agents might have actually been used.

VI. The Question of Mycotoxins

62. As referred to in paragraphs 10, 12, and 18 above, after consideration of the reply by the Government of the United States of America to the note verbale of the Secretary-General and the replies of Canada and the United States to the questionnaire prepared by the Group (see annex I), the Group considered a note verbale dated 14 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. This contained a new submission involving the question of the alleged use of mycotoxins and was considered although this submission was received during the concluding stages of the Group's work. This submission stated, *inter alia*, as follows:

"For several years, the United States has been concerned about reports that lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons are being used in the conflicts in Laos and Kampuchea and, since the Soviet invasion in December 1979, in Afghanistan. As a result of this concern, the United States has actively endeavoured, as have other concerned members of the international community, to obtain information which might enable us to ascertain the facts pertaining to these reports.

"Since 1979, the United States has been reviewing and carefully analysing information and evidence obtained relating to alleged chemical attacks in these regions. We now believe we have information which will answer some of the questions raised by the reports.

"Reports about exposure to the cloud describe bizarre effects which, in rapid sequence, caused dizziness, nausea, coughing of blood-tinged material, choking, vomiting of massive amounts of blood, bloody diarrhea, formation of multiple small hard blisters, followed by shock and death in those directly under the sprays. For those on the periphery of the attacks or who ate or drank contaminated food, or water, symptoms took longer to develop (days, rather than minutes to hours) and usually led to death within two weeks if no treatment was given.

"United States experts have studied and evaluated the symptoms described in these reports in an effort to form a judgement about what agent or agents might have caused such effects. The conclusion reached was that no known traditional chemical warfare agent alone or in combination with others could produce all of the symptoms described or cause death to occur as rapidly as has been reported.

"Recent analysis of a leaf and stem sample from the area of a reported chemical attack in Kampuchea has revealed the presence of substances which are not traditional chemical warfare agents, but which cause the specific symptoms and effects which have been described. Specifically, tests on the sample identified abnormally high levels of three potent mycotoxins of the trichothecene group: nivalenol, deoxynivalenol, and T-2 toxin. Levels of deoxynivalenol and nivalenol detected were up to 20 times greater than that reported to occur as a result of natural intoxication. A report on the tests is annexed to this letter.

"Symptoms associated with trichothecene poisoning include the rapid onset of vomiting, multiple hemorrhaging of mucous membranes, bloody diarrhea and severe itching or tingling of the skin with formation of multiple small hard blisters. All of the trichothecenes produce similar symptoms; however, there are some differences in the degree of severity: nivalenol and deoxynivalenol produce fewer skin irritative effects than T-2; nivalenol is a slightly stronger hemorrhagic than either deoxynivalenol or T-2; deoxynivalenol (also known as vomitoxin) causes very severe vomiting."

63. As a result of a preliminary analysis of the United States submission, the Group of Experts was of the opinion that further clarifications were required. The Chairman of the Group, in consultation with the other members, prepared a detailed questionnaire which was transmitted to the United States Government.[16] The reply to this questionnaire was received from the United States in a letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations dated 20 October 1981. In its reply, the United States also requested that United States experts on the question of the use of chemical weapons appear before the Group of Experts in order to supplement the information conveyed in the written United States submissions (Conference room paper No. 6). Pursuant to that request, the Group met with the United States experts on 21 October 1981. The American experts, *inter alia,* pointed out the following:

(a) Many of the signs and symptoms of the allegation in the Unites States submissions were consistent with trichothecene intoxication;

(b) In cases of death within one hour, some other chemical warfare agent might be involved;

(c) LD_{50} for mycotoxin was not known;

(d) They had more samples which were being analysed;

(e) Estimations of the required amount of trichothecene used in aerial attack was not calculated;

(f) Mixture of nivalenol and T_2 was perhaps meant to increase the percutaneous absorption of the trichothecene via the skin.

64. The Group took note of the letter dated 22 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/36/549) transmitting a statement by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the Government of Viet Nam rejected the United States charges concerning the alleged use of Soviet-supplied toxic chemicals in Laos and Kampuchea. The Group also considered the letter dated 9 October 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/C.1/36/5) transmitting an article by a Vietnamese authority on the subject of chemical warfare. In this connexion, the Group felt that some substantive questions in this article had already been raised by the Group in the questionnaire addressed to the Government of the United States in relation to its submission of 14 September 1981.

65. The Group decided to address itself to the question of mycotoxins in accordance with the discussion of this subject as reflected in paragraph 43 above, specifically in view of the fact that toxins are poisonous chemicals regardless of methods of production, be they biological or synthetic. At the same time the Group was aware of the limits of its mandate with regard to the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

66. In its study of the United States submission of 14 September 1981, the Group considered the responses of the United States Government to the questions submitted by the Group in light of the background information about mycotoxins which was collected from various scientific sources including discussions with some experts of the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals in the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme in Geneva.[17]

67. The Group felt that, whereas on an *a priori* basis it would not wish to question that the samples were collected from an area in Kampuchea which was alleged to have been exposed to a chemical attack, it nevertheless was of the opinion that the optimum procedure in this respect would be for a competent impartial party to have immediate access to the area of the alleged chemical attack and to be able to collect samples which are to be sent to impartial laboratories where the necessary investigations can be conducted. Furthermore, such an impartial party would be able, being on-site, to collect any relevant information on the alleged attack and observe any effects on human, animals or plants.

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[16] For the text of the questionnaire, see annex IV.

[17] See annex III for background information on trichothecenes.

92-154 O - 82 - 3

68. With respect to sampling, the Group was of the opinion that since there had been access to the area, besides vegetation, samples from soil and water should have been obtained. In this respect, it was later pointed out by the United States experts that such samples had in fact been acquired and the results of their analysis would be provided subsequently to the Group.

69. With respect to the analysis of the leaf and stem sample, the Group felt that it was necessary to prove definitively whether or not the sample contained any mycotoxin-producing origin. Likewise the soil should be tested for the presence of mycotoxin-producing fungi and the presence of mycotoxins in order to rule out the possibility of translocation of the mycotoxins to the leaf via the roots of the plant.

70. Again, the Group felt that morphological study of the leaf in question was necessary in order to ascertain the effects of mycotoxins on the structure of the leaf, especially since these mycotoxins had remained on the leaf for some time before it was picked.

71. With respect to the area from which the sample was collected, it was important to have detailed information about the survivors of the alleged chemical attack including their present place of residence and any available medical records. Such information would be necessary to determine whether or not a chemical attack had occurred as well as the possible agent that might have been used.

72. Subsequent to the receipt of the new United States submission of 14 September 1981, the Group felt that it was necessary once again to review the allegations previously submitted by the United States and Canada with a view to determining whether the signs and symptoms reported could be co-related to the possible use of mycotoxins. In this respect, it should, however, be pointed out that the available literature on mycotoxins referred only to cases of sub-acute and chronic effects in humans resulting from oral intake. In experimental work on animals, acute and chronic toxicity studies have been carried out but none of the studies covered inhalation toxicity as would be the case in chemical warfare activity.

73. The Group also examined the note verbale dated 12 November 1981 submitted by the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations and took note of the following: the latest submission provided answers to some of the inquiries of the Group, as presented in its questionnaire pertaining to the issue of mycotoxins and in the interview with the United States experts, namely (a) control samples collected from the region outside the area of alleged chemical attack were obtained and found not to contain mycotoxins; (b) sample of water collected from the area of alleged chemical attack was tested and found positive for trichothecenes. The Group points out that the following questions could still be raised with respect to the United States submissions:

(a) The question of attempting the isolation of mycotoxin-producing fungi in the samples which were collected, to discard the possibility that the mycotoxin detected originated from a natural source;

(b) The question of the presence of mycotoxin-producing fungi in the soil to discard the possibility of translocation from the soil to the stem and leaf;

(c) The question of the effect of trichothecenes on the leaf sample, since at least 10 days passed between the alleged chemical attack and the collection of the leaf;

(d) The question of the climate of South-East Asia as related to the geographical distribution of mycotoxin-producing fungi and the biosynthesis of trichothecenes, many scientific publications report production of these mycotoxins at temperatures of 20–30° C, and in warm areas;

(e) The question of the development of a hemorrhagic syndrome through exposure to T_2 toxin and some other trichothecenes is currently controversial, since there is experimental evidence according to which these toxins were unable to cause a hemorrhagic syndrome by oral administration (chronic and acute);

(f) The question of the time intervals between alleged attacks and the dates of collection of the samples, which related to the matter of stability of these compounds. For example, the latest submission states that sample F was collected from the site of an alleged attack occurring 2 April 1981, but does not provide the date of collection.

VII. On-Site Collection and Examination of Evidence

74. At the end of its second session, on 28 July 1981, the Group, having examined the submissions containing reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons, decided that on-site investigation in accordance with its mandate would be necessary in order to collect and examine evidence. The object of such visits would be to collect and examine evidence, including on-site, with the consent of the countries concerned, to the extent relevant to the purposes of the investigation, and more specifi-

cally, to examine the areas where the chemical attack had allegedly occurred; to collect remnants of any chemical ammunitions and to collect samples of any chemical agents that might have been used; to collect any contaminated objects like foliage, soil and water; to interview and conduct full medical examinations and investigations on the alleged victims of chemical attack; to interview alleged witnesses of chemical attack; to interview medical personnel who had attended the alleged victims and examine the pertinent medical records, where available; to gather other observations and data from other sources, as appropriate and to assess the extent of the damage caused by the chemical attack.

75. Accordingly, the Group requested that approaches concerning respective visits be made to the Governments of those countries where alleged use of chemical weapons had taken place, as well as of those where victims of alleged attacks were hosted in refugee camps.

76. In a letter dated 9 October 1981, the Group received an acceptance from the Government of Thailand to visit the holding centres for refugees from Indochina in pursuance of paragraph 5(b) of General Assembly resolution 35/144 C. On this occasion, the Government of Thailand declared its understanding that no on-site inspection would be conducted on Thai territory, as such weapons had not been used in Thailand itself. The Group, holding at that moment its final session at United Nations Headquarters in New York, with the purpose of drafting its report to the General Assembly, decided to visit Thailand for the purposes stated above.

77. In a letter dated 23 October 1981, the Group was informed by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations of its Government's willingness to accord the necessary co-operation for the purpose of on-site investigations in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of the above-mentioned resolution. After considering the reply of the Government of Pakistan, the Group of Experts took the following decision concerning the matter which was transmitted to the Government of Pakistan:

(a) The Group acknowledged receipt of the above-mentioned letter and expressed deep gratitude to the Government of Pakistan for its offer to co-operate with the request of the Group of Experts to visit Pakistan in connexion with the implementation of resolution 35/144 C.

(b) However, in considering this matter, the Group of Experts was also cognizant of: (a) the stipulation in resolution 35/144 C which required that the report of the Group of Experts be submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, which imposed definite time-constraints for the completion of the exercise; (b) the reply of the Government of Pakistan was formally received after the decision of the Group of Experts to accept the offer of the Government of Thailand to comply with the Group's request to visit Thailand in connexion with the implementation of resolution 35/144 C and after the various necessary arrangements had already been initiated in that respect, including the specific time-frame involved.

(c) Accordingly, the Group of Experts was of the opinion that in view of the above, the Group initially should proceed to complete its visit to Thailand for the purpose mentioned above and that it would consider the question of a possible visit to Pakistan at a later stage.

78. The Group of Experts visited Thailand from 31 October to 10 November 1981. The members of the Group of Experts were Major General Dr. Esmat E. Ezz (Chairman), Mr. Edward Ambeva, Dr. Humberto Guerra and Colonel Nestor Castillo. The Group of Experts was also accompanied by members of the Secretariat staff: Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Senior Political Affairs Officer (Secretary of the Group); Professor Herbert Marcovich (Consultant); Mr. Wlodzimierz Wieczorek, Senior Political Affairs Officer and Ms. Margaret Headley (secretary to Mr. Kheradi). In addition, the officials from the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) provided all the necessary facilities and assistance to the Group during its visit in Thailand. The local officers of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees assisted the Group during its visits to the refugee camps at Nong Khai and Ban Vinai.

79. At each stage of its work in Thailand, the Group was accorded all the necessary assistance from the Government of Thailand and the local authorities, including means of transportation and security. Upon arrival the Group had a briefing by officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Interior, and of the National Security Council.

80. During the period of its visit to Thailand, the Group carried out collection and examination of evidence in the two refugee camps of Nong Khai and Ben Vinai, close to the territory of Laos, and one refugee processing centre at Panatnikhom, closer to Kampuchea. The Group made every effort to interview the available witnesses of the alleged use of chemical weapons coming from Kampuchea, and underscored the importance of reaching Kao I Dang Camp, near the border between Thai-

land and Kampuchea, where it expected to interview more refugees from the area of Kampuchea, according to the schedule initially prepared by the Thai authorities. The Group was told that the visit to this camp could not be carried out because of security reasons, and that the refugees would be brought to the processing centre instead. However, no refugees came from Kháo I Dang to Panatnikhom.

81. The Group interviewed, in person, alleged victims and eye-witnesses of alleged chemical attacks. Summaries of the statements made during interviews are presented in annex V, and a general evaluation of the interviews appears in paragraphs 85 to 92 below.

82. During its visits to the above-mentioned refugee centres, the Group also interviewed medical personnel. The Group collected some blood samples and received, as well, other samples of blood, alleged chemical powder, and leaf and stem samples which came from an area allegedly subjected to a chemical attack.

83. In addition, the Group had access to some other sources of information as reflected in annex V.

84. In the course of its on-site investigation, the Group was handicapped by various shortcomings with respect to data collection, of which the most significant were the following:

(a) The time factor was an important element which first appeared in the planning stage. The Group had to undertake the visit at short notice without benefit of optimal preparation. Further, in the execution stage, the limited time allocated to each camp precluded more thorough interviews and exploration and the time schedule was further reduced by circumstances beyond the Group's control, including weather and security conditions, as well as time spent on travelling.

(b) The difficulty of conducting meaningful interviews through interpreters, e.g. from Hmong to Thai and from Thai to English and vice-versa, compounded by the lack of medical and technical training of interpreters, adversely affected the efficiency and accuracy of the interviews.

(c) In most cases, the interviews were conducted after a considerable lapse of time following an alleged chemical attack, thereby resulting in the disappearance of most of the signs and symptoms which might have been present and adversely affecting the accurate recollection of the events.

(d) The Group noted that given their particular background, some of the people interviewed were not fully oriented towards providing quantifiable information such as time and distance, which could assist the Group in reaching accurate assessments.

(e) Although the Group availed itself of the help of the representative of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Bangkok and the authorities of the refugee centres visited, it was unable to locate in the camps that the Group visited any of the alleged victims whose names appeared in the United States submissions.

A. GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE INTERVIEWS

1. The reliability of information

85. The Group did not find any reason to doubt the integrity of those who were interviewed. On the other hand, it could not overlook the fact that it was difficult to determine the objectivity of alleged victims or witnessess.

2. Technical aspects

86. Some of the descriptions given by the refugees on the technical aspects of alleged chemical attacks in general did not conform with the known practices for the dissemination of chemical warfare agents. Most instances involved dissemination of agents by aerial spray from high altitude, against small-sized targets. It is the feeling of the group that most probably the alleged victims or eyewitnesses sometimes did not have proper appreciation of space and time because they mentioned different periods of time for the settling of the chemicals. Varying sizes have been described for apparently the same "yellow substance": dry powder, sugar grains, pollen, corn flour, and even rice.

87. In the instances where bombs or rockets were mentioned, no samples of the remnants of such delivery systems, which could have helped in the identification of the types of chemical weapons used, were provided.

3. Medical aspects

88. The signs and symptoms described by the refugees being interviewed were similar to those found in the reports on alleged chemical attacks submitted by the United States and Canada.

89. The main symptomatology described to us, as may be seen in annex V consists of coughing, occasional eye irritation, nausea, intense vomiting and diarrhea sometimes mixed with blood. These symptoms appeared from less than an hour to several hours after the alleged exposure, sometimes correlated with eating or drinking "contaminated" food or water. Deaths of people were often reported, as occurring from within 30 minutes to several hours or days, most commonly those exposed in the open. Skin lesions variously described as rashed, blisters of different sizes, and ulcerations were also reported to occur. Extensive animal deaths were also reported and less often, damages to leaves and crops. Most of the refugees interviewed stated that opium mixed with garlic was an effective curative agent, not only alleviating the symptomatology but also preventing death.

90. Although some of the above-mentioned signs and symptoms could be caused by one or another of the known chemical warfare agents, the Group was not in a position to reach a final conclusion due to lack of hard evidence. As an example of the evaluation process, the Group wishes to cite the cases of the six alleged victims (see annex V) who had supposedly been exposed to the "yellow powder" as recently as 23 days prior to being interviewed.

91. This group of six people, a girl and five men, had a common history of alleged exposures to the "yellow powder" while they were fleeing in Laos. They reported having walked on a field covered with this material for about 50 meters before noticing it, then turning around and leaving the area, whose dimensions could not be determined with any degree of precision. Four reported having had dizziness and diarrhea which occurred about five to nine days after the exposure, and three displayed skin lesions which they attributed to the same exposure, in the lower limbs. The remaining two refugees, a girl (18) and a boy (17), reported on what they claimed to have been different occasions of exposure to chemicals. About a month before the interview, the girl ate some leaves which had had some yellow material on them after having washed them in the stream, and had dizziness, coughing, and vomiting: the boy referred to an episode in his childhood, which, in turn, had been recounted to him, and to a second one about a year previously, in which he had dizziness, headache, vomiting and diarrhea, and had developed some lesions ("weeping wounds") on his skin. The general clinical appearance of the six was acceptable. The most remarkable findings were a goiter and an enlarged spleen in the girl, and several skin conditions in both the girl and several of the men, which were compatible with scabies, superficial pyogenic infections, and contact dermatitis. Some scars were also noticed. Blood and urine analyses, performed by the laboratory of the military hospital provided no evidence of salient abnormalities, except for a moderate leucocytosis (16,200 WBC per MM) in one man and eosimophilia (18 per cent) in another of the men.

92. The Group felt that these persons, if exposed to a chemical agent at all, had minimal contact with it and that none of the symptomotology described can be attributed to this "yellow powder".

VIII. Conclusions

93. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/144 C, the Group of Experts addressed itself to the submissions at hand and, in the course of assessing the individual cases presented therein, found itself unable to reach a final conclusion as to whether or not chemical warfare agents had been used.

94. Since the symptomatology in some of the cases as presented in the submission could suggest a possible use of some sort of chemical warfare agents, the Group, therefore, expressed the desire to carry out investigations on the territories where chemical attacks had allegedly occurred and also in the territories where alleged victims and eyewitnesses of such attacks were being hosted. Up to the time of the submission of this report, however, the Group had only been able to visit some refugee camps in Thailand.

95. During its visit to the refugee camps in Thailand, the Group made an effort to meet the particular individuals who were mentioned in the United States submissions but was unable to locate them in those camps. The medical personnel interviewed in the refugee camps stated that they did not come across cases which could be attributed to chemical warfare agents. The refugees who were interviewed by the Group related stories similar to those appearing in the submissions of Canada and the United States, which reflected some aspects of their problems as persons displaced from their respective homelands, as well as those more pertinent to the issue of the alleged chemical attacks on which most were able to report.

96. It must be pointed out that all the cases interviewed related alleged chemical attacks which occurred several months earlier, and consequently the Group was

unable to detect signs and symptoms which would be suggestive of exposure to chemical warfare agents. The only alleged victims of recent exposure (23 days prior to the interviews) to alleged chemical warfare agents claimed that they walked through an area contaminated by "yellow powder". No clear characteristic physical findings of exposure to chemical agents could be recorded, and routine blood biochemical, hematological, and urine analyses obtained by the Group yielded no significant abnormalities. Nevertheless, blood samples were taken to test for any chemical warfare agents or their degradation products.

97. In the course of its interviews, the Group was given some physical samples, supposedly related to the alleged use of chemical weapons. These samples have been handed over to the United Nations for analysis by qualified and impartial laboratories. Since the Group cannot ascertain the actual source of these samples it cannot base its final conclusions on the results of such analyses. The Group expresses the hope that appropriate procedures will be devised in the future for the impartial collection and analysis of any samples that might be involved in this context.

98. Finally, in the opinion of the Group, this report is inconclusive. Any investigation designed to lead to definitive conclusions regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to an assessment of the extent of the damage caused by such chemical weapons would require timely access to the areas of alleged use of chemical warfare agents in order to establish the true facts. Such an exercise has so far not been possible.

ANNEX I

QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I. If you have personally witnessed the use of chemical weapons:

1. (a) Can you specify whether it was by means of air delivery, bombs, cannisters or sprays, artillery ammunitions, air bursts or impact?

(b) What were the features of the attack with the chemical agent with respect to the color, if any, and the prevailing weather condition?

(c) If there were clouds of gas, how long did they last before complete dissipation?

(d) Were you in the open air or under cover?

2. (a) If you were exposed to the attack, what was the distance between you and the site of detonation?

(b) What was your immediate reaction?

(c) After how long a period of time did the first symptoms begin to appear, what was the sequence of the various symptoms and how long did they last?

(d) Did you receive any medical treatment and if so, where and how soon was it given?

(e) What was the nature of the treatment and how long did it take before you completely recovered?

3. (a) If there were other casualties, how far from the site of detonation were they located?

(b) What signs and symptoms did you observe in such cases and what was the sequence in which they occurred?

(c) Did you witness any fatalities and if so, how many?

(d) Did you notice any correlation between the age, sex and general health of the victims and the intensity of the symptoms involved?

(e) How long were the victims exposed to the chemical agent?

(f) Was any treatment administered?

(g) How long did it take for the victim to recover?

(h) Have you spoken to any of the attending medical staff and what were their comments?

II. If the information that you have reported was of a hearsay nature, can you identify your sources and indicate their reliability?

ANNEX II

SUBSTANTIVE PARTS OF COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Reply from the World Health Organization dated 1 June 1981

We have not received any information directly from WHO Member States concerning the use of chemical weapons. The information at our disposal is that reproduced by the United Nations from certain Governments and I believe, therefore, the United Nations already has more information available on this question than WHO.

2. Reply from the International Committee of the Red Cross dated 19 June 1981

In conclusion, the nature of ICRC's work and the extent of its involvement in the conflicts which have occurred since the Second World War do not provide it with sufficient evidence to conclude that chemical weapons have or have not been used. The only evidence it can offer—which is not, of course, conclusive from a wider standpoint—is that, in the places where its delegates have been able to operate, they have not by themselves established the flagrant and massive use of chemical weapons.

3. Reply from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees dated 30 July 1981

Our Office is gravely concerned by this issue. However, owing to its eminently humanitarian and non-political character, UNHCR would not be in a position to participate actively in such an investigation.

ANNEX III

TRICHOTHECENES

A. Introduction

1. Outbreaks of fatal toxicity in man and animals have long been correlated to consumption of mouldy grain and other agricultural products. In general, these products were harvested under wet conditions and not properly stored. They were found to be contaminated with toxin-producing moulds. High concentration of *Fusarium* mycotoxins were found in many of these products.

2. The biggest recorded outbreak of such toxicity was in Orenburg, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1942-1943) [1] [2] where eating of bread made of over-wintered grain produced a disease called alimentary toxic aleukia, characterized by gastrointestinal disorders, haemorrhage, skin lesions, neurological disturbances, leucopenia and septic angina. In 1965-1966 similar conditions were recorded in Canada, the United States of America and Belgium due to contamination of beer and the disease was called cobalt beer cardiomyopathy. [3] [4] In Wisconsin, the United States of America, an outbreak of toxicity occurred among cattle which consumed mouldy maize in 1968. The cases were charactered by gastroenteritis an haemorrhage and were called haemorrhagic diathesis. [5] [6] In Hokkaido, Japan, mycotoxins were detected in bean hulls used as feed for horses and caused great losses in 1970. [7] In Scotland, Petrie *et al* in 1977 detected mycotoxins in mouldy brewer's grain which were used as feed for dairy cattle and caused haemorrhagic diathesis. [8]

B. Trichothecenes

3. These are a chemically related group of low molecular weight, metabolically active metabolites of fungi. They are produced in the culture of the following genera:

(1) *Fusarium*
(2) *Cephalosporium*
(3) *Myrothecin*
(4) *Trichothecium*
(5) *Trichoderma*
(6) *Stachybotrys*

They are reported to be the cause of the following diseases:

(a) Low temperature mouldy corn intoxication (haemorrhagic disease);
(b) Mouldy cereal emesis;

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[2] Gajdusek, D. C. "Acute Infectious Hemorrhagic Fevers and Mycotoxicoses in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", Washington Medical Science Publication, No. 2 (1953) (Army Medical Service Graduate School).

[3] Morin, Y. L. and Daniel, P. Canadian Medical Association Journal: 97 (1967), pp. 926-928.

[4] Morin, Y. L. and Folly, A. R. Maritineau, G. and Roussel, J. Canadian Medical Association Journal: 97 (1967), pp. 881-883.

[5] Bamburg, J. R. Riggs, N. V. and Strong, F. M. Tetrahedron: 24 (1968), pp. 3329-3336.

[6] Hsu, L. C., Smalley, E. B., Strong, F. M. and Rebelin, W. E. Applied Microbiology: 24 (1972), pp. 684-690.

[7] Ueno, Y., Ishii, K. Sakai, K., Kanaeda, S., Tsunada, H. Tanaka, T. and Enomoto, M. Japanese Journal of Experimental Medicine: 42 (1972), pp. 187-203.

[8] Petrie, L. Robb, J. and Stewart, A. F. Veterinary Review: 101 (1977), p. 326.

(c) Alkabibo toxicosis;
(d) Alimentary toxic aleukia;
(e) Mouldy bean hull intoxication;
(f) Stachybotryotoxicosis;
(g) Dendrodochiotoxicosis (myrotheciotoxicosis);
(h) Fusariotoxicosis.

4. All these diseases are considered primarily trichothecene intoxications. Trichothecenes were divided into two groups with respect to solubility: Group A, which is highly soluble in most aprotic solvents such as ethyl acetate, acetone, cholorform and diethyl ether. T2 toxin belongs to this group. Group B comprises the highly hydroxylated trichothecenes, which are relatively polar and are soluble in either very polar solvents or protic solvents such as methanol and ethanol. The members of this group may be extracted with methanol, aqueous ethanol or water. Nivalenol and deoxy-nivalenol are members of this group.

C. Natural occurrence of trichothecenes

5. Mycotoxin-producing fungi are widely distributed all over the world, and in recent years with advancement in analytical methods various mycotoxins have been isolated from fungus-infected grains and other vegetable products all over the world. Although it is generally accepted that cold and humid weather is optimal for the production of most trichothecenes, various authors have demonstrated the presence of mycotoxin-producing fungi and the production of mycotoxins in rather warm climates.[9] [10] [11] In particular, it appears that the trichothecenes nivalenol. deoxynivalenol and T2 toxins are worldwide in distribution as natural contaminants.[12] The natural occurrence of trichothecenes in feedstuff was reported by different authors to reach high values; deoxynivalenol was up to 1800 g/kg in sample from Michigan and 1000 g/kg in samples from Iowa, Indiana and Minnesota.[13] It was also reported by Vesonder *et al* in 1973 that *F. roseum* No. 117 strain from infected barley-produced deoxynivalenol in large quantities at high temperature.[14] It is important to mention that fungi may produce in laboratory culture, toxins which are different from those produced in field crops because the nutrient supply and the ecology of the fungi under laboratory conditons are quite different from those found in field conditions due to the action of micro-organisms and/or living plants.[14] It was also reported that toxins in the soil can be translocated via the root to other parts of the plant[11] and that some trichothecenes are taken up, chemically modified and stored by some higher plants.[15]

D. Production of trichothecenes in the laboratory

6. Using a sterile corn seed medium with low incubation temperatures, Ikediobi *et al*[16] obtained a yield of 1515 mg. T2 toxin per kg. of dried corn when *F. tricinctum* was incubated at 8°C 30 days. Banburg[17] achieved 900mg T2 toxin/kg of dried corn in *F. tricinctum* cultures incubated for 2 weeks at 8°C.

7. Burmeister[18] produced 9g T2 toxin from culture of *F. tricinctum* after three weeks at 15°C on 1200g of white corn grit. At 20°C only 6.24g T2 toxin was produced, while at 25°C and 32°C only 1.40g and 0.01g were produced respectively. Isolates which produce T2 toxin at low temperatures produce another toxin (HT-2) at higher temperatures.

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[9] Rikmini, C. and Bhat, R. V. Journal of Agricultural Food Chemistry: Vol 20 (1978), No. 3, p. 647.

[10] Ghosal, S., Chakrabarti, D. K and Basu Chaudhary, K. C. Experientia: 33 (1977), No. 5, pp. 547-575.

[11] Chakrabarti, D. K., Basu Chaudhary, K. C. and Ghosal, S. Experientia: 32 (1976), No. 5, pp. 608-609.

[12] Jemmali, M., Ueno, Y., Ishii, K., Frayssinet, C., and Ettienne, M. Experientia: 34 (1978), No. 10, pp. 1333-1334.

[13] Pathre, S. V. and Mirocha, C. J. in "Mycotoxins in Human and Animal Health" (Pathotox, 1977) pp. 239-253.

[14] Yoshizawa, T. and Morooka, N. in "Mycotoxins in Human and Animal Health", pp. 309-319.

[15] Jarvis, B. B., Midiwo, J. O. and Tuthill, D. Science: 214 (1981), p. 460.

[16] Ikedoibi, C. O., Hsu, I. C., Bamburg, J. R., and Strong, F. M. Analytic Biochemistry: 43 (1971), p. 327.

[17] Bamburg, J. R., "Mycotoxins of the Trichothecene Family Produced by Cereal Molds", Ph. D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison (1969).

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E. Stability

8. Trichothecenes are remarkably stable to a variety of environmental conditions: moderate variation of temperature, exposure to light, air and moderate changes in pH. They are not destroyed under conditions to which foods or feeds are normally exposed, either in storage or during cooking.[19] Some claim that at least some trichothecenes are sensitive to sunlight.

F. Biological properties of trichothecenes

9. Fate: using isotopic labelled trichothecene, Ueno[7] showed that these compounds are distributed in the various organs of the body. Maximum concentrations occurred in the liver, then in the kidney and the intestine. It was shown that trichothecenes are completely eliminated from the body within 12 hours.

10. The oral and IP LD_{50} in young mice or rats is below 10 mg/kg.[20] The oral LD_{50} in non-ruminant calves for T2 toxin is 0.6 mg/kg but these levels are nonlethal in older animals. For young rats, the oral LD_{50} of T2 was found by Kosuri *et al.*[21] to be 3.80 mg/kg while[22] found the IP LD_{50} for mice to be 3.04 mg/kg.

11. All naturally occurring trichothecenes induce non-specific dermal reactions humans and laboratory animals, which consist of severe local irritation, inflammation and desquamation when applied locally.[17 19] This effect has been used for semiquantitative estimation in purification studies of T2 toxin and to detect trichothecenes in naturally toxic feeds.[20]

12. Most trichothecenes are cytotoxic to plant and animal tissue cultures. There is correlation between cytotoxicity, dermal toxicity and phytotoxicity. Marsas *et al.*[23] and Burmeister *et al.*[24 25] have suggested the use of plant systems to detect low levels of trichothecene contamination of food and feed.

13. Trichothecenes produce cell degeneration in bone marrow, lymph node, intestine and other organs. Post mortem examination shows engorgement of capillaries around the wall of intestinal tract and ecchymotic haemorrhages in the peritoneal surface of small and large intestines. The lungs are congested and the livers show fatty degeneration.[21 26]

G. Signs and symptoms

14. After administration of an oral lethal dose, the animal becomes listless and inactive, its hair erects, and its respiration rate increases. At a later stage it may develop diarrhea which may be bloody, the body temperature may fall and the respiration becomes shallow and difficult. In sublethal doses necrotic lesions may develop in the mouth.[27 28]

15. Erosion of the mucous membrane of the gastrointestinal tract may lead to severe haemorrhagic gastro-enteritis.[21 26]

16. Emesis occurs to a degree depending on toxin and the experimental animal.[26]

17. Although haemorrhage was reported frequently in relation to consumption of food polluted with mycotoxin-producing fungi, and it was attributed to the presence of T2 toxin, several authors reported the failure of pure trichothecenes and whole cultures to produce experimental haemorrhagic syndrome in calves and pigs.[29 30]

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[21] Kasuri, N. R., Smalley, E. B. and Nicolis, R. E. American Journal of Veterinary Research: 32.

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ANNEX IV

QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONNEXION WITH ITS SUBMISSION DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 1981

The Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons wishes to submit the following questions with a view to seeking clarification on some of the points contained in the note of the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations dated 14 September 1981.

I. Questions with respect to the samples collected

1. With respect to the site from which the samples were collected:

(a) From what area exactly were the samples collected?

(b) When was this particular area exposed to the alleged chemical attack?

(c) What was the time-lapse between the alleged chemical attack and the collection of the sample? Was there any rainfall during this interval?

(d) What was the temperature at the site at the time?

2. With respect to the method of sampling:

(a) Were there any particular precautions taken in obtaining and handling the samples? If not, have any persons who handled them experienced any dermal reaction?

(b) Were the leaf and stem sample, mentioned in the report, the only samples collected? If more samples were available, why was the analysis limited to the single leaf and stem sample?

(c) Was the sample leaf picked from a living plant and was it itself fresh and living, or was it dry and dead? Was it collected from the ground?

(d) What was the species of the plant from which the sample was collected?

(e) Were there any other samples collected from the area, particularly from the soil or water?

(f) What was the time-lapse between the obtaining of the samples and their laboratory examination?

3. With respect to the laboratory tests:

(a) Have any tests been conducted to discover the presence of any mycotoxin-producing fungi in the samples?

(b) have any morphological and/or histological studies been conducted on the samples to detect any effect which could have been produced by the mycotoxin as it is known to affect higher forms of plant life?

(c) What was the method of assay of the mycotoxins? What was the exact amount of each individual mycotoxin found in the samples in terms of mg/kg of dry weight of the sample?

II. Questions with repect to the area from which the samples were collected

1. With respect to the people living in the area:

Were there any casualties in the area following the alleged chemical attack? If so, what were the signs and symptoms experienced by such casualties? Are there any medical records? Is it possible to give names of the refugee camps where they can be located? Any information that can help to locate the casualties or eyewitnesses to the attacks will be most appreciated.

2. With respect to animal life in the area:

Were any animals in the area affected in any way after the alleged chemical attack? If so, what were the signs and symptoms displayed by the animals and when did they start?

III. General questions

1. It would be appreciated if some clarification were given concerning the information contained in the last four lines of page 1 of the note dated 14 September 1981. Can this be taken to mean that the agent(s) produced its/their effect in the central area of attack within minutes/hours?

2. Page 4, paragraph 5:

"Levels of deoxynivalenol and nivalenol detected were up to twenty times greater than that reported to occur when vegetation is naturally contaminated by tricothecene toxins."

Does this mean that the vegetation in the area could be naturally contaminated?

ANNEX V

SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS MADE DURING INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS DURING ITS VISIT TO THAILAND

A. Nong Khai Refugee Holding Center

Medical personnel

Dr. Charles Weldon, Medical Director of the Center:

He has been at the camp for five months and is the longest-serving medical officer at the camp. He has had no experience with alleged victims of chemical attack. He stated that his predecessor (Dr. Townsend) claimed to have had some experience with toxic-agent victims.

Common diseases seen in the refugees are upper-respiratory-tract infections, gastrointestinal diseases, tuberculosis (resistance to standard therapy is not a big problem in the camp; the diagnoses were done by acid-fast stains of sputum and chest x-rays; some sputum cultures were sent to Bangkok for processing). Other diseases worth mentioning: paragonimiasis, scabies, other skin diseases.

Medical records of hospitalized patients go back only to March 1980. Outpatients carry their own OPD cards and no copies are kept in the hospital.

Alleged victims

1. Vang Xai Lu; male; married; age 45; Residence: Ban Pu Huat, Xiang Khwang; Occupation: soldier, formerly with the Royal Lao Army.

Place of exposure: Pou Bia Noy Village in Laos; Date of exposure: November 1980; Mode of delivery: airplane sprayed "yellow rain"; Effect: after 30 minutes' dizziness, tears, blurring of vision, coughing, chest pain, generalized itching, nausea.

Duration of recovery: about seven months, until he was treated at the camp.

Present condition: generalized body stiffness, blurred vision, generalized itching.

Physical examination: not significant.

Further information: out of 14 people with him in the rice field, 4 reportedly died later. Animals that ate "contaminated" material died. Young leaves fell off during the following week.

2. Yang Poo; female; married; age 40 (wife of Vang Xai Lu); Residence: Ban Pu Huat, Xiang Khwang; Occupation: housewife.

Place of exposure: Pou Bia Noy Village, in Laos; Date of exposure: November 1980 (two attacks, seven days apart) Mode of delivery: not described, "yellow rain" mentioned; Effect: irritation of the eyes, with no tears, intense coughing, later vomited two to three times. After a week, had bloody diarrhea for three or four days.

Duration of recovery: about 10 days.

Present condition: complained of physical weakness and numbness of both legs.

Medical records available: out-patient department card showed she had received treatment as having "peripheral neuritis."

Further information: her two children, aged 8 and 10, became sick earlier than their parents. Two other people in the field were also sick. Chickens died within 10 days, two or three a day.

3. Tang Yea Yang; male; married; age 60; Residence: Huey Kan, Phou Bie, Laos; Occupation: village head man.

Date of exposure: February 1981; Mode of delivery: airplane sprayed powder; Effect: coughing and diarrhea for two days, generalized itching for five days. The symptoms appeared after drinking water the day after it had rained.

Duration of recovery: took opium and diarrhea stopped in two days.

Present condition: no complaints.

Physical examination: not significant.

Further information: people becoming sick with coughing and diarrhea were cured with opium; some people in the village died one or two days after the attack.

B. Ban Vinai Refugee Holding Center

Medical personnel

Dr. Gideon Regalado, Medical Officer:

He has been Medical Officer of the camp since February 1980. When questioned, he mentioned respiratory diseases (common cold, bronchial asthma, chronic bronchitis, tuberculosis) as the most common, together with gastrointestinal disorders. Other endemic diseases worth mentioning were lung and liver flukes; among skin diseases, scabies and pyogenic infections (abscesses), which he attributed to crowding.

Asked to expand on the subject of alleged victims of chemical attacks, he indicated there were no means to confirm their allegations. No set of signs and symptoms were suggestive of abnormalities associated with chemical warfare agents. There were no consistent laboratory data, either. The refugees, he said, arrived in the camp anywhere from two to eight months or more after alleged attacks, having walked for 20 to 30 days in the jungle. Dr. Regalado expressed the opinion that since there is a considerable time lag between the alleged exposure and arrival of refugees in Thailand, it may be that only the "survivors" make it. He cited as an example the case of a particular refugee who was sent to a lung specialist in the town of Udon (Thailand), and whose report established no relation between his condition and exposure to chemical agents. Although mothers attribute the death of several new-born children to after-effects of "gassing" during pregnancy, no conclusion could be reached on the matter because no study has been done to clarify the issue.

The four doctors in the camp see about 300 patients a day. Medical records are kept for only three months after a particular refugee leaves camp, and are then disposed of.

Alleged victims

4. Pha Cher Pao; male; married; age 53; Residence: Pa Pai Village, Xiang Hong District, Xiang Kwang Province, Laos; Occupation: soldier, lieutenant in the "resistance army" of General Van Pao.

Place of exposure: Pha Nam Khaot; Date of exposure: 18 August 1978, 3 p.m., Mode of delivery: following artillery attack, a low-flying airplane sprayed smoke at resistance fighters.

Effect: he was hiding in a cave; he suffered eye irritation, coughing, became dizzy and had stomach pain. He took opium and had no vomiting or diarrhea. Those outside the cave (about 200 people) died within five minutes. They coughed and afterwards vomited blood. The youngest died sooner, some with convulsions. Pha developed lesions on his legs where impregnated foliage had brushed them.

Physical examination: two light-coloured, pale scars on the anterior (bony) aspect of each leg, from ½ to 1 cm in diameter.

5. Vang Yia Poa; male, married; age 40; Residence: Pao Koa Kwai, Van Bang Heng, Twakom; Vientiane, Laos; Occupation: village head man under Kraison Promirharm's Government.

Alleged witness to two attacks, alleged victim of a third attack; Dates of attack: June 1977, September 1980, January 1981; Mode of delivery: aerial spray.

Effect: (similar each time) The victims coughed up blood, later developed bloody diarrhea and a skin rash. Some symptoms were prevented by opium. 18 people died in first attack, 30 in second and 81 in third.

Further information: he stated that, having been interviewed four times, he was not going to testify again.

6. Her Mor; male, married; age 35; Residence: Poo Bia Ya Village, Vang Xia District, Xiang Kwang Province, Laos; Occupation: resistance soldier in General Van Pao's army.

Place of attack: Long Xang Village. Hong District, Vientiane; Date of attack: 17 October 1980; Mode of delivery: a slow airplane srayed a yellow powder.

Effect: dizziness, eye irritation, vomiting, bloody diarrhea. Later developed blisters of different sizes on the skin. Many people and animals died.

Duration of recovery: had not felt well until treated in the hospital at the camp in February 1981.

Physical examination: multiple small, pale scars on proximal third of leg, on anterior-lateral and -medial aspects, several sizes but about ½ cm in diameter. He attributes these scars to blisters he developed after brushing his legs against "impregnated" foliage.

7. Her Ge; male; married; age 36; Residence: Mon Lon, near Mnang Hong, Vientiane Province, Laos; Occupation: farmer.

Date of attack: 29 December 1980; Mode of delivery: an airplane flew over the village and he heard "like a soft rain" on the roof of his house.

Effect: he was dizzy next morning, and lay down; lost consciousness from noon until midnight. His wife and mother, who had remained in the house, did not develop symptoms. The same was true of two of his children who did not come out of the house. The children who had gone out to see the airplane vomited profusely and developed a skin rash. One of them received opium and was cured, while the other died. Other families had similar experiences. The animals were unaffected. Leaves became yellow and developed holes.

Further information: was interviewed by foreigners on an earlier occasion.

8. Mang Chang; female; single; age 18; Residence: Pha Hoi, Vientiane Province, Laos; Occupation: farmer.

Date exposed: October 1981 (about the 10th), and 17 October 1981; Mode of delivery: heard airplane (day was cloudy) make several passes over rice field; while the airplane could still be heard, she saw yellow powder on leaves and ground.

Effect: one hour after she ate some plants, which she had washed free of the yellow powder in a stream, she "became like drunk", with a headache, dizziness, some cough with pain, had difficulty breathing or speaking, passed sticky sputum and had to lie down; she vomited and the vomitus contained bile. The symptoms cleared after she slept in her home. No other member of the family (nine persons) who also ate the vegetables had any illness. On 17 October 1981, as a member of a group that was fleeing from Laos, she walked through a field covered with "yellow powder" for 50 meters and then turned back as soon as the group noticed it.

Present condition: she complains of "some fever" which was not confirmed (her temperature was 36.8°), and of some skin lesions on her arms where "impregnated" leaves brushed them.

Physical examination: General condition good. Has a goiter (about 10 x 10 cm palpable splenomegaly; scars and superficial infections on the legs and arms. Laboratory findings: nothing abnormal detected.

9. Ko Chang; male; single; age 17; Residence: Phu Pieng, Vientiane Province, Laos; Occupation: farmer.

Place and date of attack: in his village when he was a small child; a second time in October 1980, lastly an alleged third exposure on the afternoon of 17 October 1981.

Mode of delivery: (attack of 1980) he saw an airplane while he was in the field with his family harvesting rice; saw yellow powder which looked like pollen grains fall on leaves, the ground, himself and his family.

Effect: half an hour after exposure he felt dizzy and developed a headache; others had vomiting and diarrhea approximately three hours later; some developed "weeping wounds" on the legs. 17 October 1981 incident: with five other members of the group fleeing Laos he walked on a yellow powder for about 50 m and then turned back. It produced a "wound" on his foot and he also had diarrhea and abdominal pain on the evening of the same day. He recovered in two days.

Physical examination: not significant.

Laboratory abnormalities: eosinophilia: 18 percent.

10. Vang Yee Thao; male; single; age 18; Residence: Ban Dom, Vientiane Province, Laos; Occupation: Student (third grade primary school).

Place and date of incident: while fleeing from Laos, 17 October 1981.

Mode of delivery: unknown, but believes an airplane which the group saw was responsible. The yellow material was dry, with grains the size of ground flour. The group walked for 50 m on the powder, then turned back.

Effect: nine days after exposure to the powder, he felt dizzy and, for a short while, had difficulty breathing.

Physical examination: not significant.

Laboratory abnormalities: leucocytosis: 16,200 WBC per mm^3.

11. Kia Pao Chang; male; married; age 37; Residence: Phu Peang, Vientiane Province, Laos; Occupation: soldier and farmer.

Place and date exposed: near his village, 17 October 1981; Description: similar to those above.

Effect: Five days after alleged exposure, he became dizzy and developed numbness in his feet. He experienced diarrhea six days after alleged exposure.

Physical examination; has some lesions on legs and feet which were very superficial small exulcerations, crusted over with yellowish material.

Clinical impression: possibly eczematous lesions.

Laboratory finding: nothing abnormal noted.

12. Xiong Leng Chang; male; married; age 50; Residence; Phu Peang, Vientiane Province, Laos; Occupation; farmer.

Exposure: same incident referred to above on 17 October 1981. He heard an airplane before the incident of the group's walking on the "yellow rain"; he was by himself at that time. The powder was spread over a rice and corn field.

Effect: he felt dizzy at the time of the alleged exposure; this feeling worsened with the heat at noon the next day. He continued to feel ill for several days. He had diarrhea nine days after exposure and recovered after three days.

Physical examination: not significant.

Laboratory findings: nothing abnormal detected.

13. Chia Xang Change; male; married (two wives); age 36; Residence: Phu Peang; Occupation: farmer.

Exposure: same incident referred to above on 17 October 1981.

Effect: sore throat and mild diarrhea, seven days after alleged exposure. Has developed a "wound" on the sacral and perineal areas, which he attributes to having slept on leaves and without a shirt, on the night of 17 October.

Physical examination: dermatitis of the sacral and perineal areas.

Clinical impression: contact dermatitis.

Laboratory findings: nothing abnormal detected.

Alleged eyewitnesses

14. Lor Nao Pao; male; married; age 33; Residence: Pu Hea; Occupation: soldier (first lieutenant) in General Van Pao's army.

Date of attack: February 1979; Mode of delivery: airplane sprayed something like smoke, which reached the ground within 30 minutes and appeared to be yellow in color.

Effect: dizziness, vomiting (after one hour). first food, then blood; diarrhea in those that didn't vomit (after an hour). Out of 600 people exposed, 2 died. Those inside houses did not develop symptoms but left the village and returned a week later.

Further information: He has taken photographs of skin conditions attributed by the villagers to the attack, five months after it occurred. He has also collected some yellow material from a rock in a rice field with a stick and protecting his arms and face with a cloth, while fleeing from Laos. He says he has heard of several attacks in the area where he made the collection from, but did not witness any. He has turned in both his pictures and the yellow powder he collected to the Group.

15. Kue Yoo Kan; male; married; age 35; Residence: Phou Bia Ya Village, Xiang Hong District, Xiang Kwang Province, Laos; Occupation: soldier under General Van Pao.

Place of attack: Ban Nam Kiang, Xiang Kwang Province; Date of attack: 1 April 1978 and 2 October 1978; Mode of delivery: aerial spray.

Effect: Those who drank water from the pool were affected. They vomited and had diarrhea. His daughter, age 1, was sick after drinking unboiled water and her teeth became "spoiled". The leaves in the area developed black spots after the attack.

Present condition: he now complains of pain in the joints.

16. Thao Chang Teng; male; married; age 55; Residence: Keo Yai, Laos; Occupation: village group leader.

Place of attack: the rice field of his village, rice field for 30 families; Date of attack: September 1980; Mode of delivery: Believes a slow-flying plane which made two passes over the rice field delivered the yellow powder (granules the size of sugar granules) which was seen next day on the rice field.

Effect: The woman (age 60) who looked after the rice was found dead on the day following the sighting of the airplane. She lay in the hut, face down, holding her stomach, with frothy discharge from the nose and saliva drooling from the mouth. Three watchdogs lay dead with outstretched legs, near the hut, with their heads in the water of the rice field.

17. Yang Chao; male; married; age 25; Residence: Phou Yer, Vientiane Province, Laos; Occupation: farmer.

Place of attack: Pha Neng Village; Date of attack: December 1980; Mode of delivery: airplane sprayed smoke on the village when the people went out to look at it.

Effect: coughing, vomiting and diarrhea developed in his wife and child "after dinner". His wife took opium and was cured, while his child, who was too young to be given opium, died. Other families had similar experiences; those who did not take opium (for example, young children) died. All animals in the village died.

Spots developed on the leaves, which, however, did not fall off.

Further information: He was interviewed by two foreigners on an earlier occasion.

18. Vue Nhia Ka; male; married; age 40; Residence: Long Cheng, Laos; Occupation: soldier in the Royal Loa Army; Place of attack: Hoi Zao, Xieng Khwang, Laos; Date of attack: June 1980; Mode of delivery: two airplanes launched two rockets, which exploded in mid-air. A yellow cloud appeared and a powder settled all around.

Effect: all families (14) except one (four members) hid in special covered "bunkers". All the members of the family who were exposed (ages 15–60) had vomiting with some blood and diarrhea; blisters appeared on their skin. They all died overnight.

All animals in the village died, with much salivation and swollen abdomens. Leaves in the area became yellow and developed holes.

C. Panatnikhom Refugee Processing Center

Medical personnel

Dr. Sorapipatana Chamras, one of nine doctors working at the Center.

Dr. Chamras has never treated any case of alleged exposure to chemical warfare agents. The diseases most commonly seen in the Centre include upper respiratory tract infections and gastrointestinal disorders, especially diarrhea. Questioned about epistaxis, he reported that he saw a few cases each year, and only in children; asked to comment about diarrhea and bleeding, he said he met the problem at times, and that he thought it was usually dysentery, possibly amebic.

Alleged eyewitnesses

19. Do Hong San; male; married; age 21; Residence: Saigon, Viet Nam; Occupation: soldier (private) in the Vien Hong Regiment (sent to Kampuchea) of the Vietnamese National Army.

Place of incident: Phanom Malai (mountain in Kampuchea); Date of incident: September 1979; Description: He saw a Russian soldier firing a weapon shaped like a rocket, which exploded and emitted smoke that killed people.

Further information: This witness has been interviewed by jounalists and an article was published in Bangkok newspapers in which he described the death of both Vietnamese and Kampuchean troops which were fighting against each other.

20. Sam Sotha; male; married; age 29; Residence: Battambang City, Kampuchea; Occupation: Catholic Relief Services worker at Bishop's house.

Place of incident: 15 kms from Thailand-Kampuchea border; Date of incident: June 1980; Description of incident: saw two soldiers come on stretchers from battlefield and was told these were paralyzed by a gas used in combat. He was told the soldiers recovered in 24 hours.

21. Chhiv Nguon; male; married; age 35; Residence: Kampong Cham Province, Kampuchea; Occupation: soldier (sergeant major) with Lon Nol régime.

Place of incident: Premveng Province, Kampuchea; Date of incident: 1972.

Description of incident: during combat, he had to send back soldiers who were "sick" because of a white-coloured smoke used by the Viet Cong in Kampuchea. Those affected were "paralysed" (unconscious?) unless protected by mask or by a rag wet with urine and rubbed with onions held against nose and mouth. Sometimes 20–30 soldiers from his battalion (512 men) had to leave combat; they returned one week to one month after exposure. Sometimes a little blood came from the nose.

22. Yang Phon; male; married; age 55; Residence: Battambang City, Kampuchea; Occupation: soldier (sergeant major) of the Khmer Republic Army (Lon Nol régime), 1954–1975.

Place of incident: Dam Nak Kakos Village, Kampuchea.

Description of incident: He was traveling on foot and encountered a combat situation; he saw three civilians lying "paralysed" on the road. He smeared their noses and mouths with onion and urine and did the same to himself, and soon the civilians recovered. He did not see how the agent reached the people, but the combat sounds came from about 100–500 m.

23. Quan Nguyen; male; married; age 36; Residence: Codo Bavi Hasonbinh, North Vietnam; Occupation: soldier (captain), commanded an artillery unit in the North Vietnamese Army.

Place of incident: Vietnam and later Kampuchea.

Date of incident: From 1967 until 20 January 1980 (when he crossed the border).

He says he knows of three types of chemical weapons: tear gas, dissolving chemical and stronger, destroying chemical. He had used only tear gas.

Witnesses presenting hearsay information

24. Manivanh Kham Phiou; male; married; age 35; Residence: Vientiane, Laos; Occupation: Pilot in the Royal Lao Air Force.

Place of incident: Wattai airport; Date of incident: October 1976, 2 p.m.

Description: A wooden box containing plastic bags of some Soviet product broke and a powder came out which smelled like chlorine. The spill was cleaned and then decontaminated with no special precautions. However, his friends (Pathet Lao soldiers) commented on dangerous poisons being shipped from the Soviet Union for the use of the Vietnamese armed forces.

Effect: Mild coughing, lacrimation, sneezing and headaches in the workers who did the cleaning.

25. Vang Neng; male; married; age 39; Residence: Ban Phou Mang, Xiang Khouang Province, Laos; Occupation: Soldier (lieutenant) in the Royal Lao Army; presently Hmong Leader in Ban Vinai Refugee Holding Center; He has been hearing of the attacks since 1976.

26. Hô Tâ'n Cu'u; male; single; age 20; Residence: Qua'ng Nam da nang, South Vietnam; Occupation: Soldier (private serving in artillery unit, Vietnamese Army in Nimit, Kampuchea.

Just heard stories from soldiers.

27. Ul Saem; male; married; age 55; Residence: Takeo City, Takeo Province, Kampuchea; Occupation: Court clerk in Takeo City 1967–1970; in Phnom Pehn 1970–1979.

Description: His son told him of combat situations in which "gas" was used, which he heard as stories from other soldiers in 1974.

28. Le Van Luong; male; married; age 69; Residence: 13 c/27 Kydong, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; Occupation: Professor in Saigon University, Department of History.

Has only hearsay information.

D. Other sources of information

The Group consulted with two representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Alan Simmance, Regional Representative and Dr. Arcot G. Rangaraj, Health Officer, who provided information regarding general conditions of the refugee camps; health conditions among the refugees and local pathology. Questioned as to whether they had seen cases attributable to chemical warfare agents, they said they had no report at all on the subject. The UNHCR promised to contribute whole-heartedly with the Group in its efforts to implement its mandate. This assistance included help in locating the refugees whose names appear in the United States submissions and in the provision of an interpreter.

In the course of the interviews, several witnesses referred to a certain Dr. Amos Townsend, who had previously interviewed some of the refugees. Consequently, the Group decided to meet with Dr. Townsend in order to seek any relevant data at his disposal. Dr. Townsend is a retired colonel of the United States Air Force and currently health co-ordinator of various relief agencies including the International Rescue Committee.

Dr. Townsend stated that he himself was convinced that chemical warfare agent are being used against the Hmong people. He believed that an effort is underway either to destroy the Hmong, to scare them off, or to experiment with various new chemical warfare agents. Dr. Townsend turned over to the Group two samples of vegetation (one leaf, one stem) reportedly collected by a Hmong refugee from an area of alleged attack on 3 October 1981. These samples had been delivered to him with an anonymous note. In this respect, the Group felt that it was not in a position to verify the accuracy of the report that the samples did in fact come from the area alleged to have come under attack. As indicated in paragraph 48 above, whereas on an *a priori* basis the Group would not wish to question that samples were collected from areas of alleged chemical attack, the Group, however, cannot base its final judgment on the results of the analysis of samples collected through other than impartial procedures. He also turned over to the group several photographs of some refugees, one girl and five men, as well as whole blood (heparinized) and clotted blood collected from the girl. Finally, he stated that he had sent all evidence that he had allegedly collected to the United States through the United States Embassy in Bangkok.

The Group was also approached by members of the Canadian Embassy in Bangkok, who met with the Group and provided some background information on the Canadian submission and their own activities. It was the impression of the Group that there was no additional data that the Group could take into account.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

I have a few more questions. How much do the Soviet people know about what is going on in Afghanistan? Are they getting word of the number of wounded and dead and the state of morale of their troops? Is there any way that we can judge the morale?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Mr. Chairman, we feel, just from a study of the Soviet press, that the Soviet Government itself is under pressure to speak with some more frankness than it has in the past about the difficulties of their troops in Afghanistan. To my knowledge, they have not mentioned actual casualties, but they have frequently spoken of the difficulties and the danger of serving in Af-

ghanistan. They have spoken of the patriotic duty of Soviet soldiers to serve in Afghanistan, indicating a need to justify this type of service.

We are confident that the Soviets have suffered between 10,000 and 15,000 casualties in Afghanistan. This inevitably gets around in the population. So that understanding probably is growing. Of course, through our broadcasts by the VOA and the other broadcasts of Western countries, this type of information and detail also is being provided.

The CHAIRMAN. What does our intelligence show as to the quality of the Soviet military activity in Afghanistan? How effective is it and what about the state of morale of Soviet troops? Do we think that they really feel they have a mission to perform for the fatherland, that this is a terribly important place for them to be, and that they should be doing what they are doing?

Mr. STODDARD. Mr. Chairman, you could get an indirect answer to that question from looking at the efforts of the Soviets to keep the number of casualties secret, and to downplay their involvement in combat operations which they never have admitted even now, although Soviet publications do reflect increasingly, as Ambassador Stoessel said, some things going on there they feel the need to explain to their own people.

In terms of morale and effectiveness, it looks as though the Soviets have had to learn rather painfully a number of lessons about what is involved in their operations in Afghanistan. This is shown in the kinds of changes they have made over the last 2 years in the mix of forces, in the increments, as Ambassador Stoessel mentioned, which began in November, and in the switch from the small unit tactics to large sweep operations.

They have had to do many things to get a grip on the major cities, including much harsher repression in the urban centers, such as Kandahar and Herat, in order to keep lines of communication open and be able to control a declining percentage of the countryside.

They also have suffered considerable casualties from faulty hygiene. Though the percentage of deaths is rather low, that is not surprising in terms of the kind of war it is. But there has been a rather large percentage caused by disease from an inability to cope with the kinds of conditions they have run into in terms of water, food, and such other things. I don't have any precise figures on that, but it certainly is a very large number, quite a few thousand.

The CHAIRMAN. I would insert into the record at this point an article from the March 1, Washington Post by Dusko Doder, datelined Moscow, February 28, in which they describe the life of a Soviet conscript as lonely, cold, and under attack in an unhospitable land where things are very, very, very tough for the Soviets. It is a very vivid account of conditions there.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1982]

RED ARMY TALES: COLD, LONELY LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN

(By Dusko Doder)

Moscow, Feb. 28—Against the backdrop of snow-covered Afghan mountains, Soviet soldiers were cheering their sergeant as he received an award for successes in "socialist competition." The photograph showed smiling faces framed by Red Army fur hats and a cheerful colonel, presumably delivering a pep talk.

The scene last week captured a "particularly unusual" moment, the caption said, because "the applause is resounding in the Afghan mountains, where silence is frequently broken by the shots from automatic weapons and the explosion of grenades."

The accompanying dispatch from the front gave a remarkable glimpse of the life of the Soviet conscript: lonely, cold and under attack in an unhospitable land where things are "very, very tough" for the Soviets.

The cruelty and ferocity of the fighting was illustrated by heavy casualties suffered by Moslem insurgents, who in January alone counted 2,223 dead and 1,117 captured, according to the account.

Yet, the dispatch in the Defense Ministry newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda said, "Thousands upon thousands of bandits, armed and trained abroad, pour across the border day after day" into Afghanistan.

Their savage tactics include the bombing of schools and hospitals, the paper said. Giving "the facts of the past few days," it described a woman being hacked to death in the street. In another incident, hostages were seized, tortured and skinned alive. In the Faizabad region, the wife and 13-year-old daughter of an Afghan security official were "brutally shot" by rebels.

But, it said, the Soviet soldiers' morale was high. The Kabul Army was described as hitting "mercilessly" at the rebels, and the dispatch implied that Soviet forces had taken part in last month's large-scale operations, quoting them as saying they would not leave the Afghan people in misery.

But the reference to a possible Soviet fighting role was never explicitly stated. During the 26 months since dispatching their Army into Afghanistan, the Soviets' vocabulary seems to have lost the word war.

Combat actions are described as "exercises." There is no mention of Soviet casualties.

Western analysts attribute the apparently exaggerated nature of much of Soviet war correspondence from Afghanistan to the dilemma that Moscow faces in addressing its domestic and foreign audiences.

At home, the war has reached, directly or indirectly, a large sector of the population. Approximately 400,000 Soviet troops have been rotated in and out of Afghanistan during the past 26 months. A substantial number of conscripts serving in the Soviet Union may be facing possible duty there in the future. Then there are Soviet casualties, which have never been revealed.

According to Western specialists, even assuming a relatively low rate of 5 percent injured among the 400,000 who have served in Afghanistan, the number of wounded should be substantial—about 20,000. It is known that the Soviets have converted two schools in Tashkent into military hospitals.

Against this background, and the noticeable thirst for information about the war, the authorities are under substantial pressure to provide details in order to keep their credibility.

At the same time, Moscow insists that the fight against the rebels is conducted exclusively by the Afghan Army and that the Soviet forces are merely providing training and other types of "fraternal assistance."

To concede a direct Soviet military role, according to this argument would provide new opportunities for an international outcry including demands for details about the size of the Soviet contingent and the nature of its operations.

The job of maintaining the illusion that the Soviets are not involved in the fighting is a difficult one. Soviet sources privately acknowledge that the Afghan Army has virtually collapsed and that efforts are under way to rebuild it.

This may be reflected by the fact that at the time of increased rebel activity, the Afghan defense minister, his deputy, the chief of the Afghan Air Force and several other senior Afghan military officials remain in the Soviet Union—a visit that has lasted more than four months.

What the Soviet media focuses on instead, are the conflicting themes of "normalization" of life in the country and increased imperialist pressure from the outside to subvert the Soviet-backed government in Kabul.

The steady diet of accounts ranging from literacy studies to joint irrigation efforts to improve the quality of Afghan life is sprinkled with attacks on the United States, China and Pakistan for their support of "counterrevolutionary bandits."

The Krasnaya Zvezda dispatch from the front, published on the Soviet Army Day, provided an unusually frank account of the life of Soviet conscripts.

"We are not going to hide the fact that they are having a tough time, and sometimes it is very, very tough," the dispatch said. Yet their mood is "cheerful" and not one soldier the correspondent spoke to complained of hardship, and all are "in fighting spirit."

The correspondent described an Army camp in an unnamed valley with tents stretching in all directions "as far as the eye can see." On the eve of the Soviet Army Day last Tuesday, ending their "exercises" with a long tiring trek through slush and mire and a "strenuous attack" in a neighboring mountain pass, the soldiers spruced themselves up.

Sitting around a campfire and eating bowls of *kasha*, they reminisced about their home towns far from Afghanistan but close in spirit.

One officer, a major, was introduced as an amateur poet having written some heroic doggerel about his country's glorious role in defending Afghanistan against "dark clouds" created by its enemies.

"For a Russian it is the custom to help, I shall help you, Oh Afghan!" the major intoned.

This and a film shown to the troops that night for the first time introduced the theme that the soldiers are selfless patriots serving under hard conditions far from home to fulfill their "internationalist" duty much in the way their fathers did in the Spanish Civil War and World War II. The film, the article said, featured Soviet volunteers with internationalist brigades fighting for the Spanish city of Grenada against Franco's forces.

"Our coming to our neighbor's aid—at his urgent request—is not aggression or intervention, as ill-intentioned slanderers try to prove. The only duty of the Soviet military contingent is to help Afghanistan repel the threat from outside," the newspaper said.

The decision to publish the account on Army Day—a major holiday—apparently reflected a political need here to reassure the country that things in Afghanistan, however difficult, are not getting out of hand.

At the same time, the tone of the dispatch did not suggest that, to borrow the phrase, one could see light at the end of the tunnel.

The dispatch ended with what could be seen as an attempted moral booster for the Soviet forces in Afghanistan: "You should know, friends, that you live in every Soviet heart. People are proud of you, love you, remember you. The victory you have achieved is a victory of our Army, of our country, of brotherhood and nobility, a victory of internationalism.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the refugees, what is the cost to the United states of the refugee camps? Do we have an estimate as to what the cost is to the Pakistanis and to the United Nations? What other countries are helping out in this area? If you do not have those figures today, they could be inserted onto the record later. If you have anything that you can give us on that today, we would appreciate it.

I will read from this article in the Washington Post.

The cruelty and ferocity of the fighting was illustrated by heavy casualties suffered by Muslim insurgents who in January alone counted 2,223 dead and 1,117 captured, according to one account,

So, casualties are very heavy on both sides.

Ambassador STOESSEL. That is right. With regard to the refugee question, we will be pleased to supply the details for the record.

[The material referred to follows:]

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN REFUGEE RELIEF

[SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE]

U.S. official contributions for Afghan refugee relief in fiscal year 1980 and 1981 totalled $132 million. From the beginning of the international relief program in Oc-

tober 1979 through the end of calendar year 1981, the UNHCR committed $148 million, while the dollar value of food contributions coordinated by the World Food Program was roughly $130 million, for a total of $278 million. (These figures include U.S. contributions.) The list of countries making special contributions to the UNHCR and WFP programs is extensive, including virtually all of Western Europe (bilaterally as well as through the European Community), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and others. Also, some 28 American and European voluntary agencies have channeled private contributions into the relief effort. There are no aggregate statistics on these private contributions. Several Middle Eastern countries also appear to have made very sizeable donations, but we have no good estimate of these donations as they have not been publicized, and are not coordinated by a single body.

Pakistan has been bearing the cost of inland transportation of relief goods, a portion of the administrative costs of running the refugee camps, and supplementary cash allowances to the refugees. Another major indirect cost is the severe ecological damage being done by the presence of 2½ million refugees and their livestock. It is difficult to estimate the total of these costs to Pakistan as, in addition to the intangible aspect of ecological damage, many expenses are merged within the regular operating budget of the Government of Pakistan.

Costs for the current calendar year will depend on how much the refugee population continues to grow. The present UNHCR budget for the year is $57.6 million, but will probably increase. Basic food costs will be at least $130 million. The U.S. pledge to UNHCR is $24 million. Public Law 480 Title II food pledges have come to $54 million so far during the year, with the possibility of more as total requirements for the year become clearer. This will bring total U.S. contributions to over $210 million since the program began.

Ambassador STOESSEL. I mentioned earlier that the United States has contributed $200 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees since 1980. In this fiscal year, our contribution so far has been $67 million. But we will be pleased to provide more details and more information about the Pakistani effort for the record.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

I have one last question for you, Mr. Secretary, or for your colleagues. You have witnessed a great many tragedies in the world over your long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service. Here, we have an initiative taken by this country. We have the European parliament's initiative in marking Afghanistan Day. Is this just a passing note of concern by the world, and do you think the world is likely to just get used to and adjust to the situation? Or, do you think that by continuing to keep this on the front burner, by never letting the world forget what is being done that we can see some results, that it will not be forgotten, and that the people of Afghanistan will not be forgotten?

Ambassador STOESSEL. I certainly agree with that, Mr. Chairman. We feel that the record shows that there has been a high degree of sustained interest in and attention to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. We want to see that continue. The resolution passed by the Congress in this regard has been very helpful.

You mentioned also the action by the European parliament. These and similar actions, we feel, will be very helpful in keeping public opinion focused on this problem. We certainly do not intend to let it be forgotten.

Also, in all of our exchanges with the Soviet Union, we have in the past and we will continue to discuss this problem and to emphasize that as long as the Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan, there will be a very adverse effect on East-West relations in general and on United States-Soviet relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We have had a request from the minority for one question to be asked though they do not have any Senators here at this time. What is the reason for the UNHCR granting refugee status in India to Afghans arriving directly from Afghanistan but not those who transit Pakistan? Has the administration raised this issue with the UNHCR?

Ambassador STOESSEL. I would be very pleased to answer that question for the record.

[The material referred to follows:]

UNHCR DOCUMENTATION OF REFUGEES IN INDIA

[SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE]

In early 1982 the UNHCR office in New Delhi began granting refugee documentation to all qualified Afghan citizens. Before that time, UNHCR has given refugee documentation only to those Afghans who had come directly to Delhi from Afghanistan without stopping in another country (usually Pakistan) enroute. Justification for the previous policy—now no longer followed—was that those Afghans who fled to another country first had in fact found asylum in that country.

The CHAIRMAN. We will also have additional questions to submit to you as well.

Gentlemen, we thank you very much. I want to assure the Department that we will cooperate in every way. We appreciate the Department's cooperation with this resolution. I will set time aside in the Senate to have record statements by members who wish to participate. I have discussed with Secretary Rogers the possibility of Senators having tapes prepared to send back to their home districts, and home States. I would hope the House would do the same. In this way, we could remind every community in America that because we have our freedom, we don't take it for granted when others do not have it, that every group under suppression, whether in the Baltic States or in Afghanistan, deserves freedom.

This is the first invasion ever made by the Soviet Union of a Third World country. We will never let the Soviets forget that they made a mistake. I think they are beginning to realize it more and more.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think, also, that we certainly will take into account that our objective is not to namecall. Our objective is to have a government that is the choice of the people of Afghanistan. That is a sovereign nation. That is what the United Nations has resoundingly called for. That is what the Muslim countries have called for. If the Soviets would work out a plan for withdrawal and turn that government back to the Afghan people, we will be the first to applaud that action.

It is a difficult thing once you get into a situation like this. We are not going to namecall. We would just as soon get this behind us as quickly as possible. But it will never get behind us, I repeat, it will never get behind us unless the Soviets turn the government of Afghanistan to its people, whatever way they can figure out to do it. Whatever way the Pakistanis and other countries can help in this process will be important.

The mistake, I believe, was made. It did not work out the way the Soviets envisioned. The Soviets have not been able to get out as

fast as some in the Soviet Union had hoped. Let's accelerate that process now, and see what we can do to speed it up.

Thank you all very much.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we will resume our panel of public witnesses. They are Rosanne Klass, director of Freedom House's Afghan Information Center, Dr. Thomas Gouttierre, dean of the Center for Afghan Studies at the University of Nebraska, and Prof. Zalmay Khalilzad, Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.

I understand that each of our witnesses has a statement. It has been suggested that you summarize your statements in 5 minutes, so that the rest of our time can be devoted to questions.

I have the President of the Mexican Senate, the chairman of the Mexican Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House of Deputies Foreign Relations Committee coming in to have a meeting with me at 12 o'clock. We want to plan our interparliamentary union with them this year, so I will have to leave at 12 o'clock, but I think in 40 minutes we can cover a great deal of ground.

We very deeply appreciate your being here. I know this is a significant event for you. You all feel it very deeply. So why don't we just proceed with your testimony?

Dr. Gouttierre, I believe you had just begun your testimony. Why don't we go right down the line, and then we will turn to questions. Again, thank you all for being with us.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE, DEAN OF THE CENTER FOR AFGHAN STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, OMAHA, NEBR.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I will go right into my testimony again, Mr. Chairman.

Events this past week provide encouragement to those of us who have been actively concerned over the past several years about the situation in Afghanistan regarding the level of public awareness encouragement we have long sought. This hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee combines with President Reagan's signing authorization this Wednesday for the observance of Afghanistan Day on March 21 again brings an appropriate measure of attention to the tragic conditions in Afghanistan.

I have included a recent political cartoon in the text of these remarks because I feel it so effectively dramatizes the public relations problem suffered by the war of resistance in Afghanistan. The reference to Poland in this cartoon could be changed, of course, to El Salvador or other countries as issues evolve.

It has been disconcerting to note that while the Afghans have been steadfast and consistent in their resistance to increasing Soviet aggression and brutality inside their country, little public attention is accorded the horrible suffering of the people inside Afghanistan. Admittedly, there is little media or other access to documenting the violent acts which continue in the wake of the Soviet occupation. This fact, however, cannot absolve the cognizant members of our Government or others from the responsibility of drawing continuous and public focus on the Soviet Union's violation of

the sovereign and human rights of the people of Afghanistan, rights which have been articulated in the Helsinki Accords.

It is my hope that as a result of this hearing, there will be subsequent public focus in the U.S. Senate on Afghanistan. One result of the lack of information and focus on Afghanistan has been the development of misconceptions which even informed people in the United States maintain regarding the struggle of the Afghans. Many of these misconceptions are evident in the semantics which have become a part of the jargon associated with the Afghan resistance. The Afghans resisting the occupation of their country by a foreign power are variously referred to as "Muslim rebels" or "Muslim insurgents." Rebels and insurgents are defined in Webster's dictionary as those who engage in armed resistance against the established government of their country. The Soviets and their puppets are not the established government of Afghanistan. Afghans are engaging in armed resistance, but against an occupying force.

In this era, captivated by what I term the "Khomeini syndrome," the use of the adjective "Muslim" in conjunction with the term "rebels" also serves to mislead regarding the nature of the resistance. It is true that some 99 percent of Afghanistan's population is at least nominally Muslim. However, Islam is no more monolithic than is Christianity. Sunnis, Shias, and Ismailis are united in their opposition to the Soviet occupation, but they are as diverse in the practice of their religion as are Catholics, Lutherans, and Baptists. Many of those most actively resisting the Soviets are leftists who do not observe the practices of Islam at all.

Do we call the Polish labor union members "Catholic laborers?" Did we define the Hungarian freedom fighters with a religious adjective? To do so in the case of the Afghans conjures up the image of religious fanaticism in the minds of most Westerners. This demeans the concept and force of nationalism in the Afghan resistance. The Afghans are resisting not to regain Islam but to regain the independence of their country. As in the case of Poland today, religion is but a source for solidarity in the struggle of the Afghans against the oppressor they share with the Poles.

The Afghans resisting the Soviet occupation forces call themselves Mujahedeen, an Arabic loan word in Dari which translates as "fighters for the cause of liberty" or "freedom fighters." President Reagan has rightly noted this definition in his interview with Frank Reynolds of ABC. Many of our media and our Government officials persist in the use of the term "Muslim rebels," exacerbating the misperceptions already existing.

Even more damaging and misleading are the persistent portrayals of the Afghan freedom fighters as woefully lacking in unity in their resistance to expansionism by their northern neighbor. Such analyses betray a fundamental lack of understanding of the dynamics of Afghan society and culture. Not coincidentally, the Soviet news agency Tass, has deliberately portrayed the freedom fighters as murderers and plunderers in the same tradition that Russian imperialists followed in seeking to discredit those who resisted their expansion into central Asia more than half a century ago.

Western media, perhaps due to their inability to move freely in and out of Afghanistan in order to produce firsthand reports on the conditions and fighting therein, remain fixated on the squabbles evident between the various Afghan groups and political alliances in Pakistan. While each of these groups has varying degrees of influence and contact inside Afghanistan, and some have considerable fighting experience within as well, it must be understood that the burden of the fighting is being borne primarily by units inside Afghanistan who may or may not have links with the groups in Pakistan.

These units operate primarily in those regions which they inhabit, inspired by their own perception of the nature of the threat to their cherished, age-old way of life. The manner of organization is indigenous, effective, and generally democratic. Allegiance to one's leader is rooted in centuries of custom and tradition and is not lacking in discipline.

Over the past year, these units have begun banding together into regional and tribal confederations. One of my colleagues, Louis Dupree, has perceptively drawn an analogy between this phenomenon and the pattern which developed in the Yugoslavian resistance to the German occupation forces during World War II.

This is not to suggest that the Afghan resistance is a highly organized and unified movement. There is no question that the effectiveness of the resistance could be enhanced immeasurably by a stronger degree of cooperation among all the groups and units actively engaged. There is evidence of periodic squabbling and even fighting among various groups, yet indigenous governing structures are emerging in most regions based on tribal kinship patterns. Cooperation interregionally for the transport of supplies and weapons is more and more evident.

As the Afghans persist in their resistance, it is quite likely that even broader based federating will evolve. One could conceive of leadership with a national base emerging from these confederations, again somewhat akin to the pattern observed in Yugoslavia after World War II.

I have been told my time is up. I have just another page and a half, so I am going to continue reading and hope that that will solve any questions that may be raised.

Urban guerrilla groups, some of which are Marxist-based and are organized in Soviet-style cells, are increasingly active in Kabul and other cities. Underground letters, exhorting the population to actively resist, are proliferating in the cities and villages. Meanwhile, the status of the Afghan army deteriorates through continuing defections. The Afghan puppet government of Babrak Karmal and his Parchami comrades has been unable to develop a viable political base. The feud between the Parchamis and the Khalqis, the other branch of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, continues unabated.

In attempting to counter this disintegration of control, the Soviets are expanding their policy of dual genocide—corporal and migratory. Villages and valleys are denuded of their population through increased bombings and intimidation. Chemical warfare is being used.

Returning to the matter of misconception, the media in its unending and inordinate penchant to describe all manner of foreign involvement in terms of the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia, love to portray Afghanistan as the Soviet Union's Vietnam. Such jargonizing is no more appropriate to Afghanistan than it might be to El Salvador. Yet these reports, which do surface in the news on the fighting in Afghanistan, do seem to indicate that the Soviet Union has blundered into some manner of quagmire from which it is unable to extricate itself.

As I have indicated in an article recently published, it would be inaccurate to conclude at this stage that the Afghans are winning their war for liberation. The Afghans are winning battles, but the Soviets are far from losing the war. Two years is not all that extensive a period in guerrilla-style wars. In this century, the Soviet Union maintained fighting for nearly 15 years before eliminating the Basmachi resistance in what is now Soviet Central Asia.

In conclusion, I didn't have a chance to actually describe what I am concluding, but since I am being asked to conclude, I will.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, Dr. Gouttierre, that your full testimony will, of course, be incorporated into the record.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I understand.

In conclusion, everyone here is able to recall how the Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia in the 1930's made a celebrity of Haile Selassie. What factors exist today that fail to stimulate our public servants and the media to denounce the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as forcibly as once the armies of Mussolini were denounced?

An assessment of the current manner of U.S. support for the Afghan freedom fighters would appear to indicate that a more active public and sustained approach is desired. While some military assistance is likely being initiated through U.S. efforts, sufficient and appropriate weaponry and effective delivery systems to units in areas in need are lacking. Public discussions of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan are probably too sporadic to have the impact intended.

In supporting the Afghan war of resistance, are not the interests of the United States served as well as the Afghans?

Thank you.

[Mr. Gouttierre's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE

Events this week provide those of us who have been actively concerned over the past several years about the situation in Afghanistan with the manner of public encouragement we have long sought. This hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee combines with President Reagan's signing authorization this Wednesday for the observance of Afghanistan Day on 21 March to again bring an appropriate measure of attention to the tragic conditions in Afghanistan. I have included a recent political cartoon in the text of these remarks because I feel it so effectively dramatizes the public relations problem suffered by the War of Resistance in Afghanistan. The reference to Poland could be changed, of course, to El Salvador or other countries as issues evolve.

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'Poland this. Poland that. Whatever happened to Afghanistan?'

It has been disconcerting to note that, while the Afghans have been steadfast and consistent in their resistance to increasing Soviet oppression and brutality inside their country, little public attention is accorded the horrible suffering of the people inside Afghanistan. Admittedly, there is little media or other access to documenting the violent acts which continue in the wake of the Soviet occupation. This fact, however, cannot absolve the cognizant members of our government or others from the responsibility of drawing continuous and public focus on the Soviet Union's violation of the sovereign and human rights of the people of Afghanistan—rights which have been articulated in the Helsinki accords. It is my hope that, as a result of this hearing, there will be subsequent public focus in the U.S. Senate on Afghanistan.

One result of the lack of information and focus on Afghanistan has been the development of misconceptions which even informed people in the United States maintain regarding the struggle of the Afghans. Many of these misconceptions are evident in the semantics which have become a part of the jargon associated with the Afghan Resistance.

The Afghans resisting the occupation of their country by a foreign power are variously referred to as "Muslim rebels" or "Muslim insurgents." Rebels and insurgents are defined in Webster's dictionaries as those who engage in armed resistance against the established government of their country. The Soviets and their puppets are not the established government of Afghanistan. Afghans are engaging in armed resistance, but against an occupying force.

In this era captivated by what I term "the Khomeini syndrome", the use of the adjective "Muslim" in conjunction with the term "rebels" also serves to mislead regards the nature of the Resistance. It is true that some 99 percent of Afghanistan's population is at least nominally Muslim. However, Islam is no more monolithic than is Christianity. Sunnis, Shias, and Ismailis are united in their opposition to the Soviet occupation, but they are as diverse in the practice of their religion as are Catholics, Lutherans, and Baptists. Many of those most actively resisting the Soviets are leftists who do not observe the practices of Islam at all.

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The Afghans resisting the Soviet occupation forces call themselves Mujahedeen, an Arabic loan word in Dari which translates as "fighters for the cause of liberty" or "freedom fighters". President Reagan has rightly noted this definition in his interview with Frank Reynolds of ABC. Many of our media and our government officials persist in the use of the term "Muslim rebels", exacerbating the misperceptions already existing.

Even more damaging and misleading are the persistent portrayals of the Afghan Freedom Fighters as woefully lacking in unity in their resistance to the expansionism by their northern neighbor. Such analyses betray a fundamental lack of understanding of the dynamics of Afghan society and culture. Not coincidentally, the Soviet news agency, Tass, has deliberately portrayed the Freedom Fighters as murderers and plunderers in the same tradition that Russian imperialists followed in seeking to discredit those who resisted their expansion into Central Asia more than half a century ago.

Western media, perhaps due to their inability to move freely in and out of Afghanistan in order to produce first-hand reports on the conditions and fighting therein, remain fixated on the squabbles evident between the various Afghan groups and political alliances in Pakistan. While each of these groups has varying degrees of influence and contact inside Afghanistan, and some have considerable fighting experience within as well, it must be understood that the burden of the fighting is being borne primarily by units inside Afghanistan who may or may not have links with the groups in Pakistan.

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Over the past year these units have begun banding together into regional and tribal confederations. One of my colleagues, Louis Dupree, has perceptively drawn an analogy between this phenomenon and the pattern which developed in the Yugoslavian resistance to the German occupation forces during World War II.

This is not to suggest that the Afghan Resistance is a highly organized and unified movement. There is no question that the effectiveness of the Resistance could be enhanced immeasurably by a stronger degree of cooperation among all the groups and units actively engaged. There is evidence of periodic squabbling and even fighting among various groups. Yet, indigenous governing structures are emerging in most regions based on tribal kinship patterns. Cooperation interregionally for the transport of supplies and weapons is more and more evident.

As the Afghans persist in their Resistance, it is quite likely that even broader-based federating will evolve. One could conceive of leadership with a national base emerging from these confederations, again somewhat akin to the pattern observed in Yugoslavia after World War II.

Urban guerrilla groups, some of which are Marxist-based and are organized in Soviet-style cells, are increasingly active in Kabul and other cities. Underground letters, exhorting the population to actively resist, are proliferating in the cities and villages. Meanwhile, the status of the Afghan army deteriorates through continuing defections. The Afghan puppet government of Babrak Karmal and his Parchami comrades has been unable to develop a viable political base. The feud between the Parchamis and the Khalquis, the other branch of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, continues unabated.

In attempting to counter this disintegration of control, the Soviets are expanding their policy of dual genocide—corporal and migratory. Villages and valleys are denuded of their populations through increased bombings and intimidation. Chemical warfare, including the possible use of hydrogen cyanide, and mines disguised as toys, etc. are being used. Areas of major cities have been destroyed in heavy bombardment. Whole villages have been reduced to rubble and their populations executed en masse for being suspected of aiding or harboring Freedom Fighter groups. Descriptions of this manner of brutality are provided in Appendices I and II attached to this report.

Reports of genocidal tactics reveal that the Soviets do not want Afghans; they want Afghanistan. Lending credence to this contention is the research of John F. Shroder Jr., a geology professor and a research associate at the Center for Afghanistan Studies. Copy of an article and tables from one of his publications on this subject are provided as Appendix III to this report. It is clear from Professor Shroder's work that, while the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan primarily for strategic reasons and to save Kabul's crumbling Marxist regime, the resources of Afghanistan were also important to the Soviet decision to invade.

Returning to the matter of misconceptions, the media in its unending and inordinate penchant to describe all manner of foreign involvement in terms of the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia, l[illegible]o portray Afghanistan as the "Soviet Union's Vietnam." Such jargonizing is no[illegible]e appropriate to Afghanistan than it might be to El Salvador. Yet, those reports which do surface in the news on the fighting in Afghanistan do seem to indicate that the Soviet Union has blundered into some manner of quagmire from which it is unable to extricate itself.

As I have indicated in an article recently published (Appendix IV), it would be inaccurate to conclude at this stage that the Afghans are winning their war for liberation. The Afghans are winning battles, but the Soviets are far from losing the war. Two years is not all that extensive a period in guerrilla style wars. In this century the Soviet Union maintained fighting for nearly 15 years before eliminating the Basmachi resistance in what is now Soviet Central Asia.

Afghanistan could portend as much a danger and challenge to U.S. longterm, foreign policy interests as to the Soviet Union. A colleague, Leon Poullada, has pointed out that to ignore the Afghan struggle is a "foolish repudiation of American self-interest, because the Afghans are defending the Persian Gulf which is vital to our security. At the moment, they are better than an American Rapid Deployment Force because they are an Instant Deployment Force already fighting and successfully barring Soviet expansion. They are pinning down nearly 100,000 crack Soviet troops, thus restraining the U.S.S.R. in Poland and relieving intolerable pressures on Pakistan and Iran . . . "

There are those who fear any U.S. involvement in efforts to support the Afghans would eventually result in confrontation between American combat troops and Soviet troops. Afghans retort that they do not seek personnel, but the means to arm themselves appropriately. They also remind any American who will listen that there is a moral question involved in the debate as to whether or not support should be provided them. They stress they are committed to opposing those who have invaded and occupied their homeland even if they must use sticks and shovels.

Reports have surfaced in the press and on television that the United States is already participating in a five-nation compact to provide military assistance to the Afghan Freedom Fighters. While it does appear that increased amounts of weapons are indeed being obtained by various units, latest information strongly indicates that the right amount of the right weaponry is still not being obtained by the units and confederations in the central areas of the country. Ironically, it is in these areas where the strongest resistance is being initiated.

Equally important as military support is the continuous use of public forums like the one provided here today to dramatize the extent and cruelty of Soviet repression inside Afghanistan. The need for such public discussion is made more acute due to the lack of reporting in the manner that used to saturate American homes during the war in Southeast Asia. One is forced to wonder about the current level of courage and even integrity in the U.S. media today in failing to pursue more vigorously the question of atrocities in the war in Afghanistan.

Everyone here is able to recall how the Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia in the 1930's made a celebrity of Haile Selassie. What factors exist today that fail to stimulate our public servants and the media to denounce the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as forcibly as once the armies of Mussolini were denounced?

In conclusion, an assessment of the current manner of U.S. support for the Afghan Freedom Fighters would appear to indicate a more active, public, and sustained approach is desired. While some military assistance is likely being initiated through U.S. efforts, sufficient and appropriate weaponry and effective delivery systems to units in areas in need are lacking. Public discussions of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan are probably too sporadic to have the impact intended.

In supporting the Afghan War of Resistance, are not the interests of the United States served as well as those of the Afghans?

APPENDIX I

REFUGEE: RUSSIA WON'T DEFEAT US

In 1976, a contract between Afghanistan and UNO for the development and expansion of Kabul University brought Farooka Gauhari to Omaha to work on research for one year. At the time, Gauhari didn't know that she'd return to America five years later with 21 members of her family as a refugee fleeing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Gauhari remembers the day the revolution began in April 1978. "It was 2 p.m.—we saw planes and heard noise and bombing."

Gauhari's husband, who worked for the army air force in Afghanistan, was captured the first day by the Communists. "Many people from that base are missing," said Gauhari. "I don't know what happened to him."

He had received military and pilot training in the U.S., and didn't belong to any Communist bloc, she said. Gauhari spent three years in the country looking for him in the prisons. The only answers she received were "he's not here" and "he fled to Pakistan."

Because Gauhari didn't have much hope for finding her husband, and because she was concerned about her children's education, the family fled to India in 1980.

Gauhari wrote Christmas cards to the friends she'd made in Omaha during her 1976 visit. In response to the cards, she received a sponsorship for her and her mother. The pair took the offer, came to Omaha in May of 1981, and also found sponsors for the rest of the family.

About 16 million people and close to 100,000 Russian troops live in Afghanistan, she said. Although the majority of the people are children, women and men with little training, Gauhari said the resistance of the people to the Soviets increases day by day.

"Prices went really high for oil, food, and soap because the Russians gave them to their army, and (they also) doubled the salary of the army," said Gauhari.

"The other people were still with their old salary—the Communist government wanted people to join the army," she said.

Afghanistan refugees number about 30,000 in India, 1.7 million in Pakistan, and a large number in Iran. Gauhari said there are about 3 million worldwide.

Gauhari's sister, Shaista Wahab, works in the UNO library. She was the first of the family to leave the country. She studied for two years in India before coming to Omaha.

Wahab said she bribed Afghanistan officials to get out of the country because the government won't issue passports. Otherwise, she said she would have had to cross the border illegally.

However, Gauhari's mother and brother-in-law, Samad Nessari, who is studying English at UNO, did cross the border. They traveled through the mountains during the night to avoid detection.

In one place Nessari said they faced Russian troops. The person who was guiding them gave whiskey and American cigarettes to the Russians in exchange for passage. Gauhari said the troops accept liquor, opium, and other bribes from the people.

Late at night, people listen in secrecy to radio broadcasts from Western countries which give more accurate information than the Afghanistan media, Gauhari said.

Each day, school children attend a class called "information." They are asked what their parents listen to, and they also learn about communism. A teacher pointed to a picture of a man and asked a child to name him. The child said it was the man his father spit at when watching him on television. Authorities jailed the child's father—the man in the picture was the first Afghanistan president since the Soviet invasion.

Nessari, his wife Suraiya (who is also studying English at UNO), and their four children lived in Erat, the first province to organize a demonstration against the Communists.

"After four hours of fighting, the people took control of the city and the military base," said Nessari. Two days later, the Russians bombed the city, took over, and declared martial law. Russians searched all of the houses for the wounded. Nearly 1,200 wounded were taken to the slope of a mountain and buried in big holes, said Nessari.

Afghanistan has simpler weapons than the Soviets, but Gauhari said "The only thing that defeats Afghanistan is the bombing from the air." She added: "Afghanistans have a strong belief in God, love their freedom, and love their land.

"Russia won't defeat us. I'm proud of that," said Gauhari.

APPENDIX II

THE RUSSIAN ATROCITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Persistent reports have been received from Afghanistan over the last two years suggesting a consistent pattern of horrific human rights violations committed by the Russian invaders against the defenseless civilian population there. The accompanying clip carries only one of the numerous cases of outrageous human rights abuses.

Various reports pertaining to this particular case converge on the fact that when Russian airborne troops stormed Herat (northwestern province of Afghanistan) on 4 March 1979 from their bases in Russian central Asia to suppress the short-lived takeover by Freedom Fighters there, hundreds of civilians were buried alive on top of thousands killed by the Russians who were seeking vengeance for scores of their advisors killed earlier at the hands of Freedom Fighters.

The takeover which had lasted four days resulted in the complete control of the city of Herat by the Freedom Fighters, the coming over to Freedom Fighters of the provincial garrison, and an ephemeral spell of feedom from the tyranny inflicted by an alien totalitarian ideology.

The following day, in a house-to-house search for the wounded, the Russians (feigning sympathy) collected hundreds of them, loaded them on military trucks and carried them to "hospitals." But, alas, instead they landed in mass graves dug on the slopes of Gazargah hills just to the northeast of the city. According to reports, the bulldozers of the work forces of the Afghan Ministry of Public Works stationed in Herat were called, their Afghan operators dismissed, and Russian operators took charge of the bulldozers to dig mass graves. Nobody has ever heard again of the wounded who were taken out of their homes to "hospitals."

It is now an open secret in Herat and in fact in all Afghanistan that the Russians buried alive about twelve hundred Freedom Fighters, and there is ample evidence in Herat and elsewhere in Afghanistan to substantiate this act of infamy.

It behooves the U.S. Administration to raise this issue at the U.N. Security Council and call for a U.N. Special Commission to investigate not only this particular charge but also the Kerela massacre and other massacres that have reportedly been perpetrated by Russians in remote parts of the country of which the outside world knows little, but will probably come to light as soon as a hope is engendered for a day of reckoning. Almost certainly the Russians will veto such a measure. Even if they did, the world public opinion would realize that the Russians do have something to hide. To counter the Russian veto, the matter should be taken up with the U.N. General Assembly where the right to veto does not apply. Such a U.N. investigating commission, if refused cooperation by Soviet lackeys in Afghanistan for an on-the-site investigation in Herat and Kerela, will almost certainly find enough evidence from refugees in Iran and Pakistan.

The manifest function of such an action on the part of the U.S. Administration would be to call world attention to serious human rights violations by Russians in Afghanistan on top of their naked invasion. However, several latent functions will be served as well, vis:

1. The Freedom Fighters will get both comfort and encouragement from the fact the Russian sanguinary crimes against defenseless civilians do not go unnoticed.

2. This measure is likely to cause the Russians to exercise in the future more caution about the wantonness of their combat measures against Freedom Fighters—a caution which will render their otherwise ruthless war machine less efficacious.

3. To say that the Russians are sensitive about their image, especially in the Third World, is an understatement. This image would be dealt a serious blow if the charge of massacres and burial alive of hundreds of defenseless civilians is carried to and kept on the world stage. But if these charges are proved and prudently exploited, it would be an additional nail in the coffin of Russian communism as the champion of the oppressed and the underdog.

It is strongly believed that this proposition enjoys practical merits, both for the United States vis-a-vis her Russian adversary and the Afghan Freedom Fighters who crave for a moral booster.

This Center for Afghanistan Studies would be both honored and pleased to make available whatever resources it commands to play any possible part in the important task of unravelling the truth of Russian bloody crimes in Afghanistan—a truth that the Moscow oligarchy would hate to see divulged, in their best tradition of flouting the truth.

It is earnestly hoped that you would see fit to be instrumental in bringing this pivotal issue to the forum of the United Nations and achieve the results thereof.

G. A. AYEEN,
Research Associate,
(Former Government Minister,
Afghanistan 1968–71).

APPENDIX III

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 11, 1982]

AFGHANISTAN'S UNSUNG RICHES

(By John F. Shroder, Jr.)[1]

Afghanistan is a land of spectacular scenery enveloping stark and dynamic geology. The frequent earthquakes and floods, dust storms and avalanches, are merely surface indicators of long eons of intense mineral-resource generation below. To see this land as a geologist is to know that beleaguered, backward Afghanistan does not have to remain war torn and economically devastated for long; instead, the rich resource base there would contribute to rapid rebuilding and economic growth given sincere Soviet concern for the welfare of Afghanistan and not just for Moscow's own access to resources.

Several Western observers have claimed that Afghanistan is poor in resources; this is obviously incorrect. The dearth of prior mining, however, was only partly the fault of poor transport and the inept Afghan government; instead the many Russian diplomatic and political maneuvers to control resource development prior to their invasion must also be recognized. Now the military occupation is partially subsidized with Afghan resources.

The realization that Afghanistan actually has good resources is an idea long in coming. It began in the early 19th century with Britain's resource exploration and invasion in its contest of territorial acquisition with the Russians. Upon the conclusion of the third Anglo-Afghan war (1919), the Afghans won back diplomatic independence, and the first Soviet mission arrived in Kabul. Eight years later, the first Russian publication on "Mineral Riches of Afghanistan" appeared in a geological literature previously dominated by the English. Because the Afghans were long the victims of this Anglo-Russian competition, and in spite of many diplomatic rebuffs from Washington, they chose American Inland Oil to develop their resources in the 1930s. Although important resources were quickly confirmed, the company abruptly terminated its exclusive 25-year concessions because of transport problems and the imminence of World War II. The ill will generated by this was offset by secret American aid during wartime, and by subsequent substantial development efforts.

In the late 1950s the Afghans asked France to support further petroleum development. The Soviets forced out this NATO member and a neutral Swedish group, and took over the nascent Afghan hydrocarbon industry for themselves by offering the first major foreign-aid package to another country by the communist bloc. Also, at this time American and Russian aerial photography made possible topographic mapping and further exploration by German and French geologists.

The Soviets, however, were actively penetrating the whole Afghan economy including the military and the Ministry of mines and Industries. The leftist-oriented coup of 1973 resulted in progressive removal of Western experts from resource development projects and the assignment of deposits to East-bloc groups. Resource maps and economic analyses also were suppressed, presumably because the Soviets still lacked firm control.

By the late 1970s, extensive Soviet exploration resulted in additional first-rate geologic reports and maps and identification of over 1,400 mineral showings or occurrences as well as 70-odd commercial deposits. The Soviets then committed over $652 million in aid for further resource exploration and development, including a half-million-ton oil refinery, a 1.5 million tons per year copper smelter, and many other projects.

The French judged the Hajigak iron deposit to be the third largest in the world; the World Bank indicated the Ainak copper ores could capture 2 percent of the

[1] John F. Shroder, Jr. is a professor of geology at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and was director of the National Atlas of Afghanistan and Fulbright lecturer at Kabul University before the Soviet invasion.

world market, and that vast coal deposits together with many other resources should spur major development. Natural gas production, 80 percent of which had long been piped to the U.S.S.R. at well below world prices, was increased 65 percent after the Russian invasion. Afghan cement manufactured at world quality is now reportedly sent to the U.S.S.R. for export to the world market and replaced in Afghanistan with low-standard Soviet cement.

Other important deposits available for Soviet exploitation are chrome, lead, zinc, molybdenum, tin, rare earths, gold, barite, celestite, flourite, sulphur, asbestos, talc, magnesite, muscovite, and precious stones. An additional 200 Russian geologists were brought into Afghanistan in 1979. Their value to the Soviet takeover has not been overlooked by the Afghan freedom fighers who recently captured the senior Soviet geologist, E. R. Okhrimyuk.

The great dependence of the United States on imported minerals compared with a self-reliant U.S.S.R. has focused attention on increasing potential for resource wars as the U.S.S.R. interdicts or takes over supplies. It is certain that the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan primarily for strategic reasons and to save Kabul's failing Marxist regime, but it is equally clear that the resources of Afghanistan were also important considerations in the decision to invade.

Table 2. Metallogenic zones in Afghanistan.*

Map ID	Locale	Description
1	Eastern Badakshan	lazurite, lithium, tantalum, tin
2	Kabul	chromium, copper, iron
3	Spin-Ghar	magnesite, talc
4	Surkhab-Jaway	copper, gold, lead, zinc
5	Western Badakshan	beryllium, lithium, niobium, tantalum, tin
6	Konar	copper, iron
7	Katawaz	lead, mercury, zinc
8	Asparan	lead, mercury, zinc
9	Khost	asbestos, chromium
10	Shewa-Nakhchirpar	copper, gold, iron, tungsten
11	Wakhan	copper, iron, tin
12	Nuristan	beryllium, cesium, lithium, muscovite, niobium, tantalum, tin tungsten, precious stones
13	Arghandab-Tirin	copper, flourite, gold, iron, lead, tin, tungsten, zinc
14	Helmand	copper, lead, lithium, tantalum, tin, tungsten
15	Shindand-Kishmaran	copper, lead, tin, tungsten, zinc
16	Registan	copper, phosphorus, rare earths, tin, uranium
17	Murghab	copper, gold, iron, molybdenum
18	Balk	copper, mercury, strontium, zinc
19	Harutrod	mercury
20	Tarnak	chromium, mercury
21	Harirod-Panjsher	barite, gold, iron, lead, mercury, zinc

* After Shareq and others, 1977. These zones (Figure 1) are based on the tectonic divisions of Sborshchikov and others (1973) and represent convenient areal divisions with similar geology and mineral emplacement mechanisms. They thus represent a strategy or subdivision for mineral exploration and development convenient to the Soviet group responsible for its design.

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

JOHN F. SHRODER, JR. CENTER FOR AFGHANISTAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA



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

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Table 3. Specific mineral resources of Afghanistan according to the most recent analyses by Soviet scientists.*

Solid Combustible Materials

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits-	-Occurrences-	-Showings-
Coal	9	36	
Lignite		3	
Peat	1	8	
Shale (combustible)		1	

Metallic Minerals: Ferrous Metals

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits-	-Occurrences-	-Showings-
Chromium	1	8	5
Iron	5	52	12
Manganese		1	1

Metallic Minerals: Nonferrous Metals

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits-	-Occurrences-	-Showings-
Aluminum	1	6	
Bismuth		9	3
Cadmium	1		
Copper	6[T]	145	92
Lead & Zinc	5	61	26
Mercury		28	3[9]
Molybdenum	1	2	1
Tin	3[T]	44	16[9]
Tungsten		24	21[9]

Rare Metals

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits-	-Occurrences-	-Showings-
Beryllium	4[T]	11	4
Cesium & Rubidium	3[T]	3	
Lithium	10[T]	21	1
Tantalum & Niobium	5	13	

Radioactive Elements and Rare Earths

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits-	-Occurrences-	-Showings-
Rare Earths, Thorium & Uranium		4	

Precious Metals

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits-	-Occurrences-	-Showings-
Gold (lode)	3	51	41
Gold (placer)	2[T]	3[9]	
Silver		4	1

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Non-Metalic Minerals: Chemical Raw Materials

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits	-Occurrences	-Showings
Barite	2	11	3
Borosilicate		1	1
Celestite	2		
Flourite	1	4	2
Sulfur	1	4	3

Non-Metalic Minerals: Mineral Fertilizers

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits	-Occurrences	-Showings
Apatite		1	
Phosphorite		1	

Non-Metalic Minerals: Other

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits	-Occurrences	-Showings
Asbestos	2	17	7
Graphite		6	
Gypsum		17	
Magnesite	1	1	
Muscovite	2[T]	19	
Talc	2	3	2

Salts

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits	-Occurrences	-Showings
undifferentiated	13	1	

Precious and Semi-Precious Stones

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits	-Occurrences	-Showings
Emerald		7	
Garnet		1	
Kunzite	1		
Lazurite	1		
Ruby	1		
Serpentine		4	
Tourmaline	T	3	

Electronic and Optical Minerals

Mineral Commodity	Degree of Mineral Concentration -Deposits	-Occurrences	-Showings
Calcite		5	
Quartz	1[T]	9	7

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Industrial Materials

Material Type	Number of Quarries Actual	Potential
Construction Materials:		
Dolomite, limestone, marl	5	
Facing & ornamental stone	20	
Gravel & sand	15	
Cement Raw Materials:		
Limestone & marl	8	
Limestone & Dolomite Flux	4	
Refactory clays	3	
Brick clays	7	
Porcelain & Pottery clays	2	2
Glass sand	1	
Siliceous Sandstone		
Pinas brick & flux	2	

• After Shareq and others, 1977, p. 73-79; Agnew, 1980. The matrix shows the number of each mineral commodity arranged against degree of mineral concentration.

† Copper - plus 1 district with copper mineralization
Tin - plus 7 pegmatite districts with tin mineralization
Beryllium - plus 9 pegmatite districts with beryllium mineralization
Lithium - plus 8 pegmatite districts with lithium mineralization
Cesium & Rubidium - plus 5 pegmatite districts with cesium and rubidium mineralization
Tantalum & Niobium - plus 14 pegmatite districts with tantalum and niobium minealization
Placer gold - commercial
Muscovite - plus 1 pegmatite district with muscovite mineralization
Tourmaline - plus 2 pegmatite districts with tourmaline mineralization
Quartz - plus 1 pegmatite district with quartz mineralization

§ Tungsten - plus 91 mechanical mineralogical haloes
Tin - plus 2 non-commercial placers, plus 100 mecnanical mineralogical haloes
Mercury - plus 110 mechanical mineralogical haloes

Placer gold - marginal

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APPENDIX IV

[From Human Events, Dec. 26, 1981]

AFGHANISTAN: IS THE U.S. DOING ENOUGH?

(By Thomas E. Gouttierre)[1]

Throughout the Christmas holidays, coverage of international news in the American media will likely focus on the continuing stories relating to the imposition of martial law in Poland, the alleged terrorist designs of the Qaddafi regime, and the Soviet-American arms limitations talks. Another, and also continuing, story will likely obtain only passing mention in the media. This year's holiday season marks the second anniverary of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

Attention in the U.S. media this past year on Afghan resistance to this occupation has centered primarily on purported U.S. assistance to the Afghan Freedom Fighters, the tenacity of the Afghans in this struggle, and the plight of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In addressing the first of these in print and on television, Carl Bernstein, former Watergate *wunderkind*, implies that the level of U.S. Government support to Afghan Resistance is substantial and even, perhaps, sufficient.

Reports in the news on the fighting in Afghanistan would seem to indicate that the Soviets have blundered into some manner of quagmire from which they are unable to extricate themselves.

How accurate are the perceptions engendered by such reporting? More specifically, who is winning the war in Afghanistan and is U.S. support to the Freedom Fighters of any real consequence?

Few, if any, observers would have predicted in December 1979 that the Afghan Resistance would enter a third year. Not only is resistance continuing, it is more widespread than it was a year ago. Freedom Fighters have certain weaponry in greater abundance and variety. Accounts of Afghan victories over Soviet troops in remote regions of the country appear in the press and on television news.

However, it would be inaccurate to conclude at this stage that the Afghans are winning the war for their independence. The Afghans are winning battles, but the Soviets are far from losing the war.

While it appears the Soviets miscalculated in a number of ways in their move into Afghanistan (on Third World and U.S. reaction and on the tenacity of the Afghans, as examples), they are not yet willing to concede. Two years is not all that extensive a period relative to guerrilla-style wars. In this century the Soviets maintained fighting for nearly 15 years against the Basmachi resistance in what is now Soviet Central Asia.

In analyzing the Soviets' approach to countering resistance in Afghanistan, one must wonder if they are not mindful of their past history. By concentrating their forces at a few strategic places, the Soviets appear to be accepting the possibility of protracted resistance to their occupation.

Soviet forces enjoy overwhelming technological superiority which they use to intimidate and kill Afghan combatants and non-combatants. Their genocide tactics reveal that the Soviets do not want Afghans; they want Afghanistan.

This past summer, at a hearing in the U.S. Congress, an Afghan Freedom Fighter from central Afghanistan spoke of how villages and valleys are being denuded of their populations through bombings. He further described other instruments of death and intimidation like chemical warfare and mines disguised as toys, penknives, watches, etc. He also told of whole villages being reduced to rubble and their populations being executed on suspicion of aiding Freedom Fighter groups. Now, reports are surfacing of attempts at a "scorched earth" approach in various areas of the Panjshair and Wardak valleys where resistance is extensive.

In the face of such information, scholars and other analysts of the Afghan Resistance are repeatedly asked to assess the capacity of the Freedom Fighters to sustain their struggle to regain their independence.

Those individuals most familiar with Afghans generally agree that, at the very least, pockets of resistance will continue even at current levels of resources among the fighting units. Some are convinced that, should the Afghans be armed and otherwise supported more effectively than at present, they could maintain their resist-

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[1]Professor Gouttierre is director, International Studies and Programs and Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha. He lived in Afghanistan for 10 years and has frequently given expert testimony before Congress.

ance at levels that would be costly enough to the Soviet Union to cause it eventually to seek some manner of negotiated settlement. Such opinions are usually founded in the hope that the current Administration will commit itself to providing such support.

There are those who question U.S. involvement in the efforts to support the Afghans. Those with this concern claim that such U.S. involvement would eventually result in confrontation between American combat troops and Soviet troops.

In response, Afghans are quick to point out that they do not seek personnel, but the means to arm themselves appropriately. Afghans also consistently remind any American who will listen that there is a moral question involved in the debate as to whether or not support should be provided them. They stress they are committed to opposing those who have invaded and occupied their homeland even if they must use sticks and shovels.

Earlier, mention was made of reports in the press and on television that the U.S. is already participating in a five-nation approach to providing military assistance to the Afghan Freedom Fighters. While it appears that increased amounts of weapons are indeed being obtained by various units, most Freedom Fighter groups still lack the appropriate weaponry. This is particularly true of units and confederations in the central areas of the country and in other areas with limited access to the Pakistani border. Ironically, it is in these areas where the strongest resistance is being initiated. However, due to the lack of surface-to-air missiles in the Freedom Fighters' arsenal, Soviet helicopter gunships are able to command the field of battle in devastating fashion.

Military support is not the only option open to the U.S. for providing assistance to the Afghan Resistance. Opportunity is provided by more extensive use of forums within international organizations to dramatize Soviet repression in Afghanistan. The U.S. government likely has access to various intelligence reports on atrocities perpetrated by Soviet troops on Afghan soil. Such reports could be declassified and pertinent parts broadcast into the Soviet Union and elsewhere via the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe.

The need for such information is particularly acute due to the lack of reporting in the manner that used to saturate American homes during the war in Southeast Asia. One is forced to question the current level of courage and even integrity of the media today in failing to pursue more vigorously the question of atrocities in the war in Afghanistan.

In assessing the current role of U.S. support for the Afghan Freedom Fighters, it would appear that a more active and sustained approach is required. While some military assistance is likely being provided or initiated through U.S. efforts, sufficient and appropriate weaponry, particularly surface-to-air missiles, and effective delivery systems to units in areas in need are lacking. Present U.S. support of the Afghan Resistance does have some impact. However, it is not enough to effectively permit the Afghans to resist the Soviet occupation and to combat the genocidal policies that proceed from it.

In providing the appropriate support, would not the interests of the U.S. be served as well as those of the Afghans'?

[From the Dallas Morning News, Dec. 31, 1981]

AFGHANISTAN: SCORCHING A NATION

Far worse than the press' naive optimism about Poland until the imposition of martial law has been its neglect of the soul-shaking Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan. This neglect has moved Afghanistan specialist Professor Thomas Gouttierre to wonder in *Human Events* about the "courage and even integrity of the media today."

Hats off to those who did take to the streets Dec. 27 to protest the Soviets' brutal occupation on its second anniversary. But too often the press, on those rare occasions when it mentions Afghanistan, merely marvels at how "foolish" the Soviets were to invade, at how much they "miscalculated." Some have even miscalled it the Soviets' Vietnam.

First, the Soviets don't have a hostile press to rouse popular indignation against the war. On the contrary, all efforts are made to keep Soviet citizens in the dark about it. Second, the Soviets are now showing themselves to be brutal even by Stalinist standards. Overwhelming evidence exists of tactics that are no less than genocidal: whole valleys and villages massacred, whole populations slaughtered on the mere suspicion of aiding freedom fighters. Now there are reports of scorched-earth

tactics being used. Even Hitler never got that far. The massive evidence of Soviet chemical warfare, marshaled recently by ABC news, speaks for itself. But where are the screaming headlines?

As Professor Gouttierre says, courageous and heroic as the Afghans are, they are not winning any war of independence. The Soviets, far from verging on a pullout, are stepping up their forces. If it is not a moral obligation to help the freedom fighters, what is?

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, I am just checking to see if you did read one section of your statement. I see that the pages are not numbered. This regards Leon Poullada. Did you read that section?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. No; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind just reading that into the record? Because I think you point out how foolish it would be for Americans to ignore the Afghan struggle, and that really goes for Japan and all of Europe, which depends upon the gulf for its oil.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I will do that. Afghanistan could portend as much danger and challenge to U.S. long-term foreign policy interests as to the Soviet Union. A colleague, Leon Poullada, has pointed out that to ignore the Afghan struggle is a "foolish repudiation of American self-interest, because the Afghans are defending the Persian Gulf, which is vital to our security. At the moment, they are better than an American Rapid Deployment Force because they are an instant deployment force, already fighting and successfully barring Soviet expansion. They are pinning down nearly 100,000 crack Soviet troops, thus restraining the U.S.S.R. in Poland and relieving intolerable pressures on Pakistan and Iran."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed.

Mrs. Klass is our next witness. She is director of Freedom House's Afghan Information Center. I know that you have been closely following human rights and other developments in that country. We would be happy to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF ROSANNE KLASS, DIRECTOR OF FREEDOM HOUSE'S AFGHAN INFORMATION CENTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Ms. KLASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I am the director of the Afghanistan Information Center at Freedom House, a nonpartisan, nongovernmental, nonprofit organization which has for more than 40 years worked to support freedom and democracy in a world of widespread institutionalized oppression, identifying the forces of oppression wherever they may be and whatever they may be.

The distinguished chairman of the board of Freedom House, from the time he left the Senate until his death last week, was Clifford P. Case.

I attach here a statement on the situation in Afghanistan by the board of trustees of Freedom House, and ask that it be entered into the record as part of my testimony, along with two of my articles previously published in the New York Times.

I have been a close observer of Afghanistan since I first went to that country in the 1950's. I have known members of every Afghan Government since the 1950's, including the present Communist puppet regime, and I know some of those who will probably be chosen to replace that regime in the near future. For nearly three decades I observed Soviet preparations for the takeover of Afghani-

stan, and intense Afghan efforts first to forestall that takeover and then to resist it, efforts which lead first to the Soviet-backed coups in 1973 and 1978, and ultimately to the Soviet invasion as Moscow became increasingly open in pursuing its intentions.

Nowhere in the world today are political, civil, and human rights more brutally and systematically violated than in Afghanistan. Not as aberrations, but deliberately, as part of a policy designed to break resistance to the Communist takeover and to Sovietization. The litany of horrors not only repeats the worst of our own century, but harks back 800 years to the barbarism of Genghis Khan, who also slaughtered the Afghans when he found that he could not crush them.

Eyewitnesses and survivors attest to entire villages massacred, to people bound and flung into rivers or into cesspools of human excrement to drown, to others bound and crushed beneath tank treads, and to hundreds of others bulldozed still living into their graves. As early as the fall of 1979, I heard eyewitness reports of the use of chemical warfare.

The current regime and its Soviet masters who control every aspect of what passes for the Afghan Government today would like to blame these horrors on their predecessors, but the horrors continue; and for that matter, even before the Soviet army invaded, Soviet officers and advisers were reliably reported to be giving orders for atrocities of all kinds.

Schoolgirls protesting the Soviet occupation of their country were gunned down in the streets of Kabul in 1980, and again as recently as last September. Press gangs now invade homes by night to pull teenage boys and young men from their beds and send them off to fill the ranks of the vanishing Afghan army. Every month, approximately 400 children are shipped to the Soviet Union and Bulgaria for indoctrination.

The International Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations are denied access to Afghanistan. Between last October 26 and November 2, three hospitals, operated by a French humanitarian medical organization, in three separate provinces, were demolished by helicopters that singled them out for bombing and rocketing. Helicopters set the crops aflame just before the harvest; village granaries are emptied and destroyed—all in an effort to starve the people into submission. The planes often bear Afghan markings, but the pilots are Soviet, as they have been since mid-1979—although they reportedly sometimes wear Afghan uniforms.

In April 1981, the Soviet Union signed an international convention outlawing boobytrap mines disguised as harmless objects. Yet for 2 years before signing that convention, and ever since—to this very day—they have continued to seed such mines on the routes used by villagers and refugees. These mines, disguished as toys, watches, pens, even wads of money, are particularly attractive to young children, and hundreds of maimed children testify to their vicious power.

The Soviets boobytrap the bodies of the Afghan dead, and they use both dumdum type and poison bullets, all of which are outlawed by international conventions of long standing.

All of this, of course, is in addition to the carpet-bombing and rocketing of villages, strafing attacks on civilians, and other conventional or so-called conventional attacks of warfare.

These bits of green plastic that I have here [indicating] are fragments of some of the boobytraps, the ones the Afghans call "green birds." Some of the cyrillic lettering is still visible on the fragments. They are scattered by the hundreds along the paths and in the fields. Indeed, 20 or more people were injured recently when such boobytraps were seeded around a refugee camp inside Pakistani territory by Afghan helicopters violating Pakistani territory.

I have mentioned only a few of the human rights violations intended to crush the Afghan will to resist. Political rights, of course, have totally vanished. I will just touch briefly on one other aspect, economic abuses.

For nearly 40 years, Soviet pressure prevented the Afghan people from exploiting their considerable mineral resources—world-class chrome, iron, copper, and uranium, and others—for their own benefit. Moscow kept Afghanistan poor. Meanwhile, the Soviets mapped and surveyed Afghan resources and developed the plans to exploit them for their own, that is, Soviet, benefit, and those plans they are now trying to put into effect.

Already 1 billion cubic meters of Afghan natural gas are piped into Soviet Central Asia annually to keep that economy afloat. Nominally, the U.S.S.R. pays approximately half of world market rates for Afghan gas, but in reality, even that payment is charged against the costs of maintaining Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan. No Afghan gas goes for Afghan use, and the Afghans are forced to pay for their own occupation.

But all of that is another subject, and time is short.

Some of the tragedies the Afghans are enduring might cease if they would only stop resisting the imposition of a Communist regime, and yet they fight on. Those of us who believe in freedom cannot close our eyes to their struggle, not only for their sake but for our own. In an interview given to a Yugoslav newspaper in January, Lt. Gen. Abdul Qadir, acting minister of defense in the Kabul regime, declared openly that once Afghanistan is brought under control, the Afghan army will play a "significant" role, "like that played by the Cuban and Vietnamese armies"—and will be used, according to a May 1981 statement by Babrak Karmal, "not only in Afghanistan, but in the region as well."

In short, if the Afghans are ever forced to capitulate and give up their resistance we face the use of fighting men of this caliber as the tools for Soviet expansion in Southwest Asia.

As Ambassador Jean J. Kirkpatrick said at the United Nations last year: "The Soviet Union can conquer Afghanistan only by eliminating the Afghan nation. This the world must not permit to happen, for if Afghanistan is conquered, no independent nation will be safe."

Thank you.

[Ms. Klass' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROSANNE KLASS

Mr. Chairman, I am the Director of the Afghanistan Information Center at Freedom House—a nonpartisan, nongovernmental, nonprofit organization, which has,

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for more than 40 years, worked to support freedom and democracy in a world of widespread institutionalized oppression, monitoring political, civil, and human rights around the world, and identifying the forces of oppression, whatever they may be. The distinguished Chairman of the Board of Freedom House, from the time he left the Senate until his death last week, was Clifford P. Case.

Today I will concentrate on some of those rights violations, but I attach here a broader statement on the situation in Afghanistan by the Board of Trustees of Freedom House, and ask that it be entered into the record as part of my testimony.

I have been a close observer of Afghanistan since I first went to that country in the 1950's, and have written extensively about it. I have known members of every Afghan government since the 1950's—including the present Communist puppet regime. I know some of those who will probably be chosen to replace that regime in the near future.

For nearly three decades, I observed Soviet preparations for the takeover of Afghanistan, and intense Afghan efforts first to forestall that takeover and then to resist it—efforts sufficiently effective to lead to the Soviet-backed coups of 1973 and 1978, and ultimately to the Soviet invasion, as Moscow perforce because increasingly open about its intentions.

Those efforts continue today in the desperate struggle of the Afghan people to regain their freedom and independence, perhaps the most cherished values of the Afghans throughout their long history.

Nowhere in the world today are political, civil, and human rights more brutally and systematically violated than in Afghanistan, and deliberately so, as part of a policy designed to break resistance to the Communist takeover and Sovietisation. The litany of horrors not only repeats the worst of our own century—Lidice, Babi Yar, the Katyn Forest—but harks back 800 years to the barbarism of Genghis Khan, who also slaughtered the Afghans when he found he could not crush them.

Eyewitnesses and survivors attest to entire villages massacred à la Lidice; to people bound and flung into rivers—or into cesspools of human excrement—to drown, their families mockingly permitted to search for the bodies; to others bound and crushed beneath tank treads; and to hundreds of others bulldozed, still living, into their graves. At the Pul-i-Charkhi prison in Kabul alone—where an estimated 35,000 political prisoners have been executed since 1978 in an effort to wipe out an entire educated class—by 1979 the stench of death hung over villages for miles around.

The current regime—and its Soviet masters, who control every aspect of what passes for the Afghan Government today—would like to blame all the horrors on their predecessors. But the horrors continue; and, even before the Soviet army invaded, Soviet officers were reliably reported to be giving orders for atrocities of all kinds. As for the prisons, once the TV crews finished filming the release of prisoners in early 1980 and departed, the prisons filled up again.

Schoolgirls protesting the Soviet occupation of their country were gunned down again in Kabul as recently as last September. Press gangs now invade homes by night to pull teenage boys and young men from their beds and send them off to fill the ranks of the evaporating Afghan army. Every month, approximately 400 children are shipped to the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria for indoctrination, whether their parents like it or not.

The International Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations are denied access to Afghanistan. Between October 26 and November 2, 1981, three hospitals operated by a French humanitarian medical organization, in three separate provinces, were demolished by helicopters that singled them out for bombing. Helicopters set crops aflame just before the harvest and village granaries are emptied and destroyed in an effort to starve the people into submission. The planes often bear Afghan markings, but the pilots are Soviet, as they have been since mid-1979—though they reportedly sometimes wear Afghan uniforms.

In April 1981, the Soviet Union signed an international convention outlawing boobytrap mines disguised as harmless objects. Yet for 2 years before that—and since then, to this very day—they have continued to seed such mines on the routes used by villagers and refugees. These mines—disguised as toys, watches, pens, even wads of money—are particularly attractive to young children, and hundreds of maimed children—their hands, arms, and legs gone—testify to their vicious power.

The Soviets boobytrap the bodies of the Afghan dead, also outlawed by international convention. All this, of course, is in addition to carpet-bombing and rocketing of villages, strafing attacks on civilians and refugees, and other "conventional" forms of warfare.

These bits of green plastic [Displayed] are fragments of the boobytraps the Afghans call "green birds"; some of the cyrillic lettering is still visible. They are scat-

tered by the hundreds along the paths and in the fields. Twenty or more people were injured recently when such boobytraps were seeded around a refugee camp inside Pakistan by Afghan helicopters violating Pakistani territory.

I have mentioned only a few of the human rights violations and violations of international law. Political rights have of course vanished; and I will just touch briefly on one other aspect: economic abuses.

For nearly 40 years, Soviet pressure prevented the Afghan people from exploiting their considerable mineral resources—world-class chrome, iron, copper and uranium, among many others—for their own benefit; Moscow kept the Afghans poor. Meanwhile, the Soviets mapped and surveyed Afghan resources and developed the plans to exploit them for Soviet benefit which they are now trying to put into effect. Already, one billion cubic metres of Afghan natural gas are piped into Soviet Central Asia annually to keep that economy afloat. Nominally, the U.S.S.R. pays about half of world market rates for the gas; but in reality, even that payment is charged against the costs of maintaining Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan! No Afghan gas goes for Afghan use.

But that is another subject, and time is short.

Some time ago, a wounded Afghan boy in a Peshawar hospital said to me, "Tell the people in your country that they are doing terrible things to us." So that is what I have tried to do, and I thank you for the opportunity to keep my promise.

Some of the tragedies they are enduring might cease if the Afghans would only stop resisting the imposition of a Communist regime. And yet they fight on, stubbornly determined to be free, to choose their own government as they always have done, to be themselves. Those of us who believe in freedom cannot close our eyes to their struggle, which is important not only to them but to the world.

In an interview last month, Lt. Gen. Abdul Qadir, acting Minister of Defense in the Kabul regime, declared that once Afghanistan is brought under control, the Afghan army will be used—and I quote—"like the soldiers of Cuba and Vietnam" to spread "progressive" revolution "throughout the area." As Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick said at the United Nations last year, "The Soviet Union can conquer Afghanistan only by eliminating the Afghan nation. This the world must not permit to happen, for if Afghanistan is conquered, no independent nation will be safe."

Thank you.

[The following Advisory on Afghanistan was issued by the Board of Trustees of Freedom House on October 5, 1981, and was published in the November/December issue of Freedom at Issue:]

Toward a Constructive Political Settlement in Afghanistan

A FREEDOM HOUSE ADVISORY

Nearly two years ago—Christmas 1979—the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Just days later, the United Nations emergency special session "deplored the armed intervention" and "appealed to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned character of Afghanistan, and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country." Afghan sovereignty, integrity, nonalignment, and internal affairs had been violated by the Soviet invasion—so proclaimed 104 nations, overwhelmingly supported by nonaligned countries.

The General Assembly of the United Nations this November will reexamine the Afghanistan invasion. The European Economic Community, meanwhile, continues to press the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its troops. While the Western "ten" will not want Afghanistan to bleed indefinitely, free countries should not provide *de facto* recognition of the puppet regime in Kabul. This would legitimatize that regime and hand the Soviets a politico-diplomatic victory they stand a steadily lessening chance of winning inside Afghanistan. Instead, the Afghan people should be helped to regain their independence so they can choose their own leadership.

Afghanistan is linked to vital issues dividing the Western Alliance: strategic arms limitation talks with the U.S.S.R., deployment of theater nuclear weapons, the neutron warhead, and general attitudes toward "détente." It would undermine the larger objectives of world peace and stability if Afghanistan's sovereignty or independence were to be sacrificed to ease Alliance relationships over other divisive issues.

To yield on Afghanistan would signal the utter inability of the Alliance to stand firm even in the face of armed aggression across national borders. Yielding on Afghanistan would tell the majority of nonaligned countries which joined the West in denouncing Soviet aggression in Afghanistan that stigmatizing the aggressor is ulti-

mately ineffectual and perhaps self-defeating, that such acts by the West are only rhetorical bluff, and consistent resistance to Soviet imperialism is not to be expected from the Alliance.

The Soviet takeover began well before the 1979 invasion. Afghanistan was governed by increasingly democratic regimes from 1963 to 1973. The ground was prepared for the Soviet occupation when the 1973 coup installed a communist-dominated cabinet and government behind a nationalist façade. Afghan resistance started when the communists openly seized power in the 1978 coup and Soviet officials arrived to direct the government. Soviet troops later invaded to formalize communist control and try to crush nationwide resistance which in 1979 was on the verge of restoring Afghan independence.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan differs markedly from the U.S.S.R.'s military intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia (when the West stood aside). Afghanistan was a nonaligned country before it succumbed to Soviet pressure. Vital Western European and American interests lie just across the Gulf, and Afghanistan is a land corridor to those and other important Western geopolitical interests. The invasion also demonstrated that the Soviet Union is not the natural ally of the Third World. Nor, as advocates of détente maintain, is the U.S.S.R. a *status quo* country.

The world has tended to forget the human suffering and the continuing struggle in Afghanistan. The Afghans are demonstrating heroic resistance, fighting alone and almost unaided. Even a cosmetic "settlement" involviong Soviet troop withdrawal would not end the resistance, as long as Soviet puppets remain in Kabul.

During this cruel war the normally divided peoples of Afghanistan have come together for their common struggle. Inside and outside the country the various ethnic, tribal, and religious factions are moving toward an integrated, if not a single, defense operation. This points toward operational unity. All are united in demanding an end to the Soviet occupation and the restoration of Afghan-selected leadership and governance.

What should the United States do?

1. Help the Afghan people secure what they need to achieve their objectives.
2. Support a negotiated political settlement of the war which results not only in the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but restoration of a sovereign and independent Afghanistan in which the Afghan people are free to choose their own governmental leadership.
3. Firmly resist a diplomatic sellout. This would be implicit in accepting a spokesman for the Soviet puppet regime as the only Afghan participant in troop-withdrawal negotiations.
4. Encourage the movement toward Afghan operational unity.
5. Make sure American help, whether diplomatic or other, advances the cause of Afghans who seek a more democratic, rather than an authoritarian, Afghanistan.
6. Provide accurate information about the situation inside Afghanistan to Soviet citizens, Afghans (particularly explaining Western concern for their future), and the neighboring Muslin world, as well as to Europeans and Americans.
7. Inform Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan about the actual situation in that country and the world's reaction to it; and provide an opportunity for those Soviet soldiers who do not wish to continue fighting in this war to reach safe havens outside Afghanistan.

Afghans must be helped now to form a government in the interest of the Afghan people, not the Soviet Union.

[From the New York Times, July 30, 1981]

Afghans Battle On

(By Rosanne Klass) [1]

The Afghan people are more than holding their own in their struggle to regain freedom and national independence. They should not be abandoned by the West, which might be tempted to accept Kremlin terms for a cosmetic withdrawal of the Soviet troops in the hope of restoring the atmosphere of détente that was destroyed by the invasion.

Ever since the Soviet Army rolled into Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979, the world has assumed that the country was conquered. Reports of a growing nation-

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[1] Rosanne Klass is director of the Afghanistan Information Center at Freedom House, which monitors political rights and civil liberties around the world.

wide resistance, holding its own and even gaining, have been dismissed as bravura boasting by scattered bands of diehard religious fanatics.

But today it is apparent that Afghan resistance, largely under local leadership, is indeed blocking Soviet conquest. After 19 months, 90 percent of Afghanistan, a country somewhat larger then France, is in the hands of the Afghan people. They have paid a terrible price—an estimated one million civilian casualties, and more than two million refugees—but they are united as never before in a single-minded struggle to reject the Communist takeover that began in 1978 and to regain their freedom.

The Russians and their puppet regime that they installed control only Kabul, parts of other cities, major military bases and garrisons, the north-south supply route from Kabul to the Soviet border, and pieces of the north, including the natural-gas fields that fuel the Soviet Central Asian economy.

Even these areas are not secure. Between April 13 and July 15, at least 107 high-level Afghan Communist officials and Soviet officers were assassinated in Kabul, on two occasions at the very gate of the Soviet Embassy at midday. In Herat, a no-man's-land for two years, Soviet soldiers are killed in their barracks. Unable to wrest Kandahar from the resistance, the Russians bombed much of it into rubble in June; two weeks later, the resistance again controlled Kandahar. On June 19, the main Soviet airbase at Bagram was set ablaze, and fuel, ammunition dumps, and aircraft were destroyed. In July, the reisistance won Gulbahar on the north-south supply road. The landscape is littered with ruined Soviet tanks and armor.

Contrary to news media reports, the Afghans have received little outside aid. They have fought with the courage and cunning accumulated during centuries of guerrilla resistance to all invaders—and with weapons provided by Afghan forces, who desert *en masse*, and Soviet troops, who sell arms for hashish, American whisky, and blue jeans. The Afghan Army has distintegrated so badly, and the loyalty of remaining troops is so suspect, that the Russians no longer allow the Afghan soldiers to have antitank and antiaircraft weapons. The regime is reduced to impressing 14-year-olds into military service and ordering civil servants into uniform. Army posts are ringed with mines to keep soldiers in as well as guerrillas out.

Estimates of the Soviet dead run to more than 20,000. The dead are now being buried in Afghanistan because the shipping of coffins to the Soviet Union has become too conspicuous.

Having failed to gain control of Afghanistan, first by proxy in 1978 and 1979 under the regimes of Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin (aided by 10,000 or more Soviet "advisors" commanding down to the brigade level in the field), and then by using the Soviet Army, Moscow is now seeking to achieve it by diplomatic means.

For months, Soviet officials have been spreading the word that the Kremlin would like to negotiate a settlement. The European Economic Community, eager to restore trade relations damaged by the invasion of Afghanistan, sent Lord Carrington, Britain's Foreign Secretary, to Moscow recently with a proposal for negotiations that was promptly rejected. Undaunted, the E.E.C. hopes to work out terms that would bring the Russians to the negotiating table by late fall.

The Soviet Union has stated its requirements clearly: Its puppets in Kabul would have to participate in negotiations—that is, the Soviet-installed regime would have to be accepted as the legitimate Government of Afghanistan. If the E.E.C. yielded on this point, that would of course legitimize all past Soviet actions and leave the Kabul regime free to keep, or call back, the Soviet Army at any time under a 1978 treaty, regardless of the outcome of negotiations.

That is precisely the sort of sellout feared by the Afghans. The Afghan people won't accept any government imposed by outside powers, or any Communist regime, and would keep fighting. Such a deal would cut off any possibility of international assistance, leaving the Afghans isolated for as many decades as Moscow would need to destroy them. It would force Pakistan to choose between driving two million refugees home to die or accepting them permanently. It would assuredly make a mockery of any claim by the Western democracies to stand for freedom, self-determination, and human rights, and would discourage any future resistance to aggression anywhere in the world.



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[From the New York Times, Jan. 4, 1982]

U.S., Aid the Afghans

(By Rosanne Klass)

Just two years ago, when Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan to prevent the overthrow of the Communist regime installed in the bloody 1978 coup, most of the world thought that Afghanistan was conquered. Few observers would have predicted then that Moscow's new puppets would fail as badly as their predecessors, and that in 1982 the Afghan people would still be fighting for their freedom, and more strongly than ever.

Yet today Moscow is casting about for non-Communist turncoats to prop up the impotent regime of Babrak Karmal, while the Afghan resistance—made up of virtually all the Afghan people—controls most of the country. Soviet forces are pinned down in Kabul and a few military bases, waiting for the Afghans to exhaust themselves, forgotten by the world. The United States must make sure that this does not happen.

It is time for Washington to make the American public aware that for more than three years the stubbornly independent Afghans, struggling alone and almost unaided against the Soviet Union, have been fighting our fight. It is time to give up convoluted efforts to ignore Moscow's transparent goals and its decades of careful preparation for the opportune moment to seize Afghanistan, and face a stark fact: Afghanistan is a key to eventual Soviet expansion in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

In 3,500 years, no power that held the mountains of Afghanistan and wanted to move into the Indian subcontinent has been prevented from doing so. The Soviet Union has in effect annexed Afghanistan's Walthan Salient, the finger of land reaching eastward to China's border, and installed radar that scans India, Pakistan, and parts of China and the Indian Ocean. Preparations for subverting Pakistan proceed apace: Since 1979, *agents provocateurs* have been trained in Afghanistan. Only Afghan resistance has kept the Russians from completing new air bases within easy reach of the Persian Gulf.

Leaders of the resistance *Inside* Afghanistan have made it clear to me that, despite reports to the contrary, the resistance is operationally unified. They have asserted that their poeple are prepared to continue fighting for years, even decades—long enough, they hope, to persuade Moscow to accept a political solution restoring Afghan independence and a Government chosen by the Afghan people. But the Afghans cannot carry out such an extended struggle unaided and alone.

It is time for America to provide strong, effective assistance—diplomatic, political, economic, and with arms support. First of all, Washington, using international political and economic pressures, must make it clear that Afghanistan remains a major issue. Poland and Afghanistan should be linked in policy as they are in fact: Afghanistan helped give the Poles their 16 months of hope and perhaps kept the Soviet Army out of Poland, while every pressure put on Moscow in Poland's behalf aids the Afghan struggle.

Washington should serve notice that it will respond to any further cross-border attacks that violate Pakistan's territorial integrity. Even if the Pakistani Government is less than ideal, its collapse would spell international disaster.

America should provide more effective aid to the resistance fighters inside Afghanistan, and make sure that it gets to them—antiaircraft and antitank weapons, medical supplies, the guns and the bullets they need and lack. Afghanistan is not Vietnam: The Afghans want to do their own fighting; they ask only the weapons to do it with.

America should support and strengthen those elements—the vast majority of Afghans—who seek a more democratic rather than authoritarian future. And the Administration should reappraise its understanding of Afghan realities: For decades, American policies have been affected by accumulated disinformation systematically fed to us by Communists who infiltrated the local staff of our embassy in Kabul, starting with Noor Mohammad Taraid, the leader of the 1978 coup, who was a translator in the embassy. A number of reliable Afghan leaders have survived, and their expertise should at last be used.

Washington should stop demanding the kind of political unity that is impossible during an occupation and guerrilla warfare and should ignore the squabbling of political factions based in Pakistan. It should prepare to recognize the unprecedented internal unity that, according to reliable information reaching me, is being forged by local leadership councils throughout Afghanistan.

The Afghans have more than proved their willingness to fight for themselves. If the monstrous details of Soviet-directed atrocities in Afghanistan ever become fully known, they will rank with Lidice, the Katyn Forest, and Babi Yar. These horrors might cease if the Afghan people would only stop fighting. I asked an Afghan field commander: Why don't they? "Do you think that Americans are the only ones who care about freedom?" he replied.

The Administration should act on Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's warning: "The Soviet Union can conquer Afghanistan only by eliminating the Afghan nation. This the world must not permit to happen, for if Afghanistan is vanquished, no independent nation will be safe."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I think you have fulfilled your pledge to that young wounded Afghan boy.

I would like to note with a great deal of sadness on behalf of all my colleagues the death last Friday night of Clifford P. Case, our beloved colleague, who served as chairman of Freedom House since leaving the United States Senate. We certainly feel for his family, too. We want to express our deepest sympathy to the family of Senator Case and also to Freedom House, which has long benefited from Senator Case's guidance and support.

Professor Khalilzad, we are very happy to have you with us today. You are an American citizen born in Afghanistan. I understand that you recently visited Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.

Mr. KHALILZAD. Just for the record Senator, I did not visit Afghanistan, but I did visit Pakistan.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered about that. I wondered how you would have been permitted to get in. That might have been a little too close for you. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD, INSTITUTE OF WAR AND PEACE STUDIES AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. KHALILZAD. I am very pleased to be here, Senator Percy. Like yourself, I am a graduate of the University of Chicago, so it gives me great pleasure to present my testimony before your committee.

I think that the Afghan crisis has not received the attention it deserves. It appears to me that the Soviets are counting on the world public opinion to forget about Afghanistan. You have done a great service by holding these hearings on this important issue.

The Soviet invasion was a landmark event in contemporary history. As you know, there have been many speculations about the reasons for the Soviet invasion. Some have attributed the Soviet move to offensive considerations, while others have emphasized defensive ones. It is possible that the Soviet leaders participating in the decision voted to go in for very different reasons among themselves.

Whatever Moscow's motives, the invasion was a landmark event for two major reasons. First, at the strategic level, the Soviet invasion eliminated a traditional buffer state long considered critical to the security of Southwest Asia and, therefore, in my view fundamentally altered the geostrategic environment of this important region. It set a new precedent in the massive use of Soviet forces outside the Soviet satellite empire, and was the first application of the Brezhnev doctrine outside Eastern Europe.

The occupation of Afghanistan, if successful, will increase the ability of the Soviet Union to project power to South Asia, the Ara-

bian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. With the Soviet bases in Afghanistan, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf have been put within the range of Soviet tactical aircraft. This additional increase in capability comes in the aftermath of massive growth in the ability of the Soviet Union to project power.

I have in my statement three tables which illustrate the advantage for the Soviets in terms of the region, including the gulf, from having access to existing or potential bases and facilities in Afghanistan.

I think the other important point which should be observed about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is, it demonstrates a pattern in Soviet foreign policy that might well be applied in the case of contiguous countries near Afghanistan. The pattern is this: As the small countries near the Soviet Union or on its borders move closer to the Soviet Union ideologically, Soviet involvement in those countries increases, and the prospect of Soviet invasion of those countries also increase. That is, the closer small states on the Soviet border move to the Soviet Union, the likelier it becomes that Moscow will invade them.

I think this pattern of invading one's friends is the likely strategy that the Soviets will follow in the case of Pakistan and Iran. Soviet political economic involvement is likely to be followed by greater military involvement which will be followed by a massive Soviet invasion itself.

Therefore, Afghanistan provides instructive lessons, if you like, not only for the contiguous small states of the area but also for the United States, which opposes the spread of Soviet influence.

A similar policy, if successful in the case of other contiguous states, will have a negative effect, not only U.S. interests, but those of its allies as well.

Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I have just returned from a visit to Pakistan. I held a series of meetings with Afghan resistance leaders and have talked with many Afghan fighters, and have taken a close look at the Afghan refugee camps. Based on my trip, it appears to me that the Afghan resistance is at a crossroads. Without increased outside support, the effectiveness of the Afghan resistance is likely to decline, ultimately leading to its defeat.

I think the more than 2 years of occupation has been far more costly to the Afghans than is generally recognized. Reportedly some 3 million Afghans, or some one-fifth of the Afghan population, have left the country to go to Iran and Pakistan. Incidently, if a similar tragedy were to happen in the United States, it would mean some 50 million Americans would have had to leave their country.

A state of war governs life in the cities of Afghanistan, with curfews and food shortages. Many years of turmoil and a Soviet military strategy that at the time involved destruction of villages suspected of harboring partisans, and the departure of many agricultural workers to Pakistan, have contributed to a serious degradation in Afghanistan's agriculture.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record an article that I wrote on Soviet strategy in Afghanistan which appeared in a magazine called Problems of Communism.

I think if the Afghans inside the country have not fared well, the situation is not much better for the Afghans living in Pakistan. According to Pakistani officials, there are more than 225 camps in the northern frontier province alone. The total number of refugees in the area is more than 2 million. Life in many of the refugee camps is extremely difficult.

For example, at the Panya Camp in Haripoor, at which I visited, some 80,000 Afghan refugees reside. As of 6 weeks ago, the people in this camp had only 250 tents and 1,000 blankets. So, there were thousands without either tents or blankets. The two Afghani officials who ran the camp told shocking stories of human tragedies that they witnessed every day. A number of refugees come to Pakistan believing life in the camps would be very different than it actually is.

The exodus of large numbers of Afghans helps the Soviets as it results in emptying the areas of resistance. While the refugees could join the various partisans groups and therefore increase the numbers of the fighters, in fact, many do not because of the problems that the resistance faces.

I would only summarize those problems. First, the partisans do not have weapons and ammunition in quantities needed. They face serious limitations in terms of training. Some analysts have said that the Afghans are very difficult to train since they believe that they know more about fighting than anyone else. Nevertheless, the resistance leaders told me that they have many officers and soldiers in their ranks who would be quite suitable and willing to be trained. At times, training Afghans in other countries has been discussed, but it has never actually been carried out.

I would say that the partisan face financial problems as they cannot take care of the families of all the potential partisans who could go into fighting.

None of the problems that the Afghans face, we believe, are insurmountable. It requires political will both here and in the neighboring countries. It is possible that the current policies of sympathetic outside powers might bring about the very situation that should be feared the most, the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan. Meager assistance to the resistance movements, both those based inside Afghanistan and those in the neighboring countries, and miserable conditions in which the Afghan refugees live might lead to a feeling of resignation and defeat among the Afghans and a Soviet military victory.

It is in the self-interest of the United States and the countries of the area that this does not happen. I believe Senator Percy, that a population willing to face starvation and massive sanctions to resist an occupying army deserves the support of democratic powers. In this instance, I believe the moral imperative is backed by prudent self-interest.

At the end of my testimony, I have enumerated the elements of a broad strategy for the region as a whole. I will not go through those points.

I should also like to submit for the record an article which I have written on a strategy for that region in a journal called International Security published by Harvard University.

Thank you very much, Senator.

[Mr. Khalilzad's prepared statement and attachments follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. ZALMAY KHALILZAD

I am very glad to be here and to testify on this important issue. I believe that the Afghan crisis has not received the attention it deserves. Past western neglect of Afghanistan—resulting from miscalculations of that country's strategic value and from other errors in policy toward the surrounding region—contributed to making the present situation possible. Policies since the Soviet invasion, while an improvement over those of the past, still fall short of what is required for an effective and credible long-term strategy. I would like to begin my statement with a brief discussion of the importance of the Afghan crisis.

The Soviet invasion was a landmark event in contemporary history. There have been many speculations about reasons for the Soviet invasion. Some have attributed the Soviet move to offensive considerations, while others have emphasized defensive ones. It is possible that even the Soviet leaders participating in the decision favored invasion for different reasons. Whatever Moscow's motives, the act itself had far-reaching regional and global implications. It also provides instructive lessons about the pattern of Soviet foreign policy towards contiguous small states.

At the strategic level, the Soviet invasion eliminated a traditional buffer state, long considered critical for the security of Southwest Asia, and therefore fundamentally altered the geostrategic environment of this important region. It set a new precedent in the massive use of Soviet forces outside the Soviet satellite empire and was the first application of the Brezhnev Doctrine outside Eastern Europe. The occupation of Afghanistan, if successful, will increase Soviet ability to project power to South Asia, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. With the Afghan bases, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf have been put within the range of Soviet tactical aircraft; this additional increase in capability has followed the great expansion of Soviet power projection capability over the past 25 years. The following tables illustrate how bases in Afghanistan would increase Soviet air capability vis-a-vis several important areas:

Combat radii of aircraft in Soviet and Soviet allies service

	Kilometers
SU-7 Filter A	525
SU-17 Filter B	600
SU-20/22 Filter C/D	930
MiG 19	390
MiG 21	575
MiG 23	1,050
MiG 25	1,070

Distance from potential base areas in Afghanistan to Persian Gulf targets

	Kilometers
Helmand Valley to Hormuz	680
Farah to Hormuz	795
Kandahar to Karachi	770

Distance from Soviet air bases to potential Persian Gulf targets

	Kilometers
Kazi Magimed (near Baku) to Hormuz	1,760
Askhabad (Turkmenistan) to Hormuz	1,325
Askhabad to Karachi	1,595

Soviet policies towards Afghanistan since the mid-1950's show an interesting pattern, which might well be repeated in the case of other contiguous countries such as Iran and Pakistan. Therefore, the Afghan experience provides an important lesson not only for other small states bordering the Soviet Union, but also for the United States which opposes the spread of Soviet influence. It appears that the Soviet level of activity, including military invasion in small countries on its border, increases as the political and security relations between such countries and Russia converge. Although Soviet involvement in Afghanistan goes back for many years, it increased substantially after the April 1978 coup in Kabul, which brought a Marxist-Leninist group to power. This government moved decidedly closer to the Soviet Union and signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. The Soviet invasion followed these moves, which had lowered the risks of intervention to the Soviets and

increased the Soviet stakes in the country. As the opposition to pro-Soviet government and policies inside Afghanistan increased, Moscow did not want to allow a reversal of Afghan-Soviet relations at a time and place when the "correlation of forces" looked to its advantage. The case of Afghanistan also shows that it is more difficult to reverse a Soviet gain on its border than in the case of non-contiguous areas.

Moscow is likely to follow a similar strategy vis-a-vis Iran and Pakistan, i.e., if they move politically and militarily close to Moscow, the likelihood of direct and massive Soviet intervention then would increase, especially if the Kremlin regards such a move not to be excessively costly. Therefore, higher costs for Moscow in Afghanistan could affect Soviet calculations towards the other states in the area: learning that expansion is costly and therefore not to be undertaken lightly. Moscow is likely to pay increasing attention to Iran and the surrounding areas, a region which has grown in importance to the Western allies and paradoxically Western ability to influence development there has declined. Soviet policies aim at further weakening U.S. positions in the area and strengthening its own. However, Soviet control—direct or indirect—over Iran and the Gulf, would represent a massive threat to Western interests on the economic, political and military levels. Such control would provide the Soviets with a lever to weaken and divide the Western alliance, a persistent Soviet goal. To counter Soviet policies in the area, Washington needs a multi-pronged strategy, one which includes support for the Afghans. I have enumerated the elements of a comprehensive strategy in the concluding section of this testimony.

I have just returned from a visit to the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. Based on my visit to the refugee camps and conversations with Afghan resistance leaders and fighters, I believe the two years of occupation have been far more costly to the Afghans than it is generally realized. Some three million Afghans—or some one-fifth of the population—have fled to Pakistan and Iran; a state of war governs life in the cities, with curfews and food shortages; badly needed experts have left the country; and substantial civilian and partisan casualties have been sustained.

Once in Afghanistan, the Soviets initiated a multipronged strategy for pacification of the country. This has included accommodation of Islamic feelings, a propaganda blitz to win support for the Soviet position both in Afghanistan and abroad, and to blame the Afghan crisis on the Americans, Chinese, and the Pakistanis. Another element has been attempts at harmonizing relations between the factions of the ruling Communist party and to broaden the base of government through the formation of the National Fatherland Front, an umbrella organization representing the various elements of the population. Moscow is also trying to train hundreds of new cadres who are expected to help not only in maintaining law and order but running the country. The Soviet installed regime has also attempted to win popular support by undoing some of the "radical" policies of the previous government. Moscow has tried to build a loyal armed forces to turn the Russian-Afghan into an Afghan-Afghan war. The Soviet military strategy appears to consist of holding onto major cities and highways, and applying force intermittently against the area of resistance in the countryside. The Soviet strategy is aimed at minimizing Soviet loss of life, and a belief that in time they will either discourage the population from supporting the resistance or force them to leave the country. Moscow appears also to be counting on the international community to forget about the Afghan crisis.

The Soviet strategy has not been successful so far and Moscow is far from pacifying the country. Violent opposition to the occupation has spread all over the country. The future of the Afghan conflict, however, is uncertain. Several factors will play a critical role in determining whether the Soviets succeed in liquidating or neutralizing the Afghan partisan.

Both the Afghan partisan and refugee are faced with major problems, the continuation of which are likely to decrease resistance effectiveness. These problems are:

1. Inadequate training.
2. Inadequate or defective weapons.
3. Disunity.
4. Very difficult conditions in the refugee camps. According to the Pakistani officials there are more than 225 refugee camps in the Northwest Frontier Province alone. The total number of refugees in the area is almost two million.

Numbers of Afghan refugees in NWFP—official Pakistani data

	Number of refugees
April-December 1978	18,329
January-December 1979	389,072
January 1980	427,580
February 1980	538,099
March 1980	599,050
April 1980	650,076
May 1980	720,495
June 1980	779,059
July 1980	839,260
August 1980	926,216
September 1980	996,872
October 1980	1,054,148
November 1980	1,148,470
December 1980	1,232,253
January 1981	1,310,928
February 1981	1,490,301
March 1981	1,560,912
April 1981	1,688,289
May 1981	1,812,001
June 1981	1,835,894
July 1981	1,859,639
August 1981	1,887,639
September 1981	1,906,826
October 1981	1,913,412

Life in many of the refugee camps is extremely difficult. For example, at the Panya Camp in Haripoor, which I visited, some 80,000 Afghan refugees reside. As of 6 weeks ago the people in this camp had only 250 tents and 1,000 blankets. So there were thousands without either tents or blankets. Two Pakistani officials who run the camp told shocking stories of human tragedy that they witnessed every day. A number of refugees have come to Pakistan believing tht life in the camps would be very different than it actually is. The exodus of large numbers of the Afghans helps the Soviets, as it results in the emptying of the areas of resistance. While many male refugees could join the various partisan groups, many do not because of the limitations on the partisans that I have enumerated earlier.

It is not inherently impossible to decrease the problems that the Afghans face. It requires political will both here and in the neighboring countries. It is possible that the current strategy by sympathetic outside powers might bring about the very situation feared the most: the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan. Meager assistance to the resistance movements, both those based inside Afghanistan and those in the neighboring countries, and miserable conditions in which the Afghan refugees live might lead to a feeling of resignation and defeat among the Afghans and a Soviet military victory.

It is in the self-interest of the United States and the countries of the area that this does not happen. I believe a population willing to face starvation and massive sanction to resist an occupying army deserves the support of democratic powers, and in this instance, the moral imperative is backed by prudent self-interest. Remaining content to counter Soviet aggression to the "last Afghan" is not only incommensurate with western political values, but also dangerous to the security of the United States and its allies.

To deal with the various challenges arising from Afghanistan and other problems in Southwest Asia there is a need for a broad joint American and allied strategy. I will summarize the elements of such strategy.

1. Increased Western capability in the region to meet potential Soviet military threats on its own terms. In order to make this effort politically tolerable for the countries of the region the following should be relied upon (in this order):

(a) Sea Presence and the expansion of Diego Garcia.

(b) Facilities and prepositioning of heavy equipment in countries in or near the area where a security alliance already exists.

(c) Facilities and prepositioning in countries where such a "presence" will *not* create substantial and unmanageable political difficulties.

(d) Once a commitment has been made every effort should be made to honor it.

2. Improve the quality of information and analysis about the countries of the area.

3. Improve U.S. ability to communicate with the people of the area, for example, by strengthening broadcasting to the region.

4. Take advantage of Soviet difficulties prudently.

5. Maintain private and unofficial contact with a broad range of political groups in the area and recognize that stability may not be the prime goal in all cases. Develop joint political strategy towards this region with as many Western countries as possible.

6. Develop a hierarchy of preferences and a flexible political-military strategy to allow for achieving them.

7. Give publicity to aggressive Soviet policies in the region.

8. Seek resolution of problems in and between sympathetic countries.

9. Seek a regulation of Super-power competition in the area based on a balance of power in the region.

10. Tacit acceptance of Soviet territorial aggression undermines the credibility of U.S. policy. Afghanistan is important as a test case, as an exploration of U.S. and international tolerance to Soviet domination of the area.

[From Problems of Communism, November-December 1980]

Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan

By Zalmay Khalilzad

Almost a year has passed since the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. To all parties involved, the year has been costly. Afghanistan's population has been faced with severe hardships; more than a million refugees have fled to Iran and Pakistan; a state of war governs life in the cities, with curfews and food shortages; badly needed experts, from diplomats to airline personnel, have left the country; and substantial civilian and partisan casualties have been sustained.[1] As for the USSR, its standing in the Third World has suffered from its first direct invasion of a Third World country since World War II. Relations with the West have also worsened, and embargoes have been imposed. Despite the costs of maintaining some 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and of incurring as many as 15,000 casualties among these forces,[2] Moscow has not yet succeeded in subduing the Afghans. Indeed, only if one assumes that the sole purpose of the intervention was to avert the imminent emergence of a hostile regime in Kabul or to get rid of Hafizullah Amin, can Soviet strategy be deemed to have achieved its ends.

What factors led to the Soviet effort to take control of Afghanistan? What is the Soviet strategy for pacification of the country and for minimizing external support for Afghan partisans? What is the nature of the Afghan opposition, and what are the prospects for unity or division among partisan groups? The answers to these questions provide some basis for hazarding an assessment of the possible future course of the Afghan conflict.

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The Political Context

The Soviet invasion marked a major escalation in the USSR's long and persistent involvement in Afghanistan. As a result, today it is essentially the Soviets who govern Afghanistan—deciding on major appointments, setting policies for dealing with the national insurgency, and determining major internal and external policies (including major speeches by Afghan representatives at the United Nations).[3] What circumstances brought this major shift?

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan increased substantially after April 1978, when a coalition of the two rival factions of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) overthrew the Mohammad Daoud regime in a military coup.[4] Both factions, Parcham (headed by Babrak Karmal) and Khalq (headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki), were Marxist-Leninist and sympathetic to the Soviet Union, but on other matters, they had major conflicts.[5] Less than three months after the coup, these dissensions had reached the level of a total break, from which Khalq emerged victorious.[6] Some of Parcham's leaders were jailed; others, including Karmal, formed a rival group in exile in Eastern Europe.

[1] *Pakistan Affairs* (Washington, DC), Aug. 16, 1980, p. 1.

[2] ABC Evening News, Sept. 18, 1980. Already in July, Soviet casualties were estimated at between 8,000 and 10,000. *Sunday Times* (London), July 27, 1980.

[3] Soviet control over Afghanistan's diplomacy was reported to the author by a private source.

[4] For a detailed discussion of the 1978 coup, see Hannah Negaran (pseud.), "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Spring 1979, pp. 93–113.

[5] Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan Under the *Khalq*," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1979, pp. 34–50.

[6] See Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Superpowers and the Northern Tier," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1979–1980, pp. 6–30.

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Signs of the Soviet-backed anti-insurgent effort in Afghanistan: at left, destruction wrought in a village by Soviet-flown MiG's; at right, Afghan partisans examine a bomb that failed to go off during an attack on a village by a Soviet MiG-21.

—Sipa Press-Black Star and David Kline-SYGMA

Khalq embarked on a radical shift in the country's external and internal policies. Externally, the new government moved Afghanistan decidedly closer to the Soviet Union.[7] Internally, fundamental reforms were introduced. Some of these reforms, such as laws dealing with marriage and the situation of women, were long overdue. However, the reforms were badly planned and were combined with unpopular symbolic acts such as the adoption of a red flag. Despite regime denials, these acts convinced many traditional Afghans of the Marxist nature of the government and contributed to large-scale popular opposition. Over time, this opposition turned into a major antiregime insurgency.

As Afghanistan's internal situation began to deteriorate seriously and Islamic fundamentalists took power in Iran, the Soviet Union started to look for a way to salvage the Afghan situation. Their initial plan was to eliminate Hafizullah Amin, Khalq's strong man; blame the excesses of the regime on him; abandon some of the more unpopular policies; and establish a broadly based government, including Parchamis.[8] This plan failed and resulted in the elimination of Taraki by Amin in September 1979.

While Amin tried to salvage the internal situation and even improve relations with the West and Pakistan, the Soviets began to lay the groundwork for their invasion. Moscow gave refuge to those who had backed Taraki against Amin, stepped up contact with the Parchami exiles in Eastern Europe and brought Babrak Karmal to Moscow, increased the Soviet military presence inside Afghanistan by persuading Amin that he needed greater Soviet assistance in the conflict with the Afghan guerrillas, and bolstered Soviet military capabilities in areas of the USSR near the Afghan border.[9] These actions were clear warning signals of a major Soviet military move against Afghanistan's President Amin. After the invasion, several Western leaders expressed surprise at this Soviet move. In fact, however, information about the Soviet Union's preparatory steps was available to Western governments and to the public through press leaks.[10] But much of the international community, including the United States, either misinterpreted or ignored these signals for a great deal of the period prior to the invasion. There is no evidence than any major steps were taken by other states to induce a change in Soviet calculations and plans.

On December 27, 1979, the USSR made its move. On the pretext of an invitation from a regime that had allegedly overthrown Amin (and whose leader, Babrak Karmal, was not even in Afghanistan), the Soviet

[7] Ibid.

[8] For a discussion of circumstances leading to the Soviet invasion, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan and the Crisis in American Foreign Policy," *Survival* (London), July–August 1980, pp. 151–61, and William E. Griffith, "Superpower Relations After Afghanistan," ibid., pp. 146–51.

[9] *Dawn Overseas* (Karachi), Oct. 27, 1979, and *The New York Times*, Dec. 8 and 22, 1979.

[10] Ibid.

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

Union entered the country in force. Soviet troops airlifted to Kabul captured major military installations, toppled Amin (who was killed in the confusion), and installed Karmal in power. Other forces moved to seize military bases in Mazar-e Sharif, Gardez, Jalalabad, Qandahar, Qonduz, and Herat (see map).[11]

Soviet Strategy in Afghanistan

Once in Afghanistan, the Soviets initiated a multipronged pacification strategy. This strategy has included a substantial emphasis on Islam, a major propaganda effort to blame the Afghan crisis on the United States and China, an attempt to keep the rival factions of the pro-Soviet PDP together, an effort to moderate some unpopular economic policies, an attempt to build a loyal Afghan armed force, the use of some 85,000 Soviet troops against a variety of religious, ideological, regional, and tribal opposition, and persistent intimidation of neighboring countries to prevent them from providing the Afghan opposition support and sanctuary.

Islam in Soviet tactics. Since the invasion, the Soviets have been engaged in a major ideological effort to win popular support for the new Kabul regime. They recognize the political power of Islamic revival in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and have tried to prevent it from taking an anti-Soviet character and to give it an anti-US orientation. In Afghanistan, emphasis on Islam has been a major part of the Kabul government's official statements. Khalq's all-red flag has been changed to one featuring the Islamic color of green. The government has established an office of "Islamic teachings," under Karmal's direction. Some religious leaders jailed under Amin were released after the invasion. Kabul's new rulers have also sponsored a series of meetings with local religious leaders from various parts of the country and have organized a national conference of "religious scholars and clergy" to persuade them that "respect for [the] sacred religion of Islam" is part of the government's program.[12]

Babrak Karmal himself has tried to outdo Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran in "dedication" to Islam. Each of Karmal's speeches begins with a reference to Allah and is interspersed with quotations from the Koran, chants of "Allahu Akbar" (God is Great), and references to Afghanistan's Islamic tradition.[13]

Babrak Karmal, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, meets with one of the delegates to a July 1980 conference of the country's Islamic ulemas and mullahs in Kabul.

TASS from Sovfoto

Karmal has accused the United States, among others, of only pretending to be friendly to Islam.

> *My compatriots, it is the countries of America, Britain, and China who are falsely talking in the name of Islam. Is it not written in the holy Koran that the Jews no longer have the right to own a home? Is it not written that the Jews are the enemies of Islam? The US, Britain, and China, who are strengthening Israel, have become the friends of the Jews.*[14]

Karmal has also argued that true Islam exists in Soviet Central Asia, and offered to pay expenses for Afghan ulemas and clergy who wished to see for themselves.[15] A delegation of 88 Afghan religious leaders was sent to the Soviet Union to "visit

[11] *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1980.

[12] The text of the "Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," as released by Afghanistan's mission to the United Nations and published in the *Newsletter* of the Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, June 1980, pp. 48–52. See also *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Feb. 8, 1980.

[13] See, for example, Karmal's speech to Afghan elders, broadcast on Radio Kabul in Dari on June 18, 1980, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SAS*), June 20, 1980, pp. C 1-5.

[14] Ibid., p. C 2.

[15] See Karmal's address to a conference of Afghan ulemas and clergy on July 1, as broadcast by Kabul Radio in Pashto, July 2, 1980, in *FBIS-SAS*, July 7, 1980, p. C 3.

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mosques, miscellaneous places and to hold meetings with Muslims of the USSR" to see for themselves that the USSR is Islamic.[16] Karmal has even said that the "date of December 27 represents the intervention of God Almighty," and has called the Soviet "help" for the Afghans "an act of God."[17]

A propaganda blitz. Since the invasion, Soviet media have paid enormous attention to events in Afghanistan. The same themes are repeated, and the analysis is predictable. The goal has been to win popular support for Soviet actions, both in the USSR and in Afghanistan. This effort has become especially important as the military difficulties have increased.

Moscow's 42 hour-a-week broadcasts to Afghanistan in Dari and Pashto (the country's two main languages) and the Soviet-controlled Afghan propaganda machinery have tried to convince the Afghans and others that only a "limited Soviet military contingent" was sent to Afghanistan and then only at the repeated request of the "legitimate Afghan government"; that the overthrow and execution of Amin were carried out "by the Afghan army itself, supported by broad strata of the population";[18] and that the sole function of Soviet "assistance" was to defend Afghanistan against outside attacks.[19] Those accused by Moscow of attacking Afghanistan include the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt, and Israel.[20] President Amin is declared to have been a CIA agent.[21] The US response to the Afghanistan invasion was described as part of a continuous effort by Washington to sabotage détente, to revive the cold war,[22] and to take up a "hegemonist course."[23] President Carter's State of the Union message in January 1980 was characterized as a declaration that the United States had the right "to intervene in practically any region of the globe where they see fit."[24] In a February 1980 speech, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev argued that the "US and Chinese interference in Afghanistan" was a threat not only to that country, but to the USSR as well"[25]—a theme that has been persistent in Soviet propaganda.

President Karmal has charged that the US and its allies had "worked out" a plan "so that 3-4 million people of Afghanistan would have been killed. Their designs," said Karmal, "were to have Afghanistan torn to pieces and divided into several parts. One part was to go to Pakistan, one part to China, and Kabul and its surrounding area were to go to Amin. . . ."[26]

The Soviets have asserted on many occasions that their troops will be withdrawn as soon as the causes for their presence (outside interference) are eliminated. Delay in the departure of the troops is blamed especially on the US.[27] (Soviet behavior belies such assertions. Moscow has rejected as "illogical" the British-sponsored proposal of the European Common Market for neutralization of Afghanistan with international guarantees if the Soviets withdraw,[28] and has refused to enter into negotiations about the fate of Afghanistan with a three-person committee appointed by the Islamic Conference.[29] It has shown a similar attitude toward several Iranian proposals.[30] And, as we shall see below, the Soviet military presence shows no signs of being a short-term phenomenon.)

In their propaganda efforts within Afghanistan, the Soviets and the Karmal regime have focused their attention particularly on Afghan youth. A new weekly publication known as *Darafshe Jawanan* (Youth Flag) has appeared, aimed at gaining support among the youth. The government has established a new school named the "Faculty of Workers" to train Afghan youth ideologically, and hundreds of Afghan students have been sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries. One important Afghan-Soviet undertaking is an agreement to send some 350 ninth graders a year to the Soviet Union for "vocational training."[31]

Elusive PDP unity. A major Soviet goal since the occupation has been to harmonize relations between the rival PDP factions—Khalq and Parcham—and to broaden the base of support for the regime by bring-

[16] Radio Kabul in Pashto, July 6, 1980, in *FBIS-SAS*, July 7, 1980.
[17] See Karmal's June 18, 1980, speech, loc. cit.
[18] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 7, 1980.
[19] Ibid., Jan. 6, 1980. See also Peter Kenez, "What Russia Is Reading About Afghanistan," *The New Leader* (New York, NY), Feb. 11, 1980, and Adrian Karatnycky, "In for the Long Haul: Reporting the Line in Afghanistan," *Commonweal* (New York, NY), May 23, 1980.
[20] *Pravda*, Jan. 24, 1980.
[21] Ibid., Jan. 18, 1980.
[22] Ibid., Jan. 5, 1980.
[23] Ibid., Jan. 25, 1980.
[24] Ibid., Jan. 12, 1980.
[25] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1980.
[26] See Karmal's June 18, 1980, speech, loc. cit., p. C/3.
Amin has also been accused of establishing contact with one of the main religious opposition groups, the Islamic Party, and of plotting to carry out another coup against the PDP. See *Kabul New Times*, Jan. 22 and 27, 1980.
[27] Brezhnev has stated: "The United States loudly demands a withdrawal of Soviet troops when in fact, they do everything to eliminate this possibility. Let the USA, together with Afghanistan's neighbors, guarantee this [stopping outside interference] and then the need for Soviet military assistance will disappear." *Izvestiya*, Feb. 25, 1980.
[28] Ibid., Feb. 21, 1980.
[29] *The New York Times*, May 22, 1980.
[30] Syed Shabbir Hussain et al., *Afghanistan Under Soviet Occupation*, Islamabad, World Affairs Publications, 1980, p. 192.
[31] *Kabul New Times*, Sept. 7, 1980.

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KABUL NEW TIMES

Sanguinary Amin band ousted

United PDPA ends reign of terror: murderer meets his fate

Historical statement of Jaddi 6, 1358

Part of page 1 of the January 1, 1980, issue of Kabul New Times, *announcing the installation of a new regime in Afghanistan headed by Babrak Karmal, of the Parcham wing of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Pictured below Karmal were leading figures of the Revolutionary Council, including Assadullah Sarwari and Lt. Col. Mohammad Aslam Watanjar of the PDP's Khalq faction.*

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison

ing some nonparty members into government positions. Babrak Karmal, upon being installed as President, claimed the leadership of a united party. Several Khalqis, especially those who had been loyal to Taraki, were appointed to high positions in the regime. These included Assadullah Sarwari, who was named First Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President of the Revolutionary Council; Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi, Minister of the Interior and Member of the Central Committee of the PDP; Lt. Colonel Sher Jan Mazdooryar, Minister of Transport and member of the Central Committee of the PDP; and Lt. Colonel Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Minister of Communications and member of the Central Committee.

However, there are many indications that the Soviets have not been successful in effecting complete integration of the two groups. Factional conflicts have been reported at all levels of the civil and military bureaucracy.[32] At the highest level, Sarwari—like Karmal himself in 1978—has been dismissed and relegated to the post of ambassador to a pro-Soviet capital, in this case Ulan Bator.[33] There have also been accounts of feuds and shoot/outs between the

[32] There are various roots of the traditional conflicts between Khalq and Parcham. For one, Khalq is largely dominated by persons of Pashtun background, whereas Parcham has a greater Tajik representation. Khalq has also tended to favor a more radical social and economic program than Parcham. See Zalmay Khalilzad's *The Return of the Great Game: Superpower Rivalry and Domestic Turmoil in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey*, Los Angeles, CA: California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, 1980.

[33] *The Economist* (London), Aug. 30, 1980. Sarwari was replaced by an unknown Khalqi figure, Abdorrashid Arian.

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two factions at lower levels of the military. For example, the appointment of a Parchami officer to replace a Khalqi one to command the 14th Armored Division in Ghazni reportedly contributed to that division's mutiny in August 1980.[34] In October, there were reports of shootings between the rival factions in the 4th and 15th armored brigades in the Puli-charkhi garrison near Kabul.[35]

Many Parchamis who suffered under Khalqi rule seem bent on taking revenge on those who had supported Amin and even Taraki.[36] For their part, Khalqis, who reportedly constituted two thirds of the PDP civilian membership and four fifths of the party's military wing,[37] regard Parchamis as usurpers and unqualified to rule.

Internal conflict has demoralized the PDP and further complicated the crisis of legitimacy and security for the Kabul regime. It is also a persistent headache for the Soviets. Too close an identification by Moscow with the Parchamis might bring Khalqis to unite in active opposition to the Soviet presence in the country.[38] The Soviet Union, on the other hand, may be trying to maintain ties with the Khalq wing as a reserve should Karmal fail to cope with the situation in Afghanistan. There is, for example, nothing to prevent Moscow from trotting Sarwari back from Ulan Bator or putting some other Khalq leader at the helm in Kabul should circumstances dictate.

Karmal's effort to broaden his regime's base has also failed. Initially, he argued that his government would be based upon a "national united front under the leadership of the working class." He also promised the establishment of "revolutionary tranquillity" and elimination of arbitrary arrest and executions, and assured Afghans that in his "New Model Revolution" citizens would be allowed to form "progressive and patriotic parties."[39] Karmal stated, too, that a Loya Jirgah (Grand National Assembly) would be called to ratify a new constitution for the country, and he appointed more than a dozen nonparty members to high government positions.[40]

Like the other elements of the Soviet strategy, this base-broadening has not been successful. For one thing, the establishment of opposition groups has not been allowed. For another, Afghanistan remains in a state of war, with the large majority of the population opposed to the Soviet occupation, an opposition expressed with varying degrees of activism. Karmal's efforts to win support have fallen largely on deaf ears because of the presence of Soviet troops. Until or unless the troops depart, the government in Kabul will suffer from a lack of legitimacy.

Economic policies. The Soviet-installed regime has attempted to win popular support by undoing some of the "radical" policies introduced by the previous government in the economic realm and by encouraging the private sector through extension of credit and increased payment for goods delivered to the government by private firms. Karmal has argued that "it is not our duty to practice socialism."[41] According to the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the government has returned "illegally confiscated" capital and shares. In addition, it has permitted direct business links with foreign firms under state control, and has lowered customs tariffs.[42] To encourage private-sector participation in trade, the government has reportedly turned 20 state-controlled import associations over to private merchants.[43] Afghan sources claim that imports by the private sector during the first four months of 1980 totaled US$88.3 million, an increase of more than 50 percent over imports of US$55.6 million in the comparable period of 1979.[44]

Afghanistan's main trading partners reportedly continue to be the Soviet Union, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, and India. In the early part of 1980, trade with Japan was running at three times the level for the comparable 1979 period. As for the USSR, one of its first acts after invading Afghanistan was to announce conclusion of a new agreement with the Karmal government to triple the export of natural gas to the Soviet Union (to 2.3 billion cubic feet a year). As in the past, the Soviets are getting Afghan gas at a price far below the international level. (After 1973, Iran charged the Soviets more than 50 cents a 1000 cubic feet, while as late as 1976, the USSR was paying only 34 cents a 1000 cubic feet to the Afghans.) It is estimated that at present the Soviets are giving US$2.83 a 1000 cubic feet for Afghan gas,

[34] Ibid., Aug. 8, 1980.

[35] *The New York Times*, Oct. 16, 1980.

[36] Among the Khalqis executed were 10 associates of Amin, including his brother and nephew. Ibid., June 19, 1980.

[37] *The Economist*, Aug. 8, 1980.

[38] There is already evidence of some isolated Khalqi opposition to the occupation. *The New York Times*, Oct. 16, 1980.

[39] *Kabul New Times*, Jan. 1, 1980.

[40] For details, see Richard S. Newell, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan," *The World Today* (London), July 1980, esp. pp. 257-58.

[41] *Kabul New Times*, Jan. 1, 1980.

[42] From an interview with correspondent I. Shchedrov, published in *Pravda*, Sept. 8, 1980, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 17, 1980, pp. D/2-4.

[43] *Manchester Guardian*, Feb. 10, 1980.

[44] Shchedrov interview, loc. cit.

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Crowds and onlookers during a shopkeepers' strike in Kabul in February 1980.

—Ariane/Gamma-Liaison

which is substantially below the US$3.97 Moscow has offered the Iranians. The Iranians, in turn, have been demanding more than US$5.00 a 1000 cubic feet for their natural gas.[45] (The natural gas agreement, incidentally, lends some weight to the argument that "hunger for Afghanistan's important and strategic minerals was an incentive for the Soviet invasion and attempt to annex Kabul to the Soviet bloc."[46])

Occupied by Soviet forces and in a state of civil war, Afghanistan continues to face major economic problems which have contributed to the regime's continued unpopularity. There are serious shortages of essential items, such as wheat, rice, and meat, in many parts of the country.[47] Remittances from Afghan workers abroad have declined. Work on several development projects financed by international organizations such as the Asia Development Bank has been suspended. Many months of turmoil, a Soviet military strategy that involves the destruction of villages harboring partisans, and the departure of many agricultural workers to Pakistan have contributed to a breakdown in the country's agriculture, a process set in motion earlier by a poorly planned land reform. Some have speculated that starving the population in the areas of greatest resistance through destruction of the region's agriculture might be a calculated Soviet strategy.[48]

Opposition to the Soviets has included shopkeeper strikes, the most important of which took place in February in Kabul and Herat. There have also been such strikes in Qandahar and other towns.[49] The insurgents often interrupt land transport. One road that has been frequently cut is the one linking Kabul to Jalalabad.[50] In addition, Ariana Afghan Airlines recently suffered the defection of nearly 250 personnel, including the country's chief pilot.[51] All these factors cumulatively have increased the country's economic problems, resulting in shortages and substantially higher prices.

Building loyal Afghan armed forces. A major element of the post-invasion Soviet policy has been to reconstitute an Afghan armed force of pre-1978 size

[45] *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), May 16, 1980.

[46] *Business Week* (New York, NY), Sept. 29, 1980.

This analysis also argues that the Soviet-sponsored coup of 1978 was itself designed to halt President Daoud's attempts to weaken Afghanistan's ties—including economic ones—with Moscow and to improve ties with Iran and the West. The basis for this judgment is a three-year-old geological study by Soviet experts that showed Afghanistan to possess substantial quantities of copper, oil, gas, barite, bauxite, beryl, iron ore, fluorspar, coal, and chrome ore. According to *Business Week*, this study has been translated by the UN Development Program.

[47] *Afghanistan Times* (Los Angeles, CA), March 1980, and *Asiaweek*, Feb. 15, 1980.

[48] See, for example, *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), July 21, 1980.

[49] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 8, 1980, and *Kabul New Times*, June 25, 1980.

[50] *The New York Times*, Aug. 21, 1980.

[51] *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 15, 1980, p. C/3.

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(more than 100,000 men) in order to minimize Soviet manpower losses. Already in the period between the April 1978 coup and the invasion, Afghanistan's army had experienced numerous purges of officers, a decline in morale, and a number of defections.[52] Since the invasion, the defections have continued. At the end of July 1980, the 14th Armored Division based in Ghazni reportedly mutinied. Effective regular Afghan military strength in September 1980 was estimated at less than 30,000.[53] The Russians cannot entirely trust even this small force, especially with weapons that might be useful for the partisans.

The Kabul regime has taken several measures to increase the number of Afghans fighting against the rebels. One has been to reduce the legal draft age from 22 to 20. Another is to ask many persons such as teachers, "the only breadwinner" in the family, and university students—all previously exempted from military service—to enlist.[54] Forced recruitment, however, will present the Soviets with the dilemma that unwilling recruits are potential insurgents.

The Soviet-backed regime has also been trying to organize a party-controlled militia consisting of young recruits. To increase incentives to join the militia and remain with it, the regime is reportedly offering a princely monthly salary in excess of US$160, more than Afghanistan's annual gross national product per capita.[55] According to Kabul reports, these militia were used during August-September in battles against the partisans in northern Afghanistan near Mazar-e Sharif.[56] Kabul is also sending large numbers of young Afghans to the USSR for military training.[57]

Soviet military operations. Many months after the invasion, the internal security situation in Afghanistan has not improved significantly. Soviet forces have found themselves forced to adapt to unexpected conditions. They appear to foresee a long struggle and to be developing a capability for an indefinite stay.

At first, the Soviet Union relied on large-scale ground operations involving use of tanks, armored vehicles, and large troop formations. These forces had difficulty in maneuvering in the mountainous terrain that the partisans use as bases for hit-and-run operations against the occupying Soviets and the Kabul regime.[58] Consequently, the Soviets have increasingly deployed helicopter-borne commandos, backed by columns of motorized infantry. Moscow has also employed fighter-bombers to soften up partisan targets ahead of commando strikes. There have been a number of charges that Soviet forces have used napalm, nerve gas, booby traps, antipersonnel cluster bombs (filled with thousands of needle-sharp arrows), and internationally outlawed dum-dum bullets.[59] The

[52] *The New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1979, and Jan. 1, 1980; and *New York Crescent* (New York, NY), Nov. 16, 1979.

[53] US Department of State, *Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan*, Special Report No. 72, Washington, DC, June 1980. Others have placed the number of Afghan soldiers as low as 15,000–20,000. See Agence France-Presse (AFP), Hong Kong, report on estimates in New Delhi diplomatic circles, in *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 10, 1980, p. C/6.

[54] *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 10, 1980, p. C/6.

[55] *The Baltimore Sun*, Sept. 3, 1980.

[56] For references to the fighters of the "Democratic Youth Organization," see FBIS-SAS, Sept. 11, 1980, pp. C/1–3, and Sept. 17, 1980, p. C/3.

[57] *The Economist*, Aug. 23, 1980.

[58] The hit-and-run operations also extend into the cities. One such urban group, called "Jan Nasaran" (Suicide Squad), operates in Kabul. Such groups have as their slogan the phrase "Russ Kushi" (Kill the Russians). *Afghanistan Times*, March 1980, p. 1.

[59] *The New York Times*, Jan. 8 and Sept. 11, 1980; *The Economist*, Feb. 16, 1980; *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Aug. 18, 1980.

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

Colonel Abdul Rauf, a former leader in the Afghan Army, who joined the Islamic rebels in Kunar Province with 2,000 men. Before defecting, Rauf called in a Soviet helicopter, which was shot down by rebel forces.

—Steve McCurry/Gamma-Liaison.

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new Soviet strategy has caused the destruction of many Afghan villages and has contributed to a substantial increase in the flow of Afghan refugees to Iran and Pakistan.

It has been reported that the Soviets, apparently uncertain of how to contain the counterinsurgency, have called in Cuban and Vietnamese experts to help in the war against the fast-moving Afghan guerrillas.[60] Moreover, as the conflict has dragged on, the Soviet Union has gradually brought in "older and more experienced" troops to replace the young and largely inexperienced draftees who make up the bulk of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[61]

As of September 1980, the USSR had deployed in Afghanistan some 85,000 men and 320 combat aircraft (including more than 70 MI-24 helicopters, the weapon most feared by the partisans; more than 100 MiG-21's; some 30 MiG-23's; and several Ilyushin bombers).[62] In addition, the Soviets maintain a substantial force in Soviet Central Asia near the Afghan border for possible use in Afghanistan.

Initially, the Soviets took control of Afghan military bases in the Kabul area, and at Mazar-e Sharif, Gardez, Jalalabad, Qandahar, Qonduz, and Herat. Later the Soviets divided the country into seven military commands. Moscow's 201st Motorized Rifle Division, located in Qonduz and Feyzabad in the northeast, is largely responsible for that region's security. The 16th Motorized Rifle Division, based in Mazar-e Sharif, is responsible for the security of Balkh Province and the surrounding region. The 275th Division, operating out of Jalalabad, is responsible for the east-central region. The 105th Airborne Division and the 360th Motorized Rifle Division are responsible for the security of Kabul and its neighboring areas. The 54th Division (located in Herat) and the 68th Division (stationed at the airbase in nearby Shindand) are responsible for the security of much of western Afghanistan. The 357th Motorized Rifle Division looks after security in Qandahar.[63] In each of these military regions, the Soviets have several hundred commando forces as well. Although all such regions have a local PDP leader, they are in fact governed by Soviet generals.[64]

In addition, it would appear that the war against the Afghan insurgents has given the Soviet Union an opportunity to test in combat a variety of new weapons, including a new type of armored personnel carrier, new helicopters, new assault rifles, and new automatic grenade launchers. See *The New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1980.

[60] *The Times* (London), Sept. 19, 1980.

[61] Ibid.; also *The Washington Star*, Sept. 4, 1980.

[62] *The New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1980.

[63] Ibid.

[64] *Daily Telegraph* (London), Sept. 3, 1980.



Soviet armored personnel carriers at a strategic point along an Afghan road.

—Barrie Penrose/Camera Press.

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Other signs of increased Soviet capability for an indefinite stay in Afghanistan include the reported establishment of separate Soviet military headquarters and the construction of permanent underground storage facilities for fuel and ammunition. They are building at least one permanent bridge across the Amu Darya at Termez. They have constructed permanent communication facilities, upgraded Afghan airfields, enlarged existing helicopter gunship maintenance workshops, and begun construction on new airports. They are also reported to be considering plans to construct a railroad in Afghanistan linking Kabul with the Soviet rail system.[65] Finally, to "legitimize" the Soviet presence, Moscow has signed a status-of-forces agreement with the Karmal regime. This agreement is similar to those in effect between the USSR and several East European countries.

Soviet pressure on Afghanistan's neighbors. The USSR has exerted both implicit and explicit pressure on Afghanistan's neighbors in an attempt to limit their reaction to the Soviet invasion.

The Islamic countries were clearly shocked by the Soviet decision to intervene. Many regarded Moscow's actions as belying Soviet claims to be a supporter of national liberation movements. In the United Nations and in the Islamic Conference, they condemned the Soviet aggression against a small, nonaligned member of the international community. When various efforts to resolve the crisis on a regional basis came to no avail, the Islamic Conference voted, on January 29, 1980, to suspend Afghanistan from membership until Soviet troops are withdrawn from that country.[66] Pakistan and Iran joined the boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

Some regional actors are even providing limited assistance to the Afghan resistance movement. Saudi Arabia has announced it will extend US$25 million to the insurgents.[67] Pakistan is sheltering more than a million Afghan refugees and is furnishing sanctuary to several partisan groups (see the discussion below). Egypt has reportedly also been providing some military equipment and training to the Afghans.[68]

At the same time, many states in the region, particularly Arab states, tend to view the Afghan crisis as of secondary importance compared to the Palestinian problem. They regard a Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli dispute as beneficial to the cause of the Palestinians and hence do not want to jeopardize relations with Moscow because of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has played on this sentiment by encouraging the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to seek to mediate between the Kabul regime and several Muslim states.[69] Countries dependent on Moscow for substantial economic and military support, e.g., Syria (one could also mention India), have been careful not to antagonize the Soviet Union in their reactions to the Afghanistan intervention.

Other states have been restrained in their responses out of a feeling of intimidation. This is true of Pakistan and Iran, both of which the Soviets have explicitly warned against helping the Afghan opposition.[70]

Pakistan is particularly critical in this regard. The position that Islamabad takes regarding the Afghan partisans will have an important bearing on the success or failure of Soviet policy in Afghanistan. By continuing to provide sanctuary and limited support for groups fighting the Soviets, Pakistan can be an obstacle to the Soviet pacification strategy. On the other hand, Pakistan could help the Soviet cause if it acted to make things very difficult for the partisans.

Recognizing this, the Soviet Union has applied considerable pressure on Pakistan. Soviet aircraft have frequently violated Pakistan's airspace,[71] and Moscow has threatened to support political groups inside Pakistan opposed to the government of President Zia-ul-Haq, with an eye toward installing a government that would be hostile toward the Afghan partisans.[72] Several leading members of the opposition Pakistan People's Party, including Morteza Bhutto, the son of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, have visited Kabul and New Delhi.[73] There is also the possibility of Soviet support for ethnic nationalists in the Pashtun (Pathan), Baluch, and Sind areas of Pakistan. The Kabul regime has been in touch with opposition groups in these areas, especially those unfriendly to the Afghan partisans, and Karmal has threatened open support for Pakistan's Baluch and Pashtun nationalists.[74] Finally, the USSR could conceivably

[65] *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 10, 1980, p. D/5, and *The Washington Post*, Jan. 8, 1980. The report *Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan* cited in fn. 53 above mentions a second permanent bridge under construction, but the author could not confirm this report.

[66] *Dawn Overseas*, weekly edition, Feb. 19–25, 1980.

[67] *The Middle East* (London), August 1980, pp. 36–37.

[68] *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1980.

[69] Some PLO members have openly praised Kabul's Soviet-installed regime. The author heard this expressed in an interview with Dr. Mohammad Ashahir, head of the PLO office in Moscow, broadcast on Radio Moscow's Persian-language service on Mar. 27, 1980.

[70] *The New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1980.

[71] According to Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq, there have been 200 violations of Pakistan's airspace by Soviet and Afghan aircraft. Ibid., Sept. 27, 1980.

[72] *Business Week*, Sept. 15, 1980.

[73] *MERIP Reports* (Washington, DC), September 1980, pp. 24–28.

[74] *The Middle East*, August 1980, pp. 36–37.

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Afghan rebels at Miram Shah in Pakistan prepare to return to the struggle against forces of the USSR and the Soviet-backed Karmal regime in Afghanistan's Paktia Province.

—Jim Sheldon/Contact

move against Pakistani territory proper, for "defensive" reasons.

While the Pakistanis have generally held back from challenging Soviet air incursions militarily, they have protested shelling of Afghan refugee camps by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[75] Recently, Islamabad expelled the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, Sarwar Azimov, on charges of subversion.[76] It also closed the Soviet press and information office in Karachi and asked the USSR to reduce the number of its embassy diplomats in Pakistan.[77] New restrictions on travel by foreign diplomats inside Pakistan likewise seem aimed primarily at persons from Soviet-bloc countries.[78]

But faced with various forms of Soviet pressure, the government in Islamabad has shown itself reluctant to allow significant amounts of Western weapons to reach those fighting Babrak Karmal's government and Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, it is unlikely to meet Soviet demands that it stop Afghan partisans from entering Pakistan. Indeed, it would have serious difficulty—as would a government hostile to the partisans—in completely controlling its border with Afghanistan.

Iran, too, seems intimidated by Soviet pressure. For example, Tehran has refused to permit establishment of a partisan-controlled Afghan radio station on Iranian territory.[79] Moreover, Iran's state of war with Iraq is not likely to increase Tehran's willingness to incur Soviet displeasure regarding the Afghan situation.

Moscow's Afghan Opposition

So far, we have focused on Moscow's strategy for Afghanistan. However, this strategy's success or failure, or at minimum the cost of pursuing it, will depend to a considerable measure on the nature of the domestic opposition to the Karmal regime.

[75] Pakistan's restraint may be wearing a bit thin. In one incident on Sept. 26, 1980, an Afghan helicopter was shot down, and two Pakistani security officers were killed. See *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1980.

[76] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 31, 1980.

[77] Reportedly, the Soviets were spreading anti-Zia publications in the Karachi area. Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] From private interviews by the author with Afghan resistance leaders.

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This resistance to the Soviet occupation and the Karmal regime has taken many forms. We have already mentioned strikes by shopkeepers. Students and pupils also have demonstrated against the government, beginning in Kabul at the time of the February shopkeepers' strike. There were student demonstrations of a more violent nature in Kabul on April 25-30, 1979. Students have continued to express their displeasure by boycotting classes and participating in the distribution of "shabnama" (literally, night letters—mimeographed or handwritten statements critical of the occupiers and distributed secretly under cover of darkness).

In addition, there has been substantial open violence, ranging from spontaneous assaults on solitary Soviet soldiers in towns and attacks against Soviet and Afghan government personnel and offices in Kabul and other centers, to interruption of transport through acts of sabotage and harassment, to organized partisan operations against Soviet and "loyal" Afghan forces.

Although violent opposition to the occupation has spread all over the country, it has varied in intensity from region to region over time. Immediately after the invasion, some of the fiercest fighting took place in Badakhshan Province and the surrounding region, home of a number of anti-Soviet Central Asian Muslims who had fled the Soviet Union after the Russian revolution. Soviet forces have tried to isolate Badakhshan from the rest of the country, causing serious food shortages there, and have used some of their forces based in Central Asia in attacks against Badakhshi fighters.[80] Another region where considerable fighting took place early on after the Soviet intervention was in the Konar valley of eastern Afghanistan.[81]

From Badakhshan and Konar, the fighting spread, although in an uncoordinated way, to other parts of the country, including the areas surrounding Kabul. The opposition has in fact managed to maintain control of many parts of the countryside.[82] It has also at times challenged Soviet control of major cities. For example, Jalalabad and Herat came under partial opposition control during August and September 1980.[83]

However, it is in the Panjsher valley where the most serious fighting involving Soviet air and ground forces has taken place recently. As elsewhere in the Afghan countryside, the Soviet pacification effort in Panjsher has been a failure to date. Reportedly, the Soviets withdrew from the valley in September 1980 after suffering major losses.[84]

Principal Insurgent Groups

The groups leading the insurgency today are basically the same ones that attacked the Khalqi regimes of Taraki and Amin, calling them "Stalinist" and declaring their decrees null and void because of a lack of "an Islamic foundation."[85] The Soviet intervention has lent greater legitimacy to the opposition groups by giving them the role of fighters for the liberation of their homeland from foreign occupation. It is no longer an internal conflict, but a war for freedom and independence.

Although there are numerous groups involved in the struggle against Moscow, the best-known ones are motivated by Islam and headquartered in areas of Pakistan and Iran close to the Afghan border. Some of these have been active for many years against the spread of secularism and Marxist ideologies in Afghanistan. In the 1960's, they organized Jawanani Musalman (Young Muslims) and Nedai-Haq (Voice of Truth) groups and the Islamic newspapers *Gahiz* and *Nedai-Haq*. Leading members of Jawanani Musalman were Abdul Rahim Niazi, Gulam Mohammad Niazi, Abdul Rasul Sayyef, Rabbani Paghmani, Habibur Rahman, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, Sayffuddin, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Gul Mohammad.[86]

At present, the chief Islamic groups headquartered in Pakistan number six. One is the National Liberation Front, headed by Sebqatullah Mojadedi. He is from an old and well-known Afghan family, and has strong ties with some of the members of the traditional Afghan power elite. Another is the National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Gailani, who was the main force behind a limited and largely unsuccessful Loya Jirgah meeting earlier this year in Pakistan.[87] Gailani also claims to be a descendant of the prophet and was until recently an important businessman. He has strong ties with the former

[80] Ibid.
[81] *The Economist*, Feb. 16, 1980, p. 47.
[82] *The New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1980, and *The Times* (London), Sept. 19, 1980.
[83] *Daily Telegraph*, Aug. 29, 1980, and *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 18, 1980, p. C/3.
[84] From personal interviews with opposition sources.
[85] *Istiqamat* (in Persian—a monthly magazine of the Afghan Islamic Movement in Iran), No. 5, Zehija, 1399 (1979), p. 8.
[86] Abdul Mohammad Momozai, *Russian Crimes in Afghanistan* (in Pashtu), Peshawar, Pakistan, Afghan National and Islamic Publishing House, 1980.
[87] Gérard Chaliand, "A Visit to the Afghan Rebels," *The New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Oct. 9, 1980, pp. 21-23.

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

Leaders of five of the six Afghan Islamic groups that formed an Islamic Rescue Front at the January 1980 Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Islamabad. Pictured from left to right are Gulbuddin Hikmatyar of the Islamic Party, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Islamic Association, Ahmad Gailani of the National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan, and Sebqatullah Mojadedi of the National Liberation Front.

—UPI.

monarch, Mohammad Zahir Shah. There are two factions of the Islamic Party. One group is headed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, the other by Mohammad Yunus Khalis. Hikmatyar has been in Pakistan since before the overthrow of Daoud and opposed the former president. He has a well-organized party and set of cadres. The fifth group is the Islamic Association, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. He is a former theology professor at Kabul University with a long record of involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has ties with similar movements in other Islamic countries. Another body with a small following is the Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Mahammad Nabi Mohammadi.

The key group in Iran is the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, led by Mohammad Asef Mohseni Qandahari. He claims to be the leader of the Afghan Shiites and is ideologically influenced by the Khomeini revolution in Iran.

There are also several small secular groups active —largely within Afghanistan itself — against the Soviets. These include the National Socialists and the Maoists. Also, some prominent politicians of the pre-1973 period such as former Prime Minister Mohammad Yusuf have tried to become involved with those opposed to the Soviet occupation,[88] perhaps hoping to become a compromise candidate to head a future Afghan government if the Soviets withdraw.

The major Islamic groups—despite their common antipathy toward the Soviet Union and sympathy for Islam—have failed to form a stable front. Under pressure from the Islamic world, especially Saudi Arabia, the six major Pakistan-based groups formed an Islamic Rescue Front toward the end of January 1980.

[88] This was communicated to the author by private sources.

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Rasul Sayyef was accepted as the president of the new alliance. But it was not long before Hikmatyar withdrew from the alliance.[89] Major disagreements persist, and it is uncertain how long the other members will remain in the Front.

The reasons for lack of unity among Moscow's Afghan opponents are many. Besides personality conflicts, there are disagreements over leadership, the shape of a future Afghanistan, the role that the former king and former high-level Afghan officials should play, and relations with other political groups and countries.

Both Hikmatyar and Gailani have claimed to enjoy the largest number of supporters.[90] Hikmatyar's group is the best armed in terms of quantity and quality of weapons, and he is apparently unwilling to share these arms with others unless he dominates the alliance. His drive for leadership is opposed especially by Gailani, Mojadedi, and Nabi. By contrast, Rabbani and Khalis (who is known to have participated in actual fighting inside Afghanistan) are more sympathetic to Hikmatyar.

Ideologically, Gailani's group is the most liberal. The groups led by Mojadedi, by Nabi, by Rabbani, and by Khalis are successively more conservative. Hikmatyar is religiously the most orthodox. The ideological differences among the partisans are most pronounced with regard to the shape of a future Afghan government, the role of the former king, relations with other countries, and prospects for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan crisis.

Hikmatyar wants to establish an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan, similar to that in Iran. He opposes any role for the royal family in the conflict with the Soviets or in a future Afghan government. He has accused ex-king Zahir Shah (who is in Italy) and his family of being at least partially responsible for the current crisis in the country. He, at times, talks about a possible trial of the former king and some of the king's associates if an Islamic Republic is established in Afghanistan.[91] Rabbani and, to a lesser extent, Khalis are sympathetic to these views.

The other three groups have not specified the shape of a future Afghan government, preferring to concentrate on first getting the Russians out of Afghanistan. Gailani, however, is known to have close contacts with Zahir Shah and his family and to favor a political role for the former ruler in a future Afghanistan. Mojadedi and Nabi are not opposed to this idea in principle, but have repeatedly argued that they are not fighting for

[89] *The New York Times*, Mar. 17 and 28, 1980.
[90] *The Economist*, Feb. 2, 1980, and *FBIS-SAS*, Feb. 6, 1980, p. C 6

[91] Of all opposition leaders, Hikmatyar is the one whose position has been most misunderstood. For example, analyst Richard S. Newell has mistakenly called Hikmatyar's group "secularly oriented." "Revolution and Revolt in Afghanistan," *The World Today*, November 1979, p. 441. Similarly, an article in *Third World* (Mexico City), February–March 1980, refers to a Hikmatyar "plan" to bring "Nadir Shah" back to the Afghan throne. Beyond ignoring Hikmatyar's antimonarchist positions, this assertion is preposterous, for Mohammad Nadir (the father of Zahir Shah) was assassinated in 1933.



Islamic Party guerrillas (note the photo of party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar in each scene): at left, partisans brandish weapons, including an RPG-40 antitank gun, beside a disabled Soviet-type armored vehicle near the village of Khana on the Kabul-Jalalabad road; at right, an outpost in the Kunar valley.

—Sipa Press/Black Star and Lebtikova/Photoreporters.

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the royal family.[92]

Differences on relations with external powers and groups are substantial. Hikmatyar has close links with Pakistan's Jamaati-Islami and wants external support to come largely from the Islamic world. Rabbani and Khalis are sympathetic to him on this matter. Gailani, on the other hand, does not oppose assistance from and contact with non-Islamic powers. He has repeatedly called on Western powers to support the Afghan partisans in their conflict with the USSR. He is also known to have friendly ties with Saudi Arabia. On this issue, as on many others, Mojadedi and Nabi sympathize with Gailani. These differing orientations breed suspicion among the partisan groups regarding the amount of financial aid each group receives from external sources and what happens to that aid.

With regard to the Soviets, Hikmatyar avers that there can only be a military solution to the Afghan crisis and that a peaceful resolution involving negotiations with the Soviets is unlikely and undesirable. Khalis and Rabbani have expressed similar views. Gailani and the other two leaders have opposed "closing the door" on a possible negotiated settlement.

While the Pakistan-based groups receive considerable coverage in the international press, most of the fighting in Afghanistan has been conducted by localized ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups, poorly armed and with rather tenuous links with the groups in Pakistan and Iran.[93] It is possible that new leaders might emerge from the ranks of those fighting inside the country. These internal groups come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Representing the dominant Pashtun elements are tribes such as the Waziris, the Momands, and the Mengals of eastern Afghanistan. Other ethnic elements that have been active include the Nuristanis, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, and the Hazaras of central Afghanistan. The Hazaras are Shiite and constitute some 10 percent of the population.

The successes of the non-Pashtun groups, it should be noted, have introduced a new element into the Afghan political scene. Afghanistan's various ethnic and tribal groups have traditionally been suspicious of their central government, especially when it seeks to centralize the country. The Pashtuns, including those Persianized and those not, have dominated Afghan politics largely because of greater military capability (they have generally controlled the state's armed forces). However, the recent turmoil in Afghanistan has encouraged the emergence of several new centers of military power that any Afghan government will now have to take into account. The Hazaras, Tajiks, and Nuristanis are likely to push for a federal political system that would afford the various regions a large degree of internal autonomy. Failure to meet such demands might well lead to conflict among the various groups. This development would provide opportunities for manipulation by outside powers.

Politically, disunity has been costly to the partisans. It has posed impediments to winning international recognition and aid, to forming a broad-based government-in-exile, and to challenging, in forums such as the United Nations, the legitimacy of the Karmal government.

In military terms, lack of unity has had more ambiguous consequences. On the one hand, it has made coordinated military efforts among the various opposition groups difficult. On the other hand, the decentralized and sporadic nature of the opposition has made partisan forces less vulnerable to large-scale ground operations and quick defeat by the Soviets. While the Soviets control the Afghan state apparatus, it is Moscow's opponents who control much of Afghan society.

Militarily, the resistance has grown in effectiveness throughout the period of the occupation, compounding Moscow's problems. There are several indicators of this greater partisan effectiveness. For one, the opposition has recently moved from its bastions in the countryside to challenge Soviet control of several cities. Sustained fighting for control of Jalalabad and Herat took place in August and September respectively. There has also been fighting over smaller towns, including Sorubi and Aybak.[94]

Other indicators of greater effectiveness have been the appearance in partisan hands of better weapons and the demonstration by the partisans of an ability to build some rudimentary equipment inside Afghanistan. The partisans now have a few antiaircraft guns and antitank weapons, acquired either from defecting Afghan units or from purchase in the unofficial international weapons market. In addition, the Afghans have been producing and employing such simple weapons as Molotov cocktails.

There have also been reports of increased Soviet losses. For example, in recent fighting for the Panjsher valley, Soviet forces reportedly lost several aircraft and

[92] Discussion of the outlook of the various opposition groups is based on a number of direct conversations between the author and opposition sources.

[93] According to resistance sources, the latter do provide weapons to some of those fighting inside the country.

[94] See AFP (Hong Kong) dispatches of Sept. 12 and 16, 1980, in *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 17, 1980, pp. C/4–5. Sorubi is a strategic town midway along the highway between Kabul and Jalalabad. Aybak is the capital of Samangan Province, northwest of Kabul.

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Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and Afghanistan's Prime Minister Babrak Karmal confer in the Kremlin on October 16, 1980, during an extensive visit by Karmal to the USSR.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

tanks without gaining control of the area.[95] The change in Soviet military strategy for dealing with the Afghan opposition, noted above, itself suggests greater Afghan effectiveness and failure of the initial pacification program.

Prospects

Several factors will play critical roles in determining whether the Soviet Union succeeds in liquidating or neutralizing the Afghan partisans. These include the policies adopted by Pakistan toward the insurgents, the extent of external support for the partisans, the success or failure of Soviet attempts to convert divisions among the insurgents into open conflict, Soviet efforts to establish a government in Kabul which commands a large armed force and has a wide base of support, and the scope and duration of the Soviet military commitment.

We have already seen that Pakistan is likely to continue to allow Afghan refugees to enter but to limit the amount of military aid going to partisan forces. Moreover, the Afghans face food shortages. Pakistan was not prepared for a flood of more than a million refugees,[96] and international assistance has not always reached the Afghans. These problems could seriously affect the fortunes of the resistance movement in Afghanistan.

If the various rival partisan groups, whether externally based or in Afghanistan, begin to fight each other on a substantial scale, that, too, could have an adverse impact on insurgent forces.[97] Recently, Kabul

[95] On the fighting in the Panjsher valley, see *Daily Telegraph*, Sept. 5, 1980.

[96] *Pakistan Affairs*, Aug. 16, 1980, p. 1.

[97] Up to now there have been very few reports of fighting among Moscow's Afghan opponents. *FBIS-SAS*, Aug. 1, 1980, p. C/1.

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has made a considerable effort to exploit conflicts within the opposition. Tribal leaders have received the greatest attention. Besides intimidation, Kabul has also used bribery.[98] This approach has not worked so far. In fact, Lt. Colonel Faiz Mohammad, Minister of Frontiers and Tribes, was killed recently while visiting local tribal leaders in Paktia Province.[99]

Should the resistance's effectiveness increase because of greater organization or the obtaining of arms such as portable antiaircraft and antitank weapons from abroad, its prospects might improve significantly. The Soviets might be forced to make an increased military commitment to the Afghan venture or accept a compromise settlement of the crisis. In the first case, the USSR might suffer reduced capability in other parts of the world as a result of commitment of new troops and materiel to the Afghan front.[100] The USSR might also experience domestic repercussions in regions where there exist, to borrow a Soviet term, Soviet "internal colonies"—i.e., among the Islamic populations of Soviet Central Asia. In these areas, despite Soviet assimilationist policies, Islamic consciousness continues to form a type of Islamic counterculture. Third, rising costs of the invasion might exacerbate factionalism in the context of a possible Soviet succession. One might also anticipate strains between Moscow and its Eastern-bloc allies. Finally, hostility to the Soviets might increase among Islamic countries and groups in the surrounding region.

In the second case, Soviet willingness to reach a compromise is likely to be reciprocated by at least some of the groups fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Such a move might in fact set the Afghan groups against one another.

The Soviet Union has yet to establish a stable government in Kabul with a substantial Afghan armed force. Indeed, as long as the Russians continue to occupy Afghanistan, Moscow may have serious difficulty in achieving these goals. Conflict within the ruling PDP and defections from the armed forces continue.

In Afghanistan, the USSR faces the following broad choices: (1) to annex Afghanistan, making it the 16th "Soviet Socialist Republic,"[101] (alternatively, the USSR might annex only parts of Afghanistan, especially those north of the Hindu Kush mountains – a region dominated by Turkic populations similar to those in Soviet Central Asia) and keep up the military effort until the opposition is destroyed; (2) to continue the military effort while attempting to establish a stable and servile government; (3) to reach a compromise with all or some of the Afghan opposition groups (some of whom are willing to negotiate with the Russians)[102] and accept an Afghanistan that, although independent and ruled by non-Communists, would follow a policy of neutralism tilted toward Moscow. Soviet policies so far show a preference for the second alternative. But as the war drags on, the Soviet Union might eventually choose one of the other two.

There are a number of conceivable outcomes to the Afghanistan crisis. These include a Soviet-dominated, pacified Afghanistan, a protracted war lasting many years, a neutral Afghanistan, or even the spread of conflict to Pakistan. Moreover, there are varying degrees of uncertainty concerning all the factors affecting the likelihood of each of these outcomes. However, no matter what ultimately emerges in Afghanistan, events there will probably have a substantial impact on Soviet strategy in the surrounding area, on regional politics, and on the internal situation of Afghanistan's Islamic neighbors.[103]

[98] *Daily Telegraph*, Sept. 3, 1980.

[99] *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 24, 1980, p. C 3. Afghan sources have suggested to the author that Faiz Mohammad was attempting to bribe local officials on this trip.

[100] The implications of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan for Moscow's ability to intervene in Poland have been suggested in Howard Teicher, "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan: The Political-Military Costs," *Leviathan: Middle East Inquiry* (Boston, MA), Fall 1980, p. 31.

[101] This Soviet option was mentioned by Alexandre Bennigsen in "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1980, p. 49.

[102] Reported to the author by private sources.

[103] I have dealt with some of these issues in "Afghanistan and the Crisis in American Foreign Policy," *loc. cit.*

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The Superpowers and the Northern Tier

Zalmay Khalilzad

The crises of economic development, national integration, political legitimacy and international ideological conflict have resulted in major political convulsions in the Northern Tier countries[1] of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. During the past two years Afghanistan's President Daud, Iran's Premier Hoveida, and Pakistan's Premier Bhutto have been killed. An Islamic Republic has been established in Iran, a Marxist-Leninist government has come to power in Afghanistan, an Islamic-oriented military regime has been ruling Pakistan. Turkey, on the verge of economic collapse, has been the scene of increasing political violence, with thirteen of its provinces under martial law since December 1978.

The crises in the Northern Tier countries have had serious implications beyond their borders as well. The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), conceived as a *cordon sanitaire* between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf, is dead. Two western allies in the region, Pakistan and Iran, have become nonaligned. Afghanistan, previously the only nonaligned Northern Tier country, has become a de facto Soviet ally. American ground stations in Iran, which monitored Soviet activities especially in relation to SALT, have been closed, complicating SALT verification. There are serious problems in Turkey's relations with its NATO allies. Iran's armed forces, one of the largest and best-equipped in the world, have disintegrated. With the disintegration of these forces and overthrow of the Shah, Iran's regional role—checking the expansion of "radical and pro-Soviet" forces in the region—has also collapsed, and American-Pakistani relations have been deteriorating because of conflict over Pakistan's nuclear program. Reportedly the Pakistanis are clandestinely constructing a uranium enrichment facility giving them the capacity for producing fissionable material usable in nuclear weapons.

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1. In recent times the concept of the Northern Tier acquired currency in the 1950s. Former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles referred to "the northern tier of nations." This was largely a geo-strategic concept referring to the countries on the southern periphery of the Soviet Union.

The crises in Northern Tier countries are not over. In varying degrees and at several levels, each country in the region is politically fragmented. Each contains many minorities, some of whom are seeking autonomy, and many political groups with conflicting ideological beliefs. All of them have serious economic problems. These conflicts are further aggravated by the absence of a consensus on the manner of political competition. No matter which group comes to power, it is likely to be challenged, often violently, by others. Thus the region is likely to remain unstable in the foreseeable future. Although the causes of the instabilities in the Northern Tier are largely internal, they are influenced by, and provide different risks and opportunities for, external powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union.

As in other countries, Russian foreign policy (both in the imperial and subsequent Soviet period) has emerged from a mixing chamber in which the conflicting elements of Soviet values, its image of the political environment, and its capabilities have forged a compromise. In each of these interrelated categories, there have been similarities and significant differences between Russia and other countries. Within Russia itself, there have been remarkable continuities, conflicts and changes in regard to each category.

The goals of Soviet foreign policy (either short-run or long-term) toward Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey have included the weakening of the western alliance system in the region; detaching Iran, Turkey and Pakistan from such alliances; bringing nonaligned Afghanistan into the Soviet camp; the extension of Soviet power and influence over the Northern Tier countries; the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology and strengthening of Marxist-Leninist parties; access to the natural resources and airspace of the countries of the area; and trade. The Soviets have emphasized different goals at different times depending on factors such as the ideological predisposition of indigenous ruler(s) and the Soviet preoccupation in other parts of the world.

In order to achieve their goals, the Soviets have relied on positive as well as on negative incentives. On the positive side, they have used the offer of economic and military aid, trade, military alliance, help in resisting or pressuring regional rivals, support at international meetings, positive propaganda about the regime, support against domestic opponents (except pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninists), and encouragement of the local Communist Party to support the regime. The negative incentives used have included propaganda, especially radio broadcasts criticizing the target regime; military pressure, including overflights, large maneuvers close to the border (where applicable), armed incursion, providing arms for regional opponents; helping domestic

92-154 O - 82 - 8

opponents (financially and militarily, either directly or indirectly); encouraging the local communist parties to organize demonstrations and strikes against a target regime; suspension of aid; and suspension of trade.

The Soviets respond to opportunities that arise as a result of the many instabilities common to the Northern Tier and other third world countries. At the same time, however, they do not passively watch and wait but instead actively promote and seek such opportunities to extend their influence. These opportunities can arise from a crisis in relations between any Northern Tier country and any or all western countries, especially the United States; from a crisis of national integration such as ethnic and religious conflicts; from a crisis of political and economic development, producing conflicts between groups with different ideological beliefs; from regional conflicts; from local nationalism when directed against the West; and from Islam when directed against pro-Western regimes.

The United States position in the Northern Tier has experienced a steady decline. This decline, becoming more rapid just as the region becomes internationally more important, has not been unavoidable. Rather, it has resulted from a failure of military and diplomatic policy, and from a long-term inability to develop a flexible system of responses to the political conditions in regions of the third world.

Changes and Continuities in Russian Policies

Tsarist Russia had followed an actively expansionist and interventionist policy towards the countries south of its borders, a policy that gave rise to resentments in Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. After the Russian Revolution, the Soviets faced a variety of domestic threats including those from Central Asian Muslims. Since the Soviets wanted to end their isolation and concurrently to score a victory over Western powers in Asia and the Middle East ("attacking imperialism at its weakest link"), they sought improved relations with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In their Decree on Peace in November 1917, the Soviets proposed negotiations with all nations on "peace without annexation." They also renounced "all the privileges and concessions," secured by Tsarist Russia, declared themselves an ally of the Muslim countries, launched in September 1920 a great anti-imperialist propaganda offensive, and opposed both the British control of Afghan foreign policy and the 1919 British-Iranian Treaty.

However, the initial friendly moves were marred by episodes that caused the Turks, Iranians and Afghans to question the sincerity of Soviet protes-

tations. In the case of Iran, for example, the Soviet fleet, pursuing the remnants of some white Russian forces, occupied most of the area between the Caspian coast and the Elburz mountains and helped to establish a Soviet Republic in Rasht on Iranian soil. Under the pressure of Soviet troops still in Iran, a "Treaty of Friendship" was signed between the two countries on February 26, 1921. Article 6 of the treaty reserved to the Soviets the right to send troops into Iran should it become a base for "anti-Soviet aggression." The treaty with Iran was followed by similar treaties with Afghanistan and Turkey. The Soviets provided these countries with weapons, military advisors and economic aid. They also concluded non-aggression treaties with all three countries.

Soviet relations with the Northern Tier countries until World War II, while generally correct, were at times hostile. The Soviets regarded the reform of Kemal of Turkey and Reza Khan of Iran as progressive.[2] They were not pleased, however, with the treatment that communist parties received in Iran and Turkey.[3] The Soviets were also displeased about Iranian refusal to give oil concessions and demanded that Iran reduce its trade with other countries; in order to achieve those goals, they boycotted Iranian goods.[4] Soviet leaders were also critical of the 1937 treaty among Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan which provided for non-aggression, consultation, and mutual cooperation in stamping out subversive activities in the region.

Immediately after the war, the Soviets demonstrated their interest in territorial expansion vis-à-vis Turkey and Iran. In March 1945, they denounced the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression with Turkey, calling it inoperable in the light of the new international situation and putting forward their conditions for renewing the treaty. Their conditions, given on June 7, 1945, included a Soviet base on the Turkish Straits and the retrocession of three Turkish districts, Arfrin, Kars and Ardahan.[5] The demands on Turkey were accompanied with a Soviet refusal to withdraw troops from Iran, as

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2. Reza Khan's reforms included the introduction of a Western judicial system, the elimination of compulsory religious education, the prohibition of oriental dress, the declaration of women's eligibility for public office and prohibition of the veil. Kemal's reforms went further than those of Reza Khan. He replaced the Islamic calendar with the European one, Friday was replaced by Sunday as a weekly holiday, and Arabic script was abandoned.
3. Afghanistan's Communist Party was established in 1965.
4. Iran, in response, increased its exports to Germany. Nazi propaganda scored notable successes in both countries by emphasizing the common Aryan background of Afghans, Iranians and Germans. Iran's trade with Germany accounted for 41 percent of the country's total trade in 1939.
5. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference, 1945)*, Vol. 1, p. 1034.

agreed upon with Britain and the United States, by March 2, 1946. Rather than withdraw their troops, the Soviets, using their Army, encouraged the establishment of an autonomous Azerbaigjan government on Iranian territory under the leadership of the Iranian Communist Party (Tudeh).

The Iranians and the Turks refused Soviet demands and tried to persuade Western powers, especially the United States, to support their position. After initial reluctance, the United States responded favorably. The United States regarded Iran and Turkey as having major strategic value vis-à-vis the Middle East.

Washington protested forcefully the continued Soviet occupation of parts of Iran. Confronted with United States pressure and some concessions from Iran, the Soviets withdrew. The concessions, later withdrawn under popular pressure, included the assignment of three cabinet portfolios to Tudeh members, the establishment of a joint Soviet-Iranian company for the exploitation of oil in Northern Iran, and the recognition of Soviet interests in Azerbaijan. The Soviets interpreted Iranian annulment of agreed concessions as an indication that Iran favored "imperialist," *i.e.* capitalist countries. Turkey, with American support under the Truman Doctrine, also resisted the Soviets. This doctrine reflected U.S. concern for the security of Turkey and its neighbors. To the Turks, the doctrine meant that the United States had accepted the obligation to protect their territorial integrity.[6] Successful action in support of the Iranian and Turkish positions against the Soviets, as well as continued fear of the Soviet Union, led both countries to seek further increases in their security ties with the United States. Turkey dispatched a brigade to Korea in 1950 and insisted on joining NATO. Iran welcomed the Truman Doctrine, and the offer of U.S. military and economic aid, seeking even greater support.

Although neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan were subjected to the type of Soviet threat faced by Iran and Turkey, they nevertheless also sought close ties with the United States. Impressed by U.S. support of Iran and Turkey, and believing the threat of Soviet expansionism, Afghanistan sent several delegations to Washington to negotiate for American arms and a close military/political relationship. In his meeting with U.S. officials in October 1948, the Afghanistan Minister of National Economy "referred repeatedly to the 'war,' indicating his belief that a war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is inevitable, and said that when war came Afghanistan would, of course, be

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6. Necmeddin Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 97, April 1949, p. 46.

overrun and occupied, but the Russians would be unable to pacify the country. Afghanistan could and would pursue guerrilla tactics for an indefinite period."[7]

Pakistan, which became independent on August 14, 1947, also sought close relations with the United States. Pakistani leaders were hostile to the Soviet Union, because it had condemned as "politically bankrupt and reactionary" the Muslim League's demand for an independent Muslim State on the subcontinent.[8] The Soviets described the partition of India as a maneuver of "British Imperialism" and delayed recognition of Pakistan.

Moscow consistently accused the Northern Tier countries of permitting their territory to be used as bases for aggression against the Soviet Union. Discouraging close relationship between the countries of the area and the West, especially an alliance relationship, emerged as the most important Soviet goal. But Moscow failed to persuade Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey against joining Western alliances. Turkey joined NATO and CENTO,[9] Iran and Pakistan joined CENTO and the latter joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as well. Afghanistan, too, wanted a similar alliance, but did not enter one, largely because of United States reluctance to grant a defense guarantee in the event of a Soviet invasion or a major subversion effort. American reluctance was reportedly based on assumed limited U.S. logistical capabilities to provide substantial help in a short time to Afghanistan, on the dominant U.S. evaluation that Afghanistan had only minor strategic significance to U.S. global interests, and on the fear that the Afghans might use U.S. weapons against Pakistan in the pursuit of their territorial claims.[10] The U.S. refusal to provide arms to Afghanistan and the simultaneous provision of such arms to Pakistan, Afghanistan's regional rival, pro-

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7. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948,* (Washington: GPO, 1975), Vol. 5, p. 492.

8. Gen D. Overstreet and Marshal Windmiller, *Communism in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 118.

9. CENTO was known as the Baghdad Pact until 1958.

10. While the fear of possible use of American weapons by Afghans against the Pakistanis might have been justified, the other two justifications for refusing arms to Afghanistan appear now to have been mistaken. A critical look at relative logistic capabilities of the U.S. compared to the Soviet Union to project power into Afghanistan at that time shows that, in fact, the U.S. had a significant advantage over the Soviet capabilities to support operations into Kabul and Southwest Afghanistan. Pan Heuristics, *Interests and Power in the Persian Gulf,* prepared for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Los Angeles, forthcoming. An assessment of the strategic importance of Afghanistan also shows that given over 800 miles of border with Islamic areas of the Soviet Union and its closeness to the Arabian Sea, considering Afghanistan as an unimportant area was a mistaken view.

vided the Soviets with the opportunity to gain influence in Afghanistan through arms sales. In fact, Moscow had actively sought this opportunity by making arms offers even before the failure in Afghanistan-U.S. relations. Ever since 1956, Afghanistan has been exclusively dependent on the Soviets for arms. After Iran, Turkey and Pakistan had joined Western-sponsored pacts, the Soviets tried to persuade these countries to follow the example of Afghanistan and become nonaligned. In order to achieve this goal in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the Soviets used a variety of means, including support for secession groups, support of the communist parties, military pressure, offers of economic and military aid, and propaganda against the target regime in order to weaken its ties with the West.

Washington's Problems and Moscow's Opportunities

In the 1950s, American foreign policy towards the Northern Tier countries, except Afghanistan, had considerable success. In the 1960s, however, a series of crises in U.S. relations with allied Northern Tier countries coincided with increased Soviet emphasis on indirect means for gaining influence and economic cooperation in the area, and provided great opportunities for improved relations between the Soviet Union and its southern neighbors. The crises in U.S.-Northern Tier relations were largely the result of regional conflicts and the inability of the United States to respond adequately to them.

PAKISTAN

Disagreements between the United States and Pakistan about an American shipment of arms to India in 1962 strained relations between the two countries. The Pakistanis protested the change in United States policy, arguing that they had lost much prestige in the Afro-Asian world and had alienated the Soviet Union by joining Western alliances, only to have the United States provide arms to its major regional rival. Because of its displeasure over U.S. policy towards India, Pakistan called for normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and refused to support the U.S. position in Vietnam. The 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict provided another opportunity for the Soviets to try to persuade Pakistan to leave the Western alliance system and decrease relations with China. Pakistan had been disappointed over the U.S.-imposed arms embargo after the war, and had in response closed American bases in the country while refusing to withdraw completely from SEATO and CENTO or to freeze relations with China. At the same time, Pakistan improved

economic relations with the Soviet Union.[11] A similar chain of events took place in the case of a number of other American allies, among them Turkey. The intended sanction of an embargo served only to embarrass the leaders of the target countries before their domestic critics and their regional rivals, to give credence to the propaganda circulated by their opponents that the United States was an unreliable ally, and ultimately, to push them closer to the Soviet Union.

In order to pressure Pakistan, the Soviets increased aid to India, as well as to domestic dissidents. The Bengladesh War between Pakistan and India, after the latter had signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971, brought about the second Pakistani disappointment with its Western alliance in less than ten years. This again provided an opportunity for Moscow to pressure Pakistan to leave the Western alliances and decrease relations with China. The Soviets, while pleased with Pakistan's exit from SEATO, wanted it to leave CENTO as well and support Soviet plans for collective security in Asia. Several years later, as Pakistan's relations with the United States deteriorated further, following the announcement of the purchase of a reprocessing plant from France in 1976, Prime Minister Bhutto was praised in the Soviet press for his opposition to "imperialism." His opponents in the 1977 election were attacked by Moscow as "reactionary tools of Western imperialism" at a time when Bhutto was charging the United States with aiding them in exchange for their promise to cancel the reprocessing deal.

TURKEY

The United States' mishandling of the Cyprus problem provided an opportunity for improved relations between Moscow and Ankara. Despite occasional problems, Turkish-American security relations were deepening in the 1950s and early 1960s. For example, the Turks allowed the use of their airspace by American forces during the 1958 Lebanon operation, and signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. But this state of affairs was seriously affected by the June 5, 1964 letter sent to Turkey by President Johnson. The note arose from the dispute between the United States and Turkey regarding the legality of a possible Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Washington warned Turkey against military intervention by questioning the applicability of NATO commitments to Ankara if its intervention resulted in

11. Soviet economic aid to Pakistan totaled $652 million between 1954 and 1976.

Soviet attack against Turkey.[12] All this contributed to increased opposition by several Turkish political groups, and provided yet another opportunity for the Soviet Union. Turkey began diminishing the importance of CENTO (especially after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965). American official visitors were met by hostile demonstrations; difficulties were made over the presence of American personnel in the country; Turkey refused to increase the size of its armed forces committed to NATO; visits of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in Turkish ports were met by anti-American demonstrations; and the 800-man contingent of Turkish troops in South Korea were withdrawn.

After the Johnson note, several deputies in the Turkish Parliament questioned the wisdom of continued membership in NATO. The Soviets encouraged these deputies and accepted the Turkish view on independence for Cyprus and on the need to protect the island's Turkish minority. Several high-level visits followed between the two countries. On February 26, 1965, Premier Urguplu declared that Turkey would continue to cooperate with its NATO partners, but would emphasize an individual foreign policy, particularly in developing better relations with the Soviet Union.

Between the mid-1960s and the 1974 Turkish military incursion in Cyprus, relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were generally characterized by increased economic cooperation, including the financing of a $600 million steel mill at Iskenderun, increased trade and political interaction including high-level official visits, and even some military cooperation (allowing Soviet military overflights carrying military equipment to the Middle East during the 1973 War). An important political document, the "Joint Turkish-Soviet

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12. Turkish Prime Minister Inonu's reply to President Johnson said: "Mr. President, your message, both in wording and content has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always given the most serious attention to its relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergences of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations. . . . The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the U.S.S.R. as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are between us wide divergences of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. . . . Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundation of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning."

Good-Neighbor Declaration," was signed. This stipulated that the two countries would not allow the use of their territory for aggression and subversive activities against each other.[13] The Soviets, however, continued to criticize Turkey's membership in NATO and CENTO and to encourage Turkey to follow a nonaligned policy.

The improvement of relations had coincided with the increased appeal of socialism, including the "Soviet-type," among the Turkish intelligentsia. Turkey's adoption of the "Western pattern" of economic development as well as its foreign policy and security ties with the West have subsequently come under sharp and at times violent domestic attack.[14] For example, a large leftist student movement called Turkiye Devrimci Gencler Federasyonu (The Federation of Revolutionary Turkish Youth) as well as the Turkish Labor Party have organized large demonstrations against the American presence in their country.

The embargo, in the wake of the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, was imposed despite Turkey's crucial contributions to western defense. Those contributions were extensive, including protection of the southern flanks of NATO; the defense of the Persian Gulf from a potential Soviet threat; guarding the security of the Eastern Mediterranean;[15] the gathering of intelligence information about Soviet activities, including the development of long-range weapons systems, and detecting possible violations of SALT agreements;[16] maintaining the security of the Black Sea, and defending Greece itself. For the embargo to have been imposed notwithstanding dealt a severe blow to the credibility of NATO, especially of the United States, in the eyes of the Turkish leaders and population.

In response, the Turkish government in July, 1975, placed all American installations and military personnel in the country under Turkish control. One base at Incirlik was allowed to pursue "purely NATO" functions. And Turkey abrogated the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement signed between

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13. *Pulse*, December 25, 1975.
14. Even a Republican People's Party study in 1967 concluded that Turkey's membership in the alliance was disadvantageous for the country. The visits of the Sixth Fleet to Turkish ports have, at times, provoked violent clashes among rightist and leftist students. Beginning in 1971, radical groups such as the Turkish Peoples Liberation Army announced a program for kidnapping Americans and NATO employees in order to force them out of the country.
15. Overflight over Turkey reduces Soviet air deployment times to states on the Western shore of the Persian Gulf or the Middle East by almost a factor of 2.
16. According to press reports, 40 percent of the U.S. intelligence about Soviet weapons systems came from installations in Turkey.

the two countries. The U.S. embargo had pushed Turkey to further improve its ties with the Soviet Union to find alternative weapon suppliers, and to seek greater understanding with its Muslim neighbors. In 1975, Turkey signed a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with Moscow. The Soviets offered to sell Turkey MIG 21s and 23s, but the Turks reportedly decided to buy only 60 helicopters.[17] Since then, the Soviets have proposed military cooperation on many occasions.

Deterioration of U.S. relations and improvement of those with the Soviet Union and other neighboring countries have been accompanied by serious economic difficulties and domestic political violence. Turkey's economic problems are numerous. Twenty percent of the Turkish labor force has been unemployed; factories have been operating at 50 percent capacity; inflation rates have been very high (sometimes around 50 percent); short- and long-term foreign loans have extended $13.5 billion (and increasing at the rate of $2 billion per year), much of which must be repaid or rescheduled now; urban shantytowns are growing at about 6 percent a year (more than twice the national population growth rate); and income from Turkish workers abroad has been decreasing. Turkey even has difficulty raising cash to buy raw materials to keep its industry working at half-capacity.

Political violence between extreme rightist and leftist groups has increased significantly. More than 1,000 people were killed in 1978.[18] As a result, thirteen Turkish provinces have been placed under martial law. The main rightist group is the National Action Party (NAP) of Alparslan Turkes. NAP, which has participated in several Turkish governments, is Pan-Turkish and anti-Soviet. It wants Turkey to acquire a military capability that could balance that of Moscow and even opposes family planning and birth control measures in order to increase the Turkish population to the Soviet level.

Although the Turkish Communist Party is still illegal, there are many fragmented Marxist organizations active in the country.[19] While groups disagree among themselves over such issues as attitudes toward the Soviet Union, the utility of violent struggle, the issue of national minorities,[20] and participation in elections, they are generally opposed to the United States, NATO, capitalism, and American bases in Turkey. Some hope that their activities will result in a leftist military coup in the country.

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17. *Facts on File,* November 30, 1975.
18. There were 260 people killed in 1977; *Middle East Events,* January 26, 1979.
19. *Milliyat,* May 8, 1978. There are 30 Marxist periodicals and 61 Marxist publishing houses in the country and about 50 different groups.
20. There are about 8 million Alevis and 6 million Kurds in Turkey.

The Soviets have promised to increase their economic aid, but have not been able to provide the hard currency which the Turks need most. Moscow has blamed Turkey's economic problems on its large armed forces and its membership in NATO.[21] Turkey, it is claimed, has the highest per capita military spending in NATO and has fallen "under control of Western monopolist capital and economic organizations such as the I.M.F."[22] Therefore, "Turkey will not have the power to end the crises in its economy as long as it is tied to imperialist blocs and prefers the capitalist path of development."[23]

The Soviets have accused the rightist groups, especially the National Action Party, "of being fascist, connected with the CIA, and of using terrorist tactics."[24] They have blamed the United States for the domestic violence in Turkey.[25] According to the Soviets, the United States intends to "plunder Turkey," and turn it into a fascist state.[26]

Moscow has tried to persuade Turkey to remove American nuclear weapons from its territory. In their broadcasts to Turkey, the Soviets have warned that the existence of nuclear weapons in their country has made Turkey "a target for a nuclear counter-attack" and plunges Turkey's security into greater jeopardy.[27] Turkey has also been criticized for reopening the U.S. bases closed after the imposition of the American embargo.[28]

IRAN

During the 1960s, the Soviets maintained their support for the Tudeh Party and Iran's regional rivals, but also sought to encourage a decrease in Iran's dependence on the West. Disagreements between the Shah and the Kennedy Administration over issues such as the Shah's domestic policies provided the Soviets with political opportunities. In 1962, Iran assured the Soviets that it would not grant any foreign nation the right of possessing any kind of rocket bases on Iranian soil.[29]

Iran's incentive to seek improved relations with the Soviets further increased after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. The war dealt a severe blow to

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21. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), *Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), U.S.S.R.*, February 22, 1979, p. A. 4/4.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. BBC, *SWB, U.S.S.R.*, February 10, 1979, p. A. 4.
25. *Ibid.*, September 9, 1978.
26. *Ibid.*, July 31, 1979.
27. *Ibid.*, October 26, 1978, p. A. 4/4.
28. *Ibid.*, October 10, 1978.
29. Harvey H. Smith, et. al., *Area Handbook for Iran*, Washington, D.C.: UGPO, 1971, p. 293.

CENTO as well as to Iran's other western military associations. Following Western reluctance to help Pakistan, the Shah decided on greater self-reliance; this desire increasingly coincided with the United States' hesitation to get directly involved in a substantial way in third world regional conflicts, especially after the Vietnam experience.

In 1967, Iran signed an agreement for more than $100 million worth of Soviet arms. During the same year, agreements were signed for the construction of a steel mill and a gas pipeline. In 1970, Iran started the export of large quantities of natural gas to the Soviet Union (353 million cubic feet per year). There were plans for increasing these exports and for relaying them to Western Europe via the Soviet Union. Under a 1967 agreement, Iran and the Soviet Union agreed to exchange some $540 million worth of goods in five years.

Despite these positive developments in the Soviet-Iranian relationship, Moscow continued to criticize the Shah's dependence on the West. The Soviet Union and its allies used a variety of means, including favorable propaganda, official invitations and financial assistance to support members of the Tudeh Party. However, while Iran perceived a Soviet military threat, the Shah did not have a clear conception of how such a threat might materialize. He seemed at times to believe that the Soviets wanted to take over Iran directly. At other times, he talked of the Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf through Iraq. He and his advisors discussed Iran's encirclement by pro-Soviet regimes and/or Soviet-inspired local wars, such as the Dhofar insurgency in Oman and the Baluchistan secessionist movement.

Similar relations endured between Moscow and Tehran into the 1970s. While trade continued, the Soviets tried to push Iran to leave CENTO and join the Soviet-proposed Asian Security plan. They also criticized Iran's support of the Kurdish movement in Iraq (the pressure included military maneuvers near the Iranian-Soviet border), objected to Iranian policies in the Persian Gulf (especially the presence of Iranian forces in Oman), and criticized the Iranian military buildup, especially after the increase in oil revenues in 1973-74. The Soviets supported the price rise and the Arab oil embargo, but argued that the Shah's pattern of expenditure made the country more dependent on the West. The Shah in turn criticized the Soviets indirectly. He expressed concern about the "expansion of international communism" and rejected Soviet objections regarding Iran's military buildup. He also sought to decrease the dependence of countries such as Afghanistan on the Soviet Union, helped Pakistan, and promised to aid the anti-Soviet forces in the Gulf area.

Based on Soviet statements during the revolution in Iran, the Soviets did not stand behind the Shah as some have claimed.[30] There is much evidence that they consciously attempted to deepen the crisis, to the detriment of the United States and the Shah. Already in September, 1978, they blamed the Iranian crisis on the "American plundering" of Iran.[31] In October, they condemned the Shah for his "pro-imperialist" policies and accused the United States of interfering in Iran's internal affairs.[32] The United States was charged with sending forces to the Sea of Oman: "The aim behind these exercises is completely clear and self-evident; by this means they [the Americans] wish to bring pressure on the Iranian people."[33] The Soviets asserted that "imperialist puppets" in Iran (i.e., the Shah) had put the country under American control,[34] and had made Iran a vehicle of U.S. "imperialist policies" in the region. In order to agitate the Iranians against the United States, on many occasions in their Persian broadcasts to Iran, the Soviets reminded Iranians that the weapons which were being used against them were American,[35] that the Americans were their real enemy, and that the American ships were nearby in the Gulf with the goal of stopping the success of the revolution.[36] They accused the United States of treating Iran like a colony and of not recognizing the right of Iranians to choose their own government.[37] The Iranians were also assured that the Soviets had bluntly warned Washington against military intervention in Iran. Finally, Moscow argued that "any interference in the affairs of Iran . . . would be regarded by the U.S.S.R. as a matter affecting its security interests."

The Soviets also encouraged the oil workers, some of whom for a long time had been sympathetic to Tudeh, to continue their strike. They urged

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30. *Financial Times*, November 6, 1978. Yahya Armajani, in an article entitled "What the U.S. Needs to Know about Iran" in *Worldview*, May 1979, argued that the Soviet Union most likely did not agitate against the Shah. Ian Greig, in his article, "Iran and the Lengthening Soviet Shadow," published in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1979, referred to a "seeming reluctance on the part of the Soviet government to use its overt propaganda weapons such as broadcasting and official publications for the sort of attacks upon the Shah and his government that might have been expected once the situation started to escalate."

31. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), *Summary of World Broadcast, the U.S.S.R.*, September 29, 1978.

32. *Ibid.*, October 10, 1978.

33. *Ibid.*, "Moscow in Persia," December 19, 1978.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*, January 12, 1979.

36. *Ibid.*, "U.S. interference was acquiring a more blatant and overt character," January 10, 1979.

37. *Ibid.*, "The U.S. is treating Iran not as a sovereign state but as its own ancestral land," January 5, 1979 and January 9, 1979.

the Tudeh Party to join a coalition with other political opposition forces in Iran. Tudeh publications praised Khomeini and the religious movement, calling them "revolutionary" and "friends" of the oppressed people.[38] The Tudeh argued that Marx and Lenin were not against religion and that a broad coalition, including Communists and Islamic groups, was "the only guarantee" for success. Soviet broadcasts praised Khomeini as well. Like Khomeini, they argued that "Israeli soldiers were in Tehran" and were fighting for the decadent Shah.[39] Khomeini's opposition to CENTO was particularly praised. CENTO was constantly referred to as an instrument for interfering in Iran's domestic affairs. The members of the treaty, including Pakistan, were accused of planning joint military intervention in Iran.

As the domestic troubles in Iran continued, there were reports of the transfer of arms for Tudeh groups from Afghanistan. Given the nature of the Afghan-Soviet relationship, the Soviets were unlikely to have been unaware of the significance of such transfers. With Moscow's encouragement, the now ruling Khalq Party in Afghanistan and the Tudeh Party in Iran have been cooperating with each other since the early 1960s. There have also been reports of political and military camps in Afghanistan for training Tudeh members.[40] Once Khomeini had come to power, the Soviets praised the new regime, particularly its decision to withdraw from CENTO and to remove U.S. monitoring posts.

AFGHANISTAN

After the initial arms deal was signed in 1956, Soviet policy in Afghanistan was the most successful of all the Soviet attempts to befriend the Northern Tier countries. For the past two decades, Afghanistan claimed a policy of nonalignment but often with a slight pro-Soviet tilt. Kabul depended almost entirely on Soviet military equipment and training, gave exclusive exploration rights for oil and gas in the northern parts of the country, and sold natural gas to the Soviets below the international prices. The Soviets, in turn, went to lengths to maintain good relations. King Zahir Shah was called a "wise and progressive" ruler. But when he was overthrown by Mohammad Daud in 1973, with backing by pro-Soviet leftists, the Soviets hailed "the Afghan

38. *Dunia*, a Tudeh Party publication in Persian, No. 6–7, 1357.
39. BBC, *SWB, U.S.S.R.*, December 23, 1978.
40. Robert Moss, "Who is Meddling in Iran," *The New Republic*, December 21, 1978. There have been reports of large purchases of Iranian currency by the Soviets in European markets for use in Iran. George Lenczowski, "The Arc of Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1979.

revolution." The Soviets then encouraged the other Northern Tier countries to follow the model of Afghanistan in their relations with Moscow. While calling relations between the two countries exemplary, the Soviets and their allies, such as the Iranian Tudeh Party, provided organizational and financial support to Afghanistan's People's Democratic Party (PDP).

The 1973 coup might have been encouraged by the Soviets, because of their displeasure with King Zahir Shah's lack of enthusiasm for the Soviet Asian collective security plan and his treatment of the PDP's two splinter groups, Khalq and Percham. It is unlikely that these two groups would have participated in the coup without seeking Soviet advice and/or approval. Percham and Khalq might have also supported Daud, believing that he would remain a figurehead, like Nagib in Egypt, and could subsequently easily be gotten rid of. After the coup, the new Afghan government expressed support for the Soviet collective security plan. But later, once in full control of the country, President Daud, with encouragement from the Shah of Iran, weakened Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union and broke alliances with the leftists at home, demanding the dissolution of their organization. By 1976, Daud had improved relations considerably with Iran and Pakistan.

Reportedly, as Daud's policies were changing, Percham and Khalq formed a unified front to overthrow his regime. There is speculation about the possible role of the Soviet Union in bringing the two groups together. One report claims that this reconciliation took place in New Delhi with the help of the Communist Party of India[41] Given the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the Khalq and Percham, the possible risks to Afghan-Soviet relations if their challenge to Daud's regime failed, the high degree of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan's armed forces, and the presence of a well-developed Soviet intelligence outfit in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that these two groups would have combined to attempt a military coup without Soviet knowledge and perhaps consent.

After overthrowing Daud, the Khalq-Percham coalition began to fall apart, resulting in the elimination of Perchami leaders from high echelons of government. Once in control of Afghanistan, the Khalqi regime began a number of fundamental changes in the country's domestic and foreign relations. Improving relations with the Soviet Union has been one of their major foreign policy goals. It has already signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which calls for the development of "all-around cooperation" be-

41. *Ibid.*

tween them, including consultation and the introduction of "appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries," and for the development of "cooperation in the military field." In addition, a number of other cooperation agreements have been signed with the Soviets and their allies covering a variety of fields including national security, training, trade and culture. This intensification of relations is illustrated in statements by Khalqi leaders and by the state of Afghan relations with other countries. The new regime has been the most loyal supporter of Soviet third world allies such as Ethiopia, Angola, Vietnam, and North Korea. It was one of the first to recognize the new regime in Cambodia, and it has announced the end of diplomatic relations with South Korea.[42]

Prognosis for Superpower Competition

While there has been a significant improvement in the Soviet position in the Northern Tier, there has been a long-term deterioration in U.S. and allied positions in the region. One dramatic change in favor of the Soviets has been in the area of comparative capability for power projection, i.e., the ability to lift material and personnel to the countries of the area and keep them supplied. While Soviet capability to project power to a point equally distant from the United States and the Soviet Union is inferior to the American capacity (as a forthcoming study by Pan Heuristics illustrates[43]), this is not the case in the Northern Tier and the Persian Gulf, as is often assumed by authors such as Robert Legvold,[44] John Collins[45] and the International Institute of Strategic Studies.[46] The Northern Tier and the Persian Gulf are of course much closer to the Soviets. And infrastructural changes in the countries of this region have favored the Soviets in their power-projecting capabilities. While in the 1950s, the Northern Tier was a barrier to Soviet overflights,

42. According to reports, when Premier Amin was asked just where Afghanistan differed from East European countries such as Bulgaria, he retorted: "We are not a member of the Warsaw Pact."
43. For a detailed study of the changes in the relative U.S.-Soviet capabilities to project power in the Northern Tier and the Persian Gulf see, *Interests and Power in the Persian Gulf*, op. cit.
44. Robert Legvold, "The Super Rivals: Conflict in the Third World," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1979, pp. 755–778.
45. John Collins, *American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1978.
46. IISS, *Strategic Survey*, 1978, London: IISS, 1979, p. 12.

because of domestic political changes and crises, Moscow has made substantial use of the airspace of Turkey and Iran, as it did during the 1973 War in the Middle East and the 1978 Ethiopian-Somali conflict.

The relative decline in the U.S. capability to project power to the area has also been accompanied by an inability of policy makers and establishment academia to fully understand the dynamics of societies undergoing rapid change, of which the countries in and near the Northern Tier provide an excellent example. This analytic inability has led to failures in predicting and preparing for political developments that could otherwise have been influenced.

Approaching other regions of the world with political and economic development models based on experience in the West, rather than the realities of the third world countries themselves, has tended to blind theoreticians and policy makers alike to potential domestic and regional developments in the Northern Tier.[47] As CIA Director Stansfield Turner has pointed out in the case of Iran, no one—academics, journalists, intelligence agencies or politicians—had foreseen, even in broad terms, the depths of the popular dissatisfaction and the scope of the religious revivalist movement in Iran. The crisis in U.S. foreign policy toward third world countries such as those of the Northern Tier has been compounded by a lack of adequate information about the ideological predisposition and popular appeal of the various groups contending for power. For example, in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Daud regime, Washington was puzzled about the political identity of the group that came to power. Even the coup itself came as a complete surprise to the State Department, as illustrated by the statement of Adolph Dubs, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in March of 1978: "Internally, the political situation is stable (in Afghanistan). President Daud remains very much in control and faces no significant opposition." This statement was reproduced in the *Department of State Bulletin* in May, after Daud had already been overthrown.[48]

Although the tensions inherent in the process of modernization have pro-

47. For an analysis of Khomeini's revolution in Iran, and the inadequacies of the prevalent theories of political and economic development see, Zalmay Khalilzad and Cheryl Benard, "Secularization, Industrialization and Khomeini's Islamic Republic, *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 1979.

48. Reportedly, once further information about the coup became available, the State Department ordered the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to "not apply the Communist label in its political analysis of the regime." *The Wall Street Journal*, March 22, 1979, p. 12.

80-154 O - 82 - 9

duced some groups that are ideologically sympathetic to the United States, these groups are doubtful about U.S. ability and resolve to assist them economically, politically and militarily in a credible and systematic fashion. The signals they often receive from Washington are contradictory, incoherent and confusing. In the case of some of the countries in the region, U.S. policy becomes self-defeating, even incomprehensible; Washington chooses non-involvement in countries whose developments are potentially crucial to regional interests, drawing upon itself the disillusionment of sympathetic forces that had hoped for U.S. support. Washington also alienates allies by thoughtless diplomatic slights and miscalculated sanctions, by excessive punitive responses, or by a fatal neglect. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, U.S. policy has consistently been one of neglect combined with some economic aid. Dating back to the U.S. rejection of Afghan alliance requests in the 1950s, American evaluations of the importance of the country have changed without a corresponding change of policy. When the American Ambassador to Kabul was killed, U.S. economic aid was substantially reduced. This both increased the hostility of the regime and increased its dependence on the Soviet Union. But alienation of the ruling group was not accompanied by U.S. support for any of the opposition groups.

While Moscow either directly or indirectly has scored major victories in the Northern Tier, it is unlikely to remain satisfied with these achievements. As in the past, the Soviets are likely to employ a variety of means to further extend their influence in the region. Continuous domestic and regional conflicts in the area might provide the Soviets with further opportunities. The present domestic instabilities in Iran, for example, could result in the takeover of either the country as a whole or parts of it by forces more sympathetic to the Soviet Union than the present ones. At the moment, the dominant political force in the country is the religious movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini, which controls large parts of Iran through a network of more than 1,500 committees. Khomeini, while hostile to the West, has no sympathies for the Soviet Union either. Another power group whose domination of Iran would bring the country closer to the Soviet Union is the Marxist Fedayeen, which has the support of some 10,000 armed guerrillas. The third potential contender for power is another guerrilla group called the Mujahedeen, which follows an eclectic ideology, drawing on Marxism and Islam, and is less hostile to the Soviet Union than Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalists. Fourth, a particular security problem for Iran stems from the multiplicity of armed ethnic minorities which could conceivably receive Soviet encouragement and

support. Fifth, the Tudeh Party, which has support in critical areas such as the oil facilities, is also challenging the Khomeini regime. For the Soviets, the success of this group would be the optimal outcome. There are still other groups including Westernized moderates in the National Front who favor a social democratic system and have the support of a large number of technocrats, but which lack the military capability to challenge the current regime.

Looking at Turkey, the Soviets would like to get it to follow a policy of *de facto* nonalignment and ultimately to leave NATO. They are likely to promise increased economic aid to Turkey's ailing economy and renewed their offer of military aid to further weaken its ties to the West. To increase pressure on Ankara, Soviet leaders might also increase support for ideologically sympathetic groups and some ethnic minorities such as the Kurds. Soviet policy towards Turkey has already had some measure of success as is evidenced by the Turkish decision to allow American U-2 flights for SALT II verification only if the Soviets went along with such an arrangement.

In the case of Pakistan, Soviet policy is initially likely to be aimed at persuading Pakistan to decrease its aid to Afghan opponents of the Khalqi regime. In order to achieve both this short-term purpose and the long-term goal of extending its influence to the whole or part of the country, the Soviets may offer support to a variety of ideological and ethnic groups in Pakistan. Pakistan's most persistent problem has been the existence of separatist tendencies. The problem continues to exist in at least two of its four provinces (Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan), where secessionist movements have had intermittent support from Afghanistan. With the emergence of a pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Afghanistan, Afghan support for secessionists, particularly in Baluchistan, has acquired a new dimension.[49] The control of Baluchistan, which is located on the Arabian Sea, by a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul would extend Soviet influence to a vital area. Direct Soviet access to this sea would greatly improve its capacity to interdict oil transports.

In case of future ideologically-motivated civil war and especially in the case of a war between Baluch secessionists and the Pakistan armed forces, the Afghans might intervene, either alone or in conjunction with the Soviet Union. Correspondingly, Pakistan is permitting opponents of the Afghan regime to use its territory as a base, and is giving them an indeterminate amount of material support. If the Afghan government succeeds in contain-

49. For a detailed discussion of the Baluchistan problems, see Hannah Negaran, "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *ORBIS*, Spring 1979, pp. 93–113.

ing its domestic opponents—or chooses to caution or even punish Pakistan—Kabul may increase support to Baluch secessionists. There is some evidence, based on the speeches of Afghan government leaders, that such threats have already been given to Pakistan.[50] Whether the Afghan government carries out these threats depends both on its ability to win the ongoing civil war in the country, and on Soviet policies. At present, given the dimensions of the domestic conflict, including the reported disintegration of part of the Afghan armed forces, Kabul can hardly spare any forces to assist, in any substantial way, the Baluchs in Pakistan.[51]

The continued success of Soviet foreign policy in the Northern Tier is not however inevitable. Domestic as well as regional developments provide risks and opportunities for both superpowers. Whether the Soviets are successful in taking advantage of instabilities in the third world depends not only on the nature of the particular crisis, but also on Soviet capabilities and policies, as well as on those of the United States. In the past few years Washington has not been successful in developing a system of adequate response to conflicts in the Northern Tier, especially in taking advantage of Soviet difficulties and in preventing the erosion of the U.S. position. Local nationalism, Islam (especially in its fundamentalist variant as is dominant in Iran and Pakistan and among opponents of the Kabul regime), opposition to Marxist types of social reform, and resentment of foreign domination are all likely to prove major impediments to permanent extension of Soviet influence southward. These problems are already in evidence in Afghanistan. For reasons including the regime's ideological predisposition and the links with the Soviet Union, groups such as religious reformists, Muslim fundamentalists, social democrats, pro-Chinese Marxists, tribal autonomists, and Afghan nationalists have initiated a civil war. At present, the outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan is in doubt.

There have been many speculations that the Soviets might suffer a defeat in Afghanistan similar to what the United States experienced in Vietnam.[52] While this might happen, there are major differences to observe between these two cases. One of the major reasons for the U.S. defeat was the large

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50. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, *South Asia*, June 27, 1979, pp. 5–8 and June 13, 1979, pp. 4–5. Also, Henry S. Bradsher, "Afghans Threaten to Stir Rebellion Against Pakistan," *The Washington Star*, April 25, 1979, p. 5.
51. For a detailed discussion of the balance of military forces near Baluchistan see, Hannah Negaran, "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," op. cit.
52. *Ibid.*

scale support for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong by the Soviet Union and China. The Afghan opposition has no comparable support from the United States. Without major external constraints, Moscow is likely to retain considerable power to affect the outcome of the Afghan civil war and to play a major role in influencing the evolution of the Afghan government, even if it decides to abandon the present Khalqi leaders.

Conclusions

The Soviet Union, like imperial Russia, has been following a policy of slow but certain penetration of the Northern Tier countries. The Soviets, however, are depending more on indirect methods. Rather than making territorial demands and dispatching their armed forces to annex territories, they support various political groups and governments to weaken ties with the West and to extend Soviet influence southward. Soviet policy towards the governments and political groups in the Northern Tier has been largely determined by the state of their relations with the West and with China. Support of minority ethnic groups by Moscow illustrates this point. Whether and how much such movements are supported is largely determined by the state of Soviet relations with the central government in question. During the 1950s, when Iraq was part of CENTO, for example, the Soviets supported the Iraqi Kurds against Baghdad. After the 1958 coup, when Iraq left the pact and followed a foreign policy more sympathetic to the Soviet Union however, the Soviets helped the reformed Iraqi regime in its struggle against the Kurds. And Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO, by contrast to Afghanistan's adoption of "nonalignment," led the Soviets to support Afghan claims on ethnic Baluch and Pashtuns in Pakistan.[53]

The United States has been experiencing increasing difficulties in affecting developments in the Northern Tier. These difficulties are due to a crisis in policy that is occurring on many levels. Washington's relative capability to

53. Soviet policies toward the Northern Tier countries exhibit a hierarchy of preference in which the pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist groups and governments take the first place followed by (in order) groups nonaligned but sympathetic to the Soviet Union; groups nonaligned but hostile to the West (or China); groups nonaligned but hostile to the West as well as the Soviets (or China); groups nonaligend but sympathetic to the West (or China); groups aligned with the West. The Soviets supported Khomeini against the Shah because the former advócated policies that were hostile to the West, while the latter was clearly allied with the United States and was flirting with China. The above ideal-typical preference schedule is at times tactically modified by demands of *real politik* without the abandonment of ultimate preferred goals.

project military power in the region has declined in some critical areas, and Western alliances in the region have either disintegrated (CENTO) or are facing serious problems (U.S.-Turkish relations). Analytic deficiencies in understanding and predicting possible directions of change (as demonstrated in Iran) have hampered American policies and at times made them seriously counterproductive (as in Turkey). Contributing to this lack of analytic clarity has been the absence of reliable information concerning the strength, ideological predisposition, popular appeal, and domestic and regional links of the groups contending for political control (as in Iran and Afghanistan). Here the U.S. focus on stability has often worked to the detriment of an effective policy; concern with maintaining existing, superficially stable political systems has caused a suppression in the perception of and policy toward social changes. The result has been an alignment with those nominally in power at the cost of lost opportunities in regard to alternative political actors and currents. Lack of a coherent, decisive, and informed U.S. policy, having enough flexibility to include the range of contingencies in such a politically unstable region, in addition to a decline in relative U.S. military capability to project power, have now brought about a credibility crisis of the U.S. in the region. It is a problem that must be faced and taken into account in any future policy formation. In the case of Iran, the United States was manifestly unprepared for events and was caught both unable and unwilling to take any definitive measures; that has undeniably been a warning to other groups potentially inclined towards U.S. alliances and security guarantees. The less the United States affects events, either overtly or clandestinely, the less sympathetic governments and groups are likely to expose themselves to risks that might serve American interests. This reluctance in turn further reduces U.S. ability to influence the direction of change and encourages hostile governments and political groups to act in defiance.

The position taken recently by some decisionmakers and analysts[54] in response to Afghanistan's alignment with the Soviets, Pakistan's and Iran's nonalignment, and improved relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, is reminiscent of a geopolitical school of thought which believes that it is only natural for countries close to another superpower to affiliate with it, accommodate it, or to at least remain militarily neutral.[55] Arguing within

54. Even some members of Congress have recently shown an inclination to this view. For details see, *Interests and Power in the Persian Gulf*, op. cit.
55. Selig Harrison, "The Shah, Not Kremlin, Touched Off Afghan Coup," *The Washington Post*, Sunday, May 13, 1979, p. C1.

this framework, some authors have advised Washington not to assist the opposition to the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, since even if the opposition came to power it would have to follow a policy of "Soviet-tilted neutralism," and that Washington's support of the opposition might provoke the Soviets into retaliatory expansion in Pakistan and Iran.[56] The dubious premise of this argument is that if allowed to "keep" Afghanistan, the Soviet Union will be satisfied—a line of thinking that has not become more cogent since it produced the idea of "satisfying" Hitler by allowing a certain amount of territorial expansionism into contiguous states. Such hopes are also contradicted by past Soviet policies toward the other countries in the region. In fact, U.S. acquiescence to each additional Soviet gain is likely to encourage further expansionism, and might lead to a large-scale conflict between the superpowers by a Soviet miscalculation that the U.S. will not risk a military confrontation somewhere further down the line. In any case, the idea that influence and power naturally decline geographically has many shortcomings. Japan and Europe are both within the "Soviet sphere" geographically speaking, and yet they are close American allies, while Cuba, in this simplistic division of the world, should at best be a U.S. ally and at worst follow a policy of "American tilted neutralism."

Developing a better understanding of the domestic and regional political dynamics, providing aid (either directly or indirectly) to sympathetic groups, taking advantage of Soviet difficulties, and maintaining a reliable capability to help friendly powers are all essentials if the United States is to reverse its loosening grip in this pivotal region.

While various levels of capability are required for influencing distant events, in some cases the United States and its allies could affect developments in the Northern Tier with a minimum of expenditure. Afghanistan offers a good example. By supporting sympathetic groups within the Afghan opposition, Washington could well affect the outcome of the civil war and influence the ideological direction of opposition groups, encouraging moderate and politically liberal tendencies. Given the popular nature of the opposition, the quantity and quality of aid required is likely to be insubstantial and the degree of U.S. involvement would remain minimal. The United States nevertheless stands to potentially gain a great deal by a change of

56. *Ibid.*, For a discussion of Pakistan's nuclear program, and possible U.S. responses, see, Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan and the Bomb: The Program, the Incentives, and the Lessons," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December, 1979.

regime. If the present Afghan regime is replaced by a group friendlier to the United States, it is possible that the new government might agree to allow American ground stations on its soil for purposes of SALT verification. The defeat of the pro-Soviet regime would also decrease Soviet capability for pressuring Iran and Pakistan, and might deal a severe blow to Soviet alliance relationships as Vietnam did to those of the United States. Even if the civil war continues, increased Soviet involvement in Afghanistan will reduce Soviet capabilities for involvement elsewhere.

In Iran, too, U.S. resignation is not an adequate response. Iran remains a fragmented polity, a condition exacerbated by the recent mobilization of wider segments of the population and by the experience that even a powerful regime such as that of the Shah can be toppled. In the continuing clashes between ethnic groups, leftists, and religious groups, there are a number of opportunities for the United States. Given the tenuous conditions under which he rules his new Islamic Republic, Khomeini himself may be induced to seek closer relations with the United States. A number of factors could affect such a decision, including the threat posed by Soviet expansionist aims, Khomeini's domestic squabbles with pro-Soviet oppositionists and a variety of ethnic and ideological groups, as well as his support of the Afghan opposition. In Iran, as in other countries of the region, the United States needs to develop a range of responses to a variety of outcomes. Washington cannot afford to be caught by surprise or to stake everything on a single arrangement which might not be reliable.

The Vietnam experience made many Americans correctly suspicious of indiscriminate large scale direct military involvement in third world crises. However, the consequences drawn from the Vietnam debacle were themselves indiscriminate; they affected the relative U.S. capability and willingness to develop the needed variety of responses to a broad range of potential developments in the third world. A hierarchy of preferences in terms of levels and forms of involvement, as well as a recognition of the changing importance of different regions to U.S. interests, has not yet been developed. American involvement in Vietnam was, at least partially, motivated by fear of a domino effect. Dominos, however, can also fall the other way. A Soviet failure in a region such as the Northern Tier—or an American success—could also have a domino effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor. We appreciate your testimony. Having just come from the area, would you describe how you perceive the area below Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, Baluchistan, Iran, and Pakistan? What is the feeling of the people in that area? Is there an independence movement of some sort in Baluschistan upon which the Soviets could capitalize?

This is what concerns me. None of us know what the true motivation of the Soviets is, though I accuse them face-to-face of having an intention to someday go through Baluchistan to get to the deep warmwater ports that they have long wanted. I said, any effort to cut off oil supplies of the free world would be viewed with grave concern, and that could mean war. I said, let there be no miscalculation about it. The lifeline of the free world goes through the Strait of Hormuz.

How do you visualize that? You have alluded to motivation here.

Mr. KHALILZAD. I think that the Soviet strategy toward Pakistan and Iran is multipronged. In the case of Pakistan, Moscow is bringing pressure to bear, both positive and negative, to get Islamabad to accommodate the Soviets in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the Soviets have offered Pakistan recognition of the long-disputed borderline between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Apparently, they also have offered Pakistan nuclear reactors if it would accommodate on Afghanistan.

On the negative side, Moscow has made some very threatening statements against Pakistan. However, as far as your specific question regarding the Baluch problem is concerned, I think it has been exaggerated. The Baluch are small in number, and are divided amongst themselves. There are many Baluchs who do not favor secession from Pakistan and would like to maintain their ties with the center in Pakistan. There are others who oppose Pakistan. It is possible that the Soviet Union would use the Baluchs to increase pressure on Pakistan.

So far, Senator, I do not see any evidence that Moscow is involved in a massive operation against Pakistanis in Baluchistan. Without massive Soviet involvement on the side of anti-center Baluchs, and with prudent policies by Islamabad and Teheran, the Baluch problem is manageable both for Pakistan and Iran. For the Soviets to move and aid the Baluchs in a massive way, they are likely to do it not because they love them, but because of larger considerations of a geostrategic nature. That would be a problem not only for the Pakistanis and the Iranians, but also for all of us.

In the case of Iran, I also observe that Soviet strategy is largely aimed at gaining more influence with the center. It seems that they have offered various types of assistance to the government in Teheran, including support with internal security. Moscow hopes to gain more influence in Iran by tying it economically, politically, and militarily to the Soviet Union. If an invasion of Iran occurs, it is likely to happen after a lot of small steps had been taken to bring Iran a lot closer to the Soviet Union.

At this point, it appears that the Soviets are not involved in a big way with the Baluch opposition. Broadly speaking, Soviet strategy aims at increasing Moscow's ability to influence the region and decrease that of the United States. Therefore, as I indicated at the end of my testimony, the United States needs a multipronged strat-

egy of its own, including the ability to meet the Soviet challenge on its own terms, to decrease Moscow's incentive to intervene in the region by increasing the risks to them from such interventions.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Klass, do you have a comment?

Ms. KLASS. I would like to add one point. In 1979, I was informed about an operation in northern Afghanistan around Mazari-Sharif in which approximately 40 Cuban instructors were training Baluchis for cadres for activities in Pakistan. Just a few weeks ago, I was told that several hundred Baluchis had been sent to East Germany for special training.

It seems to me that certainly the planning for the subversion of Pakistan or for the creation of problems there if they decide they want to push the button on that, is well advanced.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gouttierre, in your appendix, I notice that you have given quite a rundown on raw materials in Afghanistan. I had the impression that Afghanistan was a rather poor country, and that its resources were limited. I wonder if you would summarize some of the raw materials that potentially are there. Maybe motivation would be not only, as we have implied, moving on through Baluchistan, but also to develop the resources that they see, even though the Soviet Union has more vast sources. What potentially would they find in Afghanistan?

Mr GOUTTIERRE. One of the activities in which our center has been engaging is the production of a national physical atlas of Afghanistan. We always were of a mind, too, I think, until we started uncovering the information that we did, that Afghanistan was not as potentially wealthy in terms of natural resources as it appears to be.

In particular, we have been able to uncover a number of political pressures, et cetera, that have stimulated the Soviet Union, which seems to have a greater realization of potential wealth of Afhanistan than we did, and at an earlier stage.

Right now, it is our belief that Afghanistan has world class, as they are called, deposits of iron, perhaps the third richest in the world, world class deposits of chromium and copper. There is also the potential of uranium in the southwestern part of the country, near the Helmand River, as well as considerable deposits of a number of other things, and a real strong potential for hydrocarbons.

In a conversation with the foreign minister of Afghanistan prior to the coup in 1978, I was able to learn of the fact that although other countries had entered the highest bids on exploitation of the chromium and copper fields in Afghanistan, that those particular concessions were given to the Soviet Union because of the military pressures that came from the Soviet Union.

So, it appears that the Soviets were well aware of these things. By our estimation, Afghanistan is not as wealthy a country in terms of natural resources as is the State of Texas, but it certainly is in the same category as the State of Oklahoma might be in terms of its potential with regard to natural resources.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just been notified that the meeting I had to attend is not scheduled for 12 o'clock but at 11:45. This is to be in the Foreign Relations Committee room at the Capitol, and my presence is expected, so I will have to go over there.

May I suggest that the three of you come into our big conference room and have an informal discussion with members of our staff? Then we can divide up some of the questions which have not been answered today so that you can take them with you.

We very much appreciate your coming here for this hearing, and we would be very happy to chat with you in the back room.

There being no further business, this meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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APPENDIX

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, 1981

AFGHANISTAN

Amnesty International was concerned about the arrests of several hundred political detainees during the year and the executions of several former government officials following trial *in camera*. It was concerned that no steps were taken by the government to investigate human rights abuses such as torture and "disappearance" which many thousands of political prisoners suffered between April 1978 and December 1979 when the present government had promised. Amnesty International continued its investigations into the fate of the "disappeared" prisoners. Amnesty International's efforts were directed towards pressing the government to implement the recommendations for the effective protection of human rights which is set out in a March 1980 memorandum, and to adhere to the assurances which the President gave Amnesty International when its mission visited the country in February 1980.

On 10 December 1980, the government stated that it "aimed at ensuring the social, economic, cultural, political and civil rights of the people as set out in the covenants on human rights". However, it has taken no steps to ratify the two international covenants, a major recommendation of the March 1980 memorandum.

On 21 April 1980 the Revolutionary Council proclaimed the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), pending the adoption of a constitution. The Fundamental Principles proclaim the right " to lead a secure life" (Article 29, section 1), the right to express opinions freely and openly (Article 29, section 7), the right not to be arrested without a warrant or outside the provisions of law valid at the time of committing the offence, the right to be presumed innocent unless found guilty and the right to legal defence (Article 30). Article 54 provides for "Special Courts" to assess "specific cases according to law" and Article 56 proclaims that "Judges are entitled to assess cases independently". The same article permits trials *in camera:* the "circumstances under which cases shall be discussed *in camera* will be anticipated by law". Verdicts are final and executions have to be approved by the Revolutionary Council Presidium (Article 58). Amnesty International has no independent information on the application of the Fundamental Principles to political prisoners arrested and tried during the year.

In the week of 26 April 1980, demonstrators, mainly school pupils and students, protested in Kabul against the presence of Soviet troops in the country. Sixty students including six girls were reported to be among those shot in the ensuing violence. On 12 May 1980, Kabul radio reported that 620 people had been arrested in connection with these demonstrations and that 96 would be tried. Amnesty International wrote to President Babrak Karmal on 14 May 1980 to express its concern at the reports of the killings, urging the government to investigate the deaths and asking it to confirm the number arrested. It recalled the assurances it had received during its February 1980 mission that political trials "would be open to the public and to Amnesty International", and asked for confirmation that Amnesty International could attend their trials, and for notice of trial dates.

The government informed Amnesty International on 31 March 1980 that the majority of those arrested in connection with the February disturbances in Kabul had been released and that "those remaining in custody would stand a fair trial". However Amnesty International was not informed by the government of the trial dates nor did it receive other details requested.

The *Kabul New Times* of 8 July 1980 reported that the Special Revolutionary Tribunal had "prosecuted a number of people arrested on charges of legal offences ranging from undermining the gains of the Saur Revolution to damaging national independence and sovereignty". The government stated that they were charged with: "espionage, distribution of news and false statements, membership in treacherous groups" and "perfidious activities such as instigating the people to counter-

revolutionary actions such as the February 21 and 22 1980 incidents". The report specified the articles in the Criminal Procedures Law and the Criminal Law and added that "the accused were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment". A few others were apparently released "due to lack of incriminating evidence". On 29 July the Presidium of the DRA announced it had commuted the death sentences imposed by the Special Revolutionary Court on two of the accused—Shir Mohammad and Qorban Ali—to 15 years' imprisonment. Their trial had taken place "in public session", and the accused had participated in the 21 and 22 February disturbances "armed with weapons". Nine others—Barat Ali Jafari, Ali Jafar, Ain Ali, Haji Ali, Sayd Mohammad Bashir, Mohammad Daud Bakhtyari, Dad Mohammad, Khan Mohammad and Mohammad Musa—were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from five to 16 years.

Amnesty International cabled President Karmal on 1 August 1980 to express its concern that the prisoners had not been tried before an ordinary court nor granted the possibility of appeal to an independent tribunal as specified in Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The head of the Afghan mission to the United Nations (UN) told Amnesty International on 23 October 1980 that between 6,000 and 7,000 people had been arrested in connection with the April 1980 disturbances, of whom all but 60 or 70 had been released. The remainder were awaiting trial. Amnesty International has not received any further details.

On 8 June 1980 Kabul radio announced that 11 men had been executed. The government said they had been executed on charges including murder, mass killings, torture and "conspiracy against the government and the revolution". Ten were officials of the former government, including some prisoners Amnesty International had interviewed in February 1980. The government also executed Abdul Majid Khalakhani, a left-wing guerrilla leader known for his opposition to Soviet troops in Afghanistan. On 10 June 1980 Amnesty International wrote to President Karmal that it was deeply concerned about the 11 executions, adding that they appeared to violate the safeguards for open trial proclaimed in Article 56 of the Fundamental Principles of the DRA. The head of the Afghan mission to the UN told Amnesty International that among those executed were officials responsible for past human rights violations and confirmed that they had been tried *in camera*.

The government announced that three more officials of the previous government had been executed on 14 June 1980. Amnesty International cabled President Karmal on 19 June 1980 saying it was deeply concerned to learn of the further executions and urging the government to stop them immediately. The trial of these prisoners *in camera* by a Special Revolutionary Court contravened the assurances Amnesty International had received in February 1980. Amnesty International deeply regretted that the government had not informed it of the charges or the trial date. It also expressed concern that there had been no possibility of appealing to an independent tribunal. "The government's failure to adhere in these cases to the requirements of international law and to implement assurances given to Amnesty International is particularly disturbing as the trials resulted in the application of the death penalty".

On 2 August 1980 Amnesty International received a detailed reply to its cables of 10 and 19 June. The government said: "we hope that the time will come when the death penalty will be abolished in Afghanistan but at present the laws of the DRA, proceeding from realities of existing conditions provide for the death penalty". The government maintained that the trials had been held in accordance with Article 56 of the Fundamental Principles of the DRA and that "the trial in question was *in camera* for security reasons".

On 8 October 1980 Amnesty International replied in detail to President Karmal, clarified its position on political imprisonment and the death penalty, and reiterated its grave concern at not being allowed to attend the trials. It deplored the reported executions of four former government officials in late August 1980. It again called upon the President to halt further executions and attached a list of 35 names of former government officials held in Pule Charchi prison. There were no further reports of executions for several months but on 8 February 1981 Kabul radio announced that three members of the *Hezbi Islami* group which opposes the government had been sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court. On 12 February it reported that four members of the *Mujahiddin* (Islamic guerrilla fighters) had been sentenced to death and executed. That day Amnesty International cabled President Karmal and appealed to him to halt further executions. It stressed that it was opposed to executions of prisoners whether carried out by the government or by groups engaged in armed opposition to the government. Amnesty International has received a number of reports that prisoners taken by such groups have been execut-

ed. One report of 2 March 1981 stated that 14 Afghan soldiers and the nephew of a DRA government minister were executed by an Islamic resistance group, the *Harhat-e-inquilib-e-islami*, after "trial by Islamic tribunal".

Statistics published in the *Kabul New Times* between 16 March 1980 and 8 December 1980 showed that the government had announced the release of at least 4,231 prisoners whom it described as "political prisoners" or "persons deceived by the enemies". Reports of political arrests included the arrests of university students at Kabul University for alleged membership of the banned Muslim Brotherhood during the late summer, arrests of several former government officials and university professors in December 1980, and arrests of suspected Islamic guerrillas and dissident members of the government reported in February and March 1981.

On 13 August 1980 the government stated that it had freed several hundred prisoners including: 140 untried prisoners during Ramadan; 240 prisoners released from Herat in September; 136 political prisoners from Kandahar in late November 1980; 86 people accused of "political offences" on 27 December 1980; and on 27 April 1981, 706 political detainees "to mark the third anniversary of the Saur Revolution". Amnesty International welcomed these releases and asked President Karmal for details of the categories of political prisoners it had released and the place where they had been held. It urged the government to publish the names of the released political prisoners as recommended in the March 1980 memorandum. Amnesty International received no reply to these requests and government announcements of releases in the *Kabul New Times* remained unsubstantiated by details of individual political prisoners.

In February 1980 the government said that there were 41 political prisoners in Pule Charchi prison, and other official sources told Amnesty International that 91 political prisoners were "under investigation". On 12 April there were 385 political and security detainees in Pule Charchi prison according to a visiting delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Their number has reportedly further increased since then and international organizations have not been allowed to visit prisons holding political prisoners. Amnesty International was investigating several reports that political prisoners have been beaten during interrogation. Amnesty International has also received reports of political prisoners held in prisons in Jalalabad, Herat, Aibah in Samangan province, Kunduz, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Baghlan, Badghis, Mazar-e-Sharif and Jauzjan, but has been unable to obtain details on individual political prisoners.

Pursuing its statement to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights of May 1979, which had described a pattern of gross violations of human rights under the former government of President Amin, Amnesty International submitted supplementary information about human rights in Afghanistan on 30 May 1980. Amnesty International noted that the government had not fully investigated the whereabouts or fate of "disappeared" people. Amnesty International had submitted to the government a list of 450 people arrested before 27 December 1979, at least 100 of whom it believed to be among the "disappeared", but had not been given the details it requested. It had also urged the government to establish responsibility for past torture and "disappearances" and to ensure that those responsible were brought to justice. Amnesty International remained concerned that no systematic review of past human rights abuses appeared to have taken place and that former officials, named by authoritative sources as responsible, continued to hold official government positions.

According to a report from the ICRC the government had agreed that the ICRC and the Afghans Red Crescent should establish a tracing agency with a mandate which included the "search for missing persons". However since the summer of 1980 the authorities have opposed the establishment of such a tracing agency.

On 19 December 1980 Amnesty International supplied supplementary information to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights about human rights in Afghanistan, reiterating its deep concern that the government had not implemented its recommendations in respect of the thousands of "disappeared" and that their families continued to live in uncertainty about their fate, some believing their relatives were still alive and detained in Kabul's Pule Charchi prison and elsewhere.

[Amnesty International News Release, Jan. 7, 1982.]

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL URGES BOTH SIDES TO STOP EXECUTIONS OF PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN

Amnesty International appealed today (Thursday, January 7, 1982) to the Afghanistan government and to guerrillas fighting against it to halt executions of prisoners.

Issuing the public appeal, the worldwide human rights movement said it had sent a letter to Afghan President Babrak Karmal, citing reports by Kabul Radio of the execution of at least 16 political prisoners in 1981. The letter recalled that President Karmal had told an Amnesty International delegation in February 1980 that he was committed to abolition of the death penalty, and it urged him to halt such executions.

Amnesty International said it was also trying to make its message known to guerrilla groups, particularly an appeal to the Hezbi Islami group, not to execute three Soviet soldiers reported to have been captured. A news agency report had quoted guerrilla leaders as saying the three would probably be tried under Islamic law and executed.

Amnesty International expressed concern in its letter to President Karmal about persistent reports that such armed anti-government groups had put prisoners to death.

The letter noted that since May 1981, Kabul Radio had reported the execution by the authorities of at least 16 prisoners, including schoolteachers and government officials, who were charged with involvement in terrorist activities. Amnesty International, which opposes the death penalty under any circumstance, said there was no evidence that the minimum legal safeguards for fair trial set out in international law, including the right of appeal, had been observed in these cases.

The organization urged the release of everyone arrested for his or her political views or activities who had not used or advocated violence.

It welcomed reports that some political prisoners had been released but expressed concern at the arrest of hundreds of others in 1981, including some believed to be held for the peaceful exercise of human rights.

Amnesty International asked President Karmal to make public the reasons for the arrest of at least 500 political prisoners, most of them members of left-wing groups, reported to have been taken into custody since August, and to say where they were being held.

The letter cited press reports that more than 100 schoolgirls were arrested in Mazar E Sharif in November for demonstrating against the wearing of Western clothes, and it called for a government investigation.

Amnesty International reiterated an appeal made by its delegation in 1980 for an investigation by the government into the fate of at least 12,000 prisoners who "disappeared" under the previous administration before President Karmal took power.

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